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Abstract 
In the context of corporate governance, this thesis aims to further investigate the 
impact of corporate boards on the effectiveness of company governance. First, by 
investigates outside director activism behaviors which measured by their dissenting 
opinions, intended meeting absences and voluntary resignations, I find that the 
incidence of activism predicts a higher incidence of enforcement action against fraud, 
suggesting outside directors are playing a whistleblower role rather than a disciplinary 
role, and the activism signal is found to attract the attention of outside investors which 
strengthen the sensitivity between CEO turnover and regulatory enforcement actions. 
The findings support outside directors may not directly discipline manager behaviors 
but use their whistleblower role to attract public outrage to override CEO entrenchment. 
Second, this thesis studies the impact of corporate secretary tenure on governance 
quality. Results show that corporate secretary tenure is negatively associated with 
board meeting frequency, outside directors’ in-meeting dissent and the incidence of 
fraud and lawsuits, and the findings are robust by additional tests. The results support 
the notion that tenure of the corporate secretary is no longer a “humble clerk” and can 
significantly influence a firm’s governance quality. Third, this thesis examines 
whether director with additional directorships on the boards of firms that are 
shareholders of the original firm is good for shareholders’ wealth. To conduct the 
analysis, I use the percentage of board directors of a listed firm who have also taken 
an additional directorship on the board of its shareholders as a measure and named it 
as Shareholder Interlock Director Ratio (SIDR) and find the SIDR is positively 
correlated with the industry-adjusted ROA, and negatively correlated with both fraud 
and lawsuit, such results are robust by additional tests including taking alternative 
8 
measures of the SIDR, as well as the impact of the SIDR on tunneling behavior, outside 
director attendance and shareholder voting behaviors. These findings suggest the 
director interlock in shareholder’s board is good for providing better governance 
services. Overall, this thesis further advances the exploration on factors that affect 
corporate governance quality.  
  
  
9 
Chapter 1 Introduction1 
Within the literature stream of corporate governance, this thesis aims to further 
examine the impact of corporate board2 on firm governance effectiveness. Starting 
from three specific research niches, the thesis provides three contributions to the 
existing governance literature related to corporate boards. First, it contributes to the 
literature on outside directors3 by identifying their new role as whistleblowers. More 
specifically, I take the outside directors’ in-meeting activism, absence as well as 
resignation behaviors as the dissenter’s voice and examine its impact on corporate 
governance outcomes. Second, this thesis contributes to an emerging stream of 
literature on the impact of corporate secretaries on governance quality. Corporate 
secretaries are a group within the senior management team who are not board members 
but work very closely with the corporate board. This group of managers has received 
little attention in the area of corporate governance until only recently. This thesis aims 
to further confirm the importance of corporate secretaries to governance quality. Third, 
this thesis contributes to the literature on director interlock and multiple directorships 
by exploring a specific group of directors who take additional directorships on the 
boards of shareholding firms and examining how this affects shareholder value. To 
more specifically investigate and discuss the above niches, following on from the 
introduction, this thesis contains five more chapters with the following contents.  
                                                             
1 Reference List for Chapter 1 is combined with Chapter 2 
2 Chinese listed firms are required to hire two-tier board system (Dahya et al., 2002), but as Ran et al. 
(2015) shows, the supervisory board cannot provide adequate monitoring function, therefore to avoid 
confusions, the notion board in this thesis all refers to the management board. 
3 All the outside directors in China are required to independent from the company. Following the 
“Guidance on establishing the independent director mechanism”, the outside director in China is defined 
as a director who does not take other roles in the company and does not have any relationship with the 
company or its shareholders that may affect their independent judgment. 
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Chapter 2, entitled “Chinese Capital Markets and Governance: A Review”, 
briefly summarizes the development of the Chinese capital markets and provides a 
short review on the role of the corporate board, the functions that influence the 
effectiveness of the corporate board, and the reason why boards need to include outside 
directors. A brief conclusion and discussion of this research niche is also provided in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 3, entitled “Whistleblowing and Enforcement Actions against Fraud: 
The Role of Dissenters in Boardrooms”, investigates a new dimension in the study of 
outside directors by examining their activism, measured by their dissenting opinions 
expressed in board meetings, intended absences and voluntary resignations. I find that 
the activism predicts a higher incidence of regulatory enforcement against fraud, 
suggesting a whistleblower role rather than a disciplinary role being played by outside 
directors. Their activism is found to trigger the attention of outside investors, and in 
turn strengthens the sensitivity between CEO4 turnover and regulatory enforcement 
actions. The results are more pronounced among firms that are controlled by private 
shareholders and followed by more financial analysts. The findings suggest that 
outside directors could use public outrage to override CEO entrenchment. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by introducing and demonstrating the whistleblower role 
of outside directors. 
Chapter 4, entitled “Does Tenure Matter: The Role of the Corporate Secretary in 
Chinese Listed Firms”, studies the impact of corporate secretary 5  tenure on the 
                                                             
4  Based on the company law in China, the highest executive of management team is defined as 
“manager”, and often carries the title of general manager or CEO. To avoid confusion and to be 
consistent with the literature, only the CEO title is used in this thesis.  
5 The “corporate secretary” is also called the “board secretary” in China, and is sometimes called the 
“company secretary” in the U.K. Based on definitions presented in the regulatory documents of different 
countries, these titles all indicate the same position. Therefore, to maintain consistency, the term 
“corporate secretary“ is used in this thesis to represent this position.    
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governance quality of Chinese A-share listed firms. The results show that corporate 
secretary tenure is negatively associated with board meeting frequency, outside 
directors’ in-meeting dissent and the incidence of fraud and lawsuits. Key findings are 
robust to an array of additional tests, including propensity score matching, instrument 
variable analysis, and alternative measures of governance such as analyst coverage, 
modified auditor opinion, number of mutual fund shareholders, and the absence of 
outside directors from board meetings. Overall, these results support the conclusion 
that the experience of the corporate secretary can significantly influence a firm’s 
governance quality. In accordance with McNulty and Stewart (2015), the results 
confirm the importance of the corporate secretary in improving modern corporate 
governance outcomes and board processes. This chapter contributes to the literature 
by highlighting the importance of the corporate secretary for corporate governance 
quality. 
Chapter 5, entitled “Does Director Interlock with Shareholder Firms’ Boards 
Create Value? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms”, explores whether the directors 
of a company who take additional directorships on the boards of companies that are 
shareholders of the original company creates shareholder value. I develop a ratio called 
the “shareholder interlocked director ratio” (SIDR), which is calculated as the 
percentage of board directors of a listed company who have also taken additional 
directorships on the boards of its shareholders. The results show that the SIDR is 
positively correlated with the industry-adjusted return on assets and negatively 
correlated with both regulatory enforcement against fraud and the probability of being 
involved in a lawsuit. This result suggests that better governance quality could result 
from the interlock. Several additional tests are conducted, including instrumental 
variable analysis, propensity score matching, taking alternative measures of the SIDR, 
12 
as well as the impact of the SIDR on tunneling behavior, outside director attendance 
and shareholder voting behaviors; the results of these additional tests further support 
the main findings. This chapter also determines that a specific group of directors who 
taking multiple directorships in shareholder companies have a significant impact on 
governance quality. The contribution of this chapter to the literature is that it opens a 
new dimension of study regarding the influence of director interlock, and provides 
evidence for the importance of shareholder-director linkage on corporate governance 
quality. 
Chapter 6 presents a brief overview of this thesis and its conclusions. It 
summarizes the main findings and presents their implications, as well as several 
possible research topics for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Chinese Capital Markets and Governance: A Review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter of the thesis provides the institutional background of Chinese capital 
markets and a brief review of the literature on corporate boards. The origin of corporate 
board research is mainly based on either agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
or resource dependence theory (Emerson, 1964). Under these two theories, the role of 
the board is designed to be either monitoring, or providing resources and advice to, the 
management team. Despite strong theoretical support, empirical research provides 
mixed results regarding the effectiveness of corporate boards in one or both of these 
roles. To provide a solid foundation for the further exploration of corporate boards in 
this thesis, the following sections will first provide an overview of the institutional 
background of Chinese capital markets, and then review the role of corporate boards 
from both agency and resource dependence views. A summary of the major factors 
that affect board effectiveness will also be provided. In addition, since the existing 
literature advocates for outside directors as being a very important component of 
corporate boards, this chapter provides a separate review on why they are needed. The 
conclusion of this chapter will highlight the three research niches that will be covered 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. More detailed reviews of the specific literature on 
the different research questions will be provided separately in the following chapters. 
 
2.2. Institutional Background 
The Chinese stock market introduced its exchanges at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange was formally opened on December 19, 1990, and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange was launched about six months later on July 3,1991. Both 
14 
remain the major stock exchange institutions to this day. At the end of 2017, the total 
number of listed A-share companies was 3,485 and the total market value was 5,671 
billion RMB, making the Chinese stock market the second largest exchange in the 
world based on market value, behind the New York Stock Exchange6 (Jiang and Kim, 
2015). 
Two types of stocks are traded in these markets: A-share and B-share equities. The 
A-share stock is valued and traded in local currency for domestic investors, while the 
B-share stock is also valued in local currency but is traded in US dollars in the 
Shanghai Exchange and in HK dollars in the Shenzhen Exchange. Before 2011, only 
foreign investors could purchase B-share stocks, but the markets were opened up to 
domestic investors who held foreign currencies. 
 After a certain time in operation, a multilevel capital market was introduced. The 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened a small- and medium-sized enterprises market in 
2004 and a growth enterprise market in 2012 to enhance the exchange’s function as a 
funding source for small companies. In addition, the National Equities Exchange and 
Quotations Co., Ltd. (NEEQ) was officially established in 2012 and is now the largest 
over-the-counter (OTC) stock market in mainland China. 
As in many other emerging economies, China’s booming capital market 
development lacked adequate regulation and supervision (Allen et al., 2005). To 
protect the interests of shareholders, the Chinese government established the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1992 as a specialized regulatory 
institution, but it only officially obtained legal status as a regulator in 1998 when the 
Securities Law was enacted (Jiang and Kim, 2015). The commission is authorized to 
issue legal mandates to regulate market participants and is empowered to directly 
                                                             
6 Source: <2018 Chinese Capital Markets Investor Protection Status White Paper> 
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investigate fraud and enforce anti-fraud measures. Moreover, unlike in many 
developed countries, the CSRC is not only in charge of monitoring market activities 
but also intervenes heavily in the authorization of seasoned equity offerings and initial 
public offerings on the stock exchanges, in order to ensure the quality of listed 
companies, market liquidity, and other economic goals of the state. For example, as 
Jiang et al. (2017) reveal, the CSRC has temporarily suspended IPO approvals nine 
times for prolonged periods. For example, no IPO application was approved in 2013 
for the entire year. The CSRC is much more powerful than regulators in developed 
countries. Xiqing Gao, the former vice-president of the CSRC, has said that too much 
power in the hands of the CSRC has harmed its efforts to monitor market activities.7 
Regarding the development of the corporate governance system in China, despite 
its late start, once the CSRC was established, regulations to protect shareholder 
benefits were issued very quickly to implement the corresponding laws. The 
foundational requirement regarding corporate governance in the Chinese markets is 
the Listed Company Governance Code. The Code was published in 2002 and revised 
recently in 2018. There are ten chapters with 98 articles in the newly revised Code. 
The contents include the basic principle of governance, the operation of boards and 
shareholder meetings, the obligations and rights of executives, the incentive and 
restraint mechanism for executives, shareholder protection, restraints on controlling 
shareholders and related parties, guidelines on corporate social responsibility, and the 
requirement for information transparency. Developed over 16 years, the revised 
version contains more detailed information on how listed companies should practice 
good governance. Compared with the old version, the newly revised code has more 
                                                             
7 2016 NPC & CPPCC Henan sub-Group Interview Contents. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sz/2016-03-
06/doc-ifxqaffy3658829.shtml 
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requirements for dividend payments and information transparency, as well as for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), which further elaborates on and emphasizes the 
regulatory requirements for listed companies to benefit investors and society.  
Focusing on corporate boards in China, the CSRC’s laws and regulations on public 
companies specifically establish the basic requirements for corporate board formation 
and operation in listed companies. As Jiang and Kim (2015) show, the corporate board 
is still the most important component of the corporate governance structure in China. 
The Chinese company law requires companies to have two-tier boards—a supervisory 
board and a regular board. The supervisory board must have at least three supervisory 
directors, and the regular board cannot have more than 19 seats or less than five seats; 
the regular board is required to have at least two board meetings per year. According 
to the CSRC regulation, as of 2003, one-third of the corporate board membership of 
listed companies must consist of outside directors. The outside director must be 
independent of the company, which is similar to the requirement in most western 
countries. Moreover, to standardize the operation of corporate boards in listed 
companies, the CSRC and the stock exchanges have released several documents and 
regulations, such as Guidance on Rules of Corporate Board Meetings and Guidance 
on Listed Company Director Elections, to help companies establish and operate boards 
more effectively.  
2.3 The Role of the Corporate Board 
2.3.1 The Monitoring Role 
The monitoring function of the corporate board has been widely documented in the 
literature since the emergence of the modern corporate governance system (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Based on agency theory, due to 
diverging interests, managers may not always aim to maximize shareholder wealth. To 
17 
address such problems, the board should be designed to fulfill a monitoring mechanism, 
to discipline managers, and ensure shareholder benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Boyd, 1990; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Empirical research on the empire-building 
behaviors of executives (Rhoades, 1983) and executive pride (Roll, 1986) supports the 
existence of such problems.  
Regarding the factors that affect a board’s monitoring function, research has 
identified independence, capabilities, and busyness as possible factors. More 
specifically, as Dalton et al. (2007) show, independence from the management team is 
the most crucial characteristic for directors to make objective disciplining decisions. 
Both Beasley (1996) and Uzun et al. (2004) show that higher levels of independence 
of a corporate board will result in fewer instances of fraud in a company. Moreover, 
when there is enough independence, the directors are more able to help boards fulfill 
their monitoring function. The monitoring capability largely relies on the bargaining 
power the board holds with respect to the management team. Baldenius et al. (2014) 
show that the balance of power between CEO and shareholders will significantly affect 
the board’s monitoring effectiveness. Usman et al. (2018) find that more gender-
diverse boards will have less bargaining power with the CEO, which reduces the 
monitoring capability of the board. In addition, busyness is a crucial factor that affects 
director monitoring outcomes. Empirical research uses additional directorships to 
measure the busyness of a director. Mendez et al. (2015) show additional directorships 
reduce monitoring effectiveness in large companies due to higher workloads and 
greater time demands.  
While the board monitoring function has been documented to be an effective 
mechanism for protecting shareholder wealth, several researchers have argued that 
monitoring is not a one-size-fits-all function. Some argue that over-disciplining the 
18 
management team may also harm company value. Guldiken and SidkiDarendeli (2016) 
show that there is a U-shaped curvilinear relationship between the board monitoring 
function and a company’s research and development (R&D), which implies that too 
much monitoring may harm the company’s motivation to innovate. Faleye et al. (2011) 
show that more intensive board monitoring will diminish the board’s strategic advisory 
function and make the management team more myopic in its work. The results for 
company value suggest that a reduced strategic advisory function will outweigh the 
increased monitoring capability of the board. Moreover, Al Dah (2018) poses the 
question of whether a board should monitor or empower the CEO. This research again 
supports the notion that the board monitoring function is not a one-size-fits-all solution 
for corporate governance, which should prompt scholars to consider research based on 
other theories when looking at the role of the board and its effectiveness. 
 
2.3.2 The Resource Provision Role 
In addition to the monitoring role, resource dependence defines another role of 
corporate boards. Unlike agency theory, which considers the monitoring of the 
management team to be the board’s priority, resource dependence theory suggests that 
resource provision is more important for company operations. To some extent, this 
notion stems from stewardship theory, which contends that the management team 
should be stewards for the shareholders and board and be given appropriate incentives 
to perform this role. Therefore, the board of directors should support the managers by 
providing resources and advice.  
Regarding resource provision-related factors that affect corporate boards, existing 
research shows that directors’ knowledge gained from prior experience, their expertise, 
and their outside sourcing are all very important. On one hand, a director’s knowledge 
19 
and expertise enables him/her to provide advice to the management team. Guner et al. 
(2008) show that directors with financial expertise will help companies increase their 
funding sources. Harford and Schonlau (2013) show director post-acquisition 
experiences are important to a company’s acquisition activities. When a company has 
directors who have previously served in companies that have made acquisitions, there 
is a higher probability that the new company will make an acquisition in the near future. 
In terms of foreign experience, Iliev and Roth (2018) show that companies may learn 
the best corporate governance practices from board members with such experience. 
On the other hand, the directors’ resources also determine their resource provision 
capabilities. Such resources may come from past work experience or current external 
positions. For example, Huang et al. (2014) show that directors who have previously 
worked for investment banks may bring resources that help their current company 
make more profitable acquisitions. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that companies 
with directors hold more additional directorships earn more in acquisition deals. All 
these pieces of research support the idea that a well-resourced director could help the 
corporate board enhance its advisory and resource provision function. 
 
2.3.3 Combining the Resource Provision and Monitoring Roles 
The above sections have reviewed the role of the corporate board from the respective 
standpoints of agency and resource dependence theory. In most studies, scholars 
follow only one of these two distinct theories to conduct their research (Chen et al., 
2016). However, as Hillman and Dalziel (2003) show, in a real-world context, a single 
theory cannot fully capture the behaviors of a board. Directors will take on both roles 
in their routine activities, not only disciplining but also providing resources and 
knowledge to the management team. For example, the resource dependence theory’s 
20 
factors of expertise and knowledge are important to directors when performing the 
monitoring function (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). As Tian et al. (2011) show, if 
directors have more resources such as social capital and ties to the management team 
(rather than remaining independent), they should be able to better monitor 
management behaviors with the knowledge they have acquired. This view has also 
been supported by Kroll et al. (2008), who demonstrate that directors with more 
experience should be better able execute their monitoring function.  
In addition, since there is a trade-off between the independence and information-
giving capacity of a director, an effective board should balance the monitoring and 
resource provision functions. Drawing on both agency and resource dependence theory, 
Chen et al. (2016) show outside directors with greater human and social capital could 
increase the probability of the company’s international expansion. Pugliese et al. (2014) 
show that even though they are based on different theoretical backgrounds, a board’s 
monitoring and resource provision tasks tend to enhance each other. Ocasio and Joseph 
(2005) show that whether a board is involved in monitoring or resource provision 
depends on the specific conditions of different boards and companies. 
 
2.4. Features that Influence the Effectiveness of Corporate Boards 
2.4.1 Size – Does One Size Fit All? 
Board size has been widely studied in the literature, since it is the most observable 
feature of corporate boards (Yemack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Despite research 
arguing that an increase in board size may benefit a company in areas such as business 
diversification and growth (Boone et al., 2007), empirical results reveal a negative 
impact on board effectiveness. Yemack (1996) shows that, with an increase in board 
size, the board’s effect on company performance will diminish, a result that has been 
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empirically supported by Eisenberg et al. (1998). Research such as Graham and 
Narasimhan (2004) shows that when companies are facing depression conditions, 
those with smaller boards will have a higher probability to survive. Cheng (2008) 
demonstrates that companies with larger boards have lower variability in their 
accounting and market performance, as well as in other performance-related activities. 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) show a negative relationship between board size and 
performance for non-US companies that is significant in Singapore and Malaysia. 
Conyon and Peck (1998) demonstrate consistent results indicting this inverse 
relationship between board size and performance in most European countries. Guest 
(2008) shows that even though UK boards play (by design) more of an advisory than 
a monitoring role, there is still a strong, inverse relationship between board size and 
Tobin’s Q (a profitability measure), as well as the return on shares. Regarding these 
empirical findings, Coles et al.’s (2008) paper, “Boards: Does one size fit all?” 
provides a possible theoretical explanation for the optimal size of corporate board. 
 
2.4.2 Independence – The Higher the Better? 
Board independence, measured by proportion of outside directors on a board, is 
another important feature that has been widely researched in the literature as a symbol 
of board effectiveness. Theoretically, the appointment of more outside directors could 
align with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) regarding the monitoring 
function, and with resource dependence theory (Emerson, 1964) regarding outside 
resource provision. Such theoretical arguments have been well supported by empirical 
research that demonstrates a consistent negative relationship between the presence of 
outside directors and the incidence of corporate fraud (Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al., 2004; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). However, in terms of accounting performance, except for 
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the study by Pearce and Zahra (1992), research shows an insignificant or even negative 
relationship between outside directors and accounting performance (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Morck et al., 1988; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 
1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002). As stated by Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996), “Boards of directors seem to have too many outsiders. Since the 
composition of the board is determined internally, this finding is puzzling.” Consistent 
with this argument, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that board composition is 
actually endogenous to performance. It is argued that the outside directors may not be 
the reason for poor accounting performance, but rather that poor performance 
motivates companies to hire more outside directors to enhance governance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the results regarding the impact of outside directors on 
company accounting performance will be biased (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
 
2.4.3 Multiple Directorships – Busyness or Reputation? 
Director interlock or multiple directorships is another feature that could influence the 
effectiveness of corporate boards. As Booth and Deli (1996) argue, multiple 
directorships could help directors build bridges between companies, creating an 
avenue for bringing in outside resources and enhancing company value (Ferris et al., 
2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). Fama and Jensen (1983) show that additional 
directorships are an indicator of an outside director’s capabilities because a good 
service record will favor outside directors in the labor market, and they will therefore 
receive more job opportunities. Gilson (1990) demonstrates that when outside 
directors leave a financially distressed company, they will on average lose about one-
third of their additional directorships due to reputation damage. Brickley et al. (1999) 
find that the additional directorships held by outside directors are significantly related 
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to the performance of the companies they have served. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
find that when companies are involved in lawsuits, the outside directors will be more 
likely to lose additional directorships than their peers. All of this research supports the 
view that multiple directorships could be seen as a proxy for a director’s reputation. 
In contrast with the reputation and resource channel-building argument, another 
stream of literature contends that additional directorships are an indicator of busyness 
and inefficiency. That is, when directors have multiple directorships, their attention 
will be distracted, and their limited time allocated to more tasks, thus diminishing their 
effectiveness. Regarding this argument, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) state that 
“…outside directors are often inadequately prepared to participate in board discussions 
because their time and attention are divided and diluted by their other board 
appointments…”. This argument is further supported by Adams et al. (2010). 
Empirical research such as the study by Core et al. (1999) also supports this argument, 
showing that with more additional directorships held by board members, the CEO’s 
salary will be relatively higher, which may indicate that the board is less effective in 
its monitoring function. Consistent with Core et al. (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
show that when an outside director has more than three directorships, board 
effectiveness will be much lower in terms of CEO replacement as well as company 
performance. 
 
2.4.4 Expertise and Experience – The Importance of Director Professions 
As Rong (2012) shows, the resources and advice provided by the board to the 
management team largely dependent on the capabilities of the directors; the experience 
and expertise of the directors—especially the outside directors—is very important to 
the board resource provision function. This idea has been further supported by Adams 
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et al. (2010). However, the empirical research indicates that a director’s impact could 
vary according to their individual professions. For example, when directors have 
accounting and legal expertise, they can help with the operation of the company. 
Gilson (1990) shows that when directors have accounting and legal expertise they can 
provide valuable help to companies that facing legal and financial distress. Klein (1998) 
finds that an increase in the number of board members with an accounting background 
will help a company improve its financial performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) 
argue that lawyers on the board of directors help the company better understand the 
law and policies and to take advantage of such regulations. Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) 
show that bankers sitting on a board can help a company enhance its financial 
performance. Guner et al. (2008) show that when directors come from commercial 
banks, the external funding sources available to the company will be significantly 
increased, which could improve the company’s ability to raise capital. In contrast, 
when the directors are scholars, the research of Raheja (2005) and Clarke (2006) 
indicates that their appointment only meets legal requirements and reputation-building 
needs and has no direct impact on company value.  
 
2.4.5 Gender Diversity – Board Composition beyond Independence 
In addition to independence, the traditional measure of board composition, gender 
diversity has attracted a lot of attention in the literature over the past two decades. 
Research in the area of behavioral characteristics argues that there are significant and 
fundamental differences between women and men (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
Female directors are seen to have significant merits: research has found them to be 
more ethical, more independent, more risk-averse, less likely to be overconfident, and 
to have better communication skills (Beyer, 1990). With those advantages, female 
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directors are expected to help company boards perform better. Drawing on empirical 
findings, Liu (2018) demonstrates that when there are more female directors on the 
board, a company is less likely to be involved in behaviors that violate environmental 
regulations. Chen et al. (2016) show that with more female directors, a company is less 
likely to have internal control weaknesses. Adams and Ferreia (2009) indicate that 
women are more active in attending board meetings and taking roles in monitoring 
committees. Gul et al. (2013) reveal that with more female representation on the board, 
analyst forecast accuracy will be increased, which implies better transparency and 
monitoring qualities. However, also due to their nature, female directors will have less 
bargaining power than male directors, which will diminish the monitoring function. 
Usman et al. (2018) find that when more women are present on the board, the CEO’s 
power will be greater, suggesting that female directors are weaker monitors. 
 
2.5. A Crucial Component of Corporate Boards - Why Companies 
Need Outside Directors 
It is evident in the existing literature that outside directors play a crucial role in 
corporate boards. To better understand the contribution they make, in this section I 
review the major needs outside directors fulfill for companies, and the empirical 
support for these needs.  
 
2.5.1 Independent Monitoring Needs 
The first and foremost reason to appoint an outside director to a company’s board is to 
have better monitoring quality. As mentioned above, due to the agency problem 
between the shareholders and the management team, the board needs to perform a 
disciplining and monitoring function with regards to the managers. However, as 
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Douglas (1934) shows, since the director is also an agent for the shareholders, a 
conflict of interest may also exist on the board. Directors who are not independent 
from management may not be able properly represent the shareholders. As Dalton et 
al. (2007) state, “… [the] board of directors, as the stewards of the shareholders, would 
not be effective monitors of management if this relationship was tainted by self-
interest…”. This conflict of interest makes outside directors who are independent from 
the management team more desirable and reliable monitors than inside directors 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Walsh and Seward, 1990).   
Despite strong theoretical support, the empirical research presents mixed results. 
On one hand, the literature shows a positive relationship between outside director 
presence and stock prices (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), information transparency 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006), and higher dividend payments (Sharma, 2011). On the 
other hand, it has been demonstrated that outside directors have no impact on a 
company’s operational performance (Klein, 1998; Core et al., 1999), and even have a 
negative influence on shareholder value (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and 
Black, 2002). In the case of Enron, while 80% of its board consisted of well-known, 
outside directors, the company still experienced a huge scandal (Ghoshal, 2005). 
Therefore, the evidence on whether the monitoring function of a corporate board can 
be fulfilled by outside directors remains inconclusive.  
 
2.5.2 Outside Resource Needs 
The second type of need is partly drawn from resource dependence theory, which 
indicates that outside resources are another possible reason boards hire outside 
directors (Pfeffer, 1972; Jensen, 1993; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). 
Peng (2003) used China as a research sample to demonstrate that guanxi is the most 
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important factor driving business operations. Therefore, the resources provided by 
outside directors may sometimes be even more desirable for a corporate board than 
performing disciplinary tasks (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Peng (2004) also provides 
empirical support for this argument, and determined that outside directors are 
especially important when the market environment is uncertain.  
Drawing on empirical research, Haunschild and Beckman (1998) show that 
directors serving on other corporate boards could provide external financial and 
acquisition-related resources. Rindova (2010) shows that outside directors are better 
role at providing advice to managers than their peers due to their superior, externally 
sourced cognitive capabilities. Boyd (1990) shows that better-resourced outside 
directors are more necessary to companies facing environmental uncertainty and 
challenges. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) demonstrate that outside directors with 
connections to strategic companies could be better advisors to the management team. 
In addition, as Jensen (1993) shows, both agency theory and resource dependence 
theory explain the appointment of outside directors from the point of view of the 
company’s internal needs, either for monitoring or resourcing purposes.  
 
2.5.3. Legal Needs  
A corporate board may also need have outside directors to simply meet legal 
requirements, not just to promote shareholder wealth. In most developing and 
developed countries, there are specific regulations requiring a certain number of 
outside directors on the boards of listed companies (Peng, 2004; Dahya and McConnell, 
2007; Chizema and Kim, 2010). For example, since 2003 at least one-third of board 
seats have to be filled by outside directors in Chinese A-share listed companies (Peng, 
2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires companies listed on the NYSE and the 
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NASDAQ exchanges to have a majority of outside directors on their boards (Linck et 
al., 2009). The Cadbury Committee in the UK requires at least three outside directors 
for listed companies (Dahya et al., 2002a).  
However, empirical research does not fully support this view. Although work by 
Guest (2008) and Linck et al. (2009) show a significant increase in the number of 
outside directors after the 2002 enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, research by Peng (2004) 
shows that most outside directors in Chinese listed companies were appointed before 
the CSRC was established in 2001. Therefore, legal compliance pressure may be one 
factor motivating boards to increase the number or proportion of outside directors, but 
it is not likely to be the only reason.  
 
2.5.4. Normative Needs 
The final reason why companies may need to include outside directors on their 
corporate boards could be related to social conformity and normative needs. 
Organizational behavior theory indicates that coercive, mimetic, and normative 
motivation exerts pressure on social entities to act like others (Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983). According to this view, the presence of outside directors could be attributed to 
social norms and pressure on companies to follow societal trends (Peng, 2004). The 
study by Meyer and Rowan (1977) show that social entities always take the same steps 
as others in their group in order to maintain legitimacy. Eisenberg (1999) shows that 
the adoption of a monitoring model could be due to societal norms and that this norm 
will cause investors and other related parties (such as the media) to pressure companies 
to adopt better governance mechanisms, thereby creating the need for outside directors, 
regardless of their validity.  
29 
2.6 Review of Corporate Governance Literature in Chinese Capital 
Markets 
When narrowing down the literature review from the global context to China, it is clear 
that the existing literature on corporate governance has already much attention to 
Chinese markets in recent decades (Allen et al., 2005; Kato and Long, 2006; Habib 
and Jiang, 2015; Jiang and Kim, 2015). To better understand corporate governance in 
Chinese capital markets, this section provides a brief review of the important topics of 
corporate governance research in China from the perspectives of ownership, corporate 
boards, and the management team.  
 
2.6.1 The Impact of Ownership on Corporate Governance in China 
Research on the relationship between ownership and governance in Chinese 
companies has mostly focused on the impacts of the controlling shareholders, 
institutional investors, and state ownership.  
 Regarding controlling shareholders, as Jiang and Kim (2015) reveal, most of the 
companies listed in China have shareholders who control company operations. In 
addition, in most of these companies, the largest shareholder’s holdings far exceed the 
second largest shareholder (Liu, 2006). One group of research studies supports the 
notion that the existence of a controlling shareholder could enhance the quality of 
direct monitoring of the management team (Xu and Wang, 1999). However, as Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and Cao et al. (2019) show, countries such as China actually have 
more serious agency problems from owner-owner conflicts, and controlling 
shareholders may damage the interests of minority shareholders by fraudulent acts of 
expropriation (Liu and Lu, 2007). Scholars have demonstrated that compared with 
having a single, large shareholder, having multiple, large shareholders is more efficient 
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for Chinese companies and could help them achieve better performance (Fang et al., 
2018; Cao et al., 2019). Therefore, it is inconclusive as to whether the existence of a 
single, large shareholder can benefit corporate governance in China (Jiang and Kim, 
2015). 
 Regarding institutional investors, existing research indicates that both mutual 
funds and foreign institutional investors could help enhance company governance 
quality in Chinese capital markets (Yuan et al., 2008; Huang and Zhu, 2015; Aggarwal 
et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018). Liu et al. (2018) demonstrates that mutual funds and 
foreign investors could enhance the information transparency of Chinese listed 
companies. Yuan et al. (2008) and Huang and Zhu (2015) find that mutual funds could 
enhance company governance quality by offering extra monitoring functions. In this 
same vein, Aggarwal et al. (2014) reveal an inverse relationship between mutual fund 
ownership and fraudulent behavior in companies. Meng et al. (2018) show that the 
presence of foreign investors could increase the willingness of companies to appoint 
more outside directors to the board to improve the board’s monitoring capability.
 Regarding state ownership, the literature shows that it can produce both positive 
and negative impacts for governance quality and shareholder value. On one hand, 
empirical work, such as the study by Hou and Moore (2010), show that some degree 
of state ownership can reduce the probability of being subject to regulatory 
enforcement for fraud. Wang and Campbell (2012) demonstrate that with increased 
state ownership, the probability of a company being subject to in earnings management 
is lower. Liu and Sun (2010) provide evidence for a positive relationship between state 
ownership and voluntary disclosure, which implies that the state’s participation could 
enhance the transparency of company information. On the other hand, Kato and Long 
(2006) suggest that state-owned companies always pursue multiple goals rather than a 
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single, profit-oriented goal, and therefore, they sometimes ignore the task of 
maximizing shareholder value. Hovey et al. (2003) show that the level of state 
ownership in a company is negatively associated with the company’s accounting 
performance. Firth et al. (2011) reveal that listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
more likely to provide false information to the press. Wang and Wu (2011) find that 
state ownership has positive relationship with accounting restatements. 
 In addition to the proportion of state ownership, the tradability of state ownership 
has also attracted a lot of attention from scholars. In the early stages of capital market 
development in China when the state-owned enterprises went public, only a minor 
portion of the shares issued could be traded on the market. The state-owned shares 
cannot be traded, which raises the problem of company governance and stock trading 
speculation (Liao et al., 2014). To resolve this issue, the split-share structure reform 
was launched in 2005 to eliminate the dual-share structure problem, and most 
companies have done away with the trading restrictions on the shares that were 
originally non-tradable, thereby significantly improving the profitability of these 
companies. (Liu et al. 2014; Liao et al., 2014). The benefits of the split-share reform 
have also been demonstrated by Beltratti et al. (2012) and Gu et al. (2018). Beltratti et 
al. (2012) show that the split-share reform led to better market value and enhanced 
governance quality for small-cap, state-owned companies. Gu et al. (2018) contend 
that after the split-share structure reform, corporate decision-making and monitoring 
quality improved. In contrast, other research studies argue that the split-share reform 
may harm the interests of minority shareholders. As Wei and Xiao (2009) show, after 
the state’s shares are liquidated, the dividend payments ratio of these state-controlled 
companies drops. Moreover, Liu and Tian (2012) show that the split-share reform 
could affect the expropriation activities of enterprises where the state owns a 
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controlling share through the acquisition of excess debt from the listed companies. 
 
2.6.2 The Impact of Corporate Boards on Corporate Governance in China 
Regarding corporate boards, a notable difference between China and other major 
economies such as the U.S. or the U.K is that China has adopted a two-tier board 
system, where the listed company must also have a supervisory board with at least 
three members (Firth et al., 2007a). Unlike the study by Tusek et al. (2009) that prove 
the usefulness of supervisory boards in other countries, early empirical research 
focusing on the Chinese market has demonstrated that the supervisory board may not 
be able to function effectively (Ran et al., 2015). Research such as Dahya et al. (2002b) 
show that the supervisory board is not given enough power to discipline executives of 
listed Chinese companies, so it only plays an advisory role. Jia et al. (2009) show that 
the size and meeting frequency of supervisory boards have no positive impact on 
governance quality in Chinese companies. More recently, Ran et al. (2015) provide 
evidence supporting the view that certain characteristics of supervisory board 
members could enhance accounting information quality, which to some extent 
supports the usefulness of supervisory boards in China. 
 Apart from board structure, the outside director is another of the most frequently 
investigated components of corporate boards in Chinese companies, which in line with 
research focusing on developed economies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Adams et al. 
2010). However, few of the empirical research studies had results that confirmed the 
outside director’s effectiveness in China. Except for Chen et al. (2006) found a 
negative relationship between the presence of outside directors and fraudulent 
behavior, other research generally found no evidence to support the outside director’s 
effectiveness in Chinese markets. Empirical work by Li and Naughton (2007) 
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demonstrate that the outside director has no significant impact on company 
performance. Bai et al. (2004) also provide evidence that the presence of outside 
directors does not enhance shareholder value. Jiang and Kim (2015) support the notion 
that outside directors cannot function effectively in Chinese companies, given the 
evidence that most companies only maintain the minimum number of outside directors 
on their boards required by regulations. More recently, Meng et al. (2018) even find 
that the presence of outside directors has a negative impact on company performance 
and that this negative impact is more pronounced in companies with higher 
information costs. 
 In addition, recent research shows the importance of some other characteristics of 
corporate board members for corporate governance in China. For example, Jian and 
Lai (2017) show that A-share listed companies with more foreign board directors could 
reduce the probability of earnings management. He and Luo (2018) find that corporate 
boards in China with an even number of directors are less efficient and often 
experience more board meeting absences and tunneling behaviors. Du et al. (2018) 
show that in China, director connections are very important for companies to obtain 
trade credit, especially for companies with financial constraints. Li et al. (2019) show 
that directors with technology backgrounds could enhance innovation in Chinese 
companies. Hu et al. (2019) used the negative stock market reaction to the resignation 
of politically connected outside directors to demonstrate the importance of political 
connections for corporate boards in China. 
 
2.6.3 The Impact of the Management Team on Corporate Governance in 
China 
Regarding the management team impacts on corporate governance, similar to research 
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on other countries, different aspects of the pay-performance and performance-turnover 
relationships in Chinese markets have been repeatedly investigated by scholars. 
Several research studies on the pay-performance relationship provide evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of cash payments to management teams in China. For 
example, Firth et al. (2007b) find a positive relationship between company operating 
profit and CEO cash compensation in Chinese capital markets. Zhou et al. (2018) show 
that CEO and CFO salaries have a negative relationship with the probability of 
committing fraud. However, as Firth et al. (2006) found when focusing on state-owned 
enterprises, in order to maintain social balance, the SOEs are more likely to set salary 
caps on management income, which diminishes the incentive function of cash 
payments. Moreover, it is argued that the economic efficiency and corporate profit are 
secondary objectives for the government (Firth et al., 2007b). Therefore, empirical 
research finds little evidence regarding the relationship between company performance 
and management pay in SOEs (Firth et al., 2006 and Conyon and He, 2011).  
Regarding the performance-turnover relationship, research shows that poor 
performance is related to both voluntary and involuntary CEO turnover in Chinese 
companies (Fan et al., 2007). Also, companies with a higher risk of default will be 
more willing to replace their management teams (Ting, 2011). However, this 
relationship may not hold in certain conditions. For example, Luo (2015) shows that 
the pay-performance relationship does not hold for the Chinese banking industry. 
Moreover, it has been proved that the performance-turnover relationship is weak in 
state-owned companies. As Cheng et al. (2008) show, CEO turnover in SOEs always 
occurs when a company has high operating, administrative and financial expenses and 
is not directly linked to poor earnings performance. Based on empirical evidence, both 
Kato and Long (2006) and Chi and Wang (2009) find that the sensitivity of CEO 
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turnover to performance is lower in SOEs. In addition, this turnover may not always 
help SOEs improve their future performance (Shen and Lin, 2009). Moreover, the 
studies by Hu and Leung (2012) and Pessarossi and Weill (2013) show that when SOEs 
are broken down into central and local SOEs, performance-turnover sensitivity and 
positive market reactions to turnover is more pronounced in central SOEs. 
In addition, recent research has also opened new dimensions for studying the 
impact of management team on governance quality in China. For example, Li et al. 
(2018) show that CEO media exposure could enhance the efficiency of incorporating 
company-specific news into stock prices. Wu et al. (2018) find that political 
connections could enhance company performance and CEO pay. Yin et al. (2019) show 
that a CEO’s personal donations could affect consumer’s attitudes to the company. 
Zhou et al. (2019) show that, in the banking industry, the age gap between the CEO 
and the board chairman could temper a bank’s risk-taking behavior. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis provided a brief institutional background of Chinese capital 
markets and reviewed the role of the corporate board, its functions, and the reasons 
outside directors are needed on corporate boards. The review highlighted several paths 
for this research. First, even though the importance of outside directors has been well-
documented around the world in the existing literature, there is insufficient evidence 
to support their usefulness in China. Any other functions that could be performed by 
outside directors are worthy of more research. One possible direction is further 
discussed in Chapter 3, regarding whether outside directors are taking on a 
whistleblower role. Second, existing research has paid extensive attention to the board 
and management team and their implications for governance effectiveness in the 
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Chinese market. However, how management teams could support board functions and 
become involved in governance work have received little attention. In Chapter 4, an 
exploration of the corporate secretary’s impact, who works closely with the corporate 
board on governance quality, will be examined in detail. Third, research has 
demonstrated how ownership and board characteristics could affect company 
governance outcomes, but few research studies consider the impacts on both 
shareholders and boards. In Chapter 5, the research on listed company directors who 
take multiple directorships on the boards of its shareholder companies will be explored 
to determine the impacts of multiple directorships on shareholder’s wealth.  
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Chapter 3 Whistleblowing and Enforcement Actions against 
Fraud: The Role of Dissenters in Boardrooms8 
3.1 Introduction 
This research aims to explore the whistleblower role of outside directors by looking at 
their dissenting opinions, intentional absences from board meetings, and voluntary 
board resignations. Outside directors form an important part of a company’s internal 
governance system, especially on management and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010). However, the literature presents 
mixed results regarding their impact on company performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 1998). Although Beasley (1996) and Fich and Shivdasani 
(2007) show that outside directors could help companies reduce the incidence of fraud, 
80% of Enron’s board consisted of high-profile outside directors who also chaired most 
of the key committees, yet a major scandal still occurred (Ghoshal, 2005). I argue that 
these mixed results could be attributed to the limitations in how outside directors are 
measured. To study their effectiveness, the literature mostly focuses on “who they are”, 
relying on characteristic-based measures such as board composition (Dahya and 
McConnell, 2007), outside director tenure (Vafeas, 2003), multiple directorship of 
outside directors, and outside director expertise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). 
However, few studies consider “what they do” by examining the actual behaviors of 
outside directors.  
 To address this issue, I propose action-based measures of “outside director 
activism” to revisit the role and effectiveness of outside directors, namely, dissenting 
                                                             
8 The modified version of this chapter of this thesis is in the R&R process of Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 
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opinions, intentional absences, and voluntary resignations. These proxies enable us to 
turn the focus from what an outside director may be capable of to what they actually 
do to fulfill their responsibilities. Information on dissenting opinions expressed by 
outside directors was not available in most countries. Recently, Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) derived this information from the board meeting minutes of 11 Israeli 
government-owned businesses. Jiang et al. (2016) examined the opinions of outside 
directors regarding the proposals presented in board meetings, information that the 
regulatory commission was required to disclose. In addition, I developed a proxy for 
activism by using the intentional absences and voluntary resignations of outside 
directors. These are mechanisms used by outside directors to avoid legal responsibility 
for problematic board decisions. For this, I developed a sample that included all 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share Stock Exchanges between 
2005 and 2010. 
 I argue that outside director activism is unlikely to be an effective disciplinary 
mechanism for reducing the incidence of fraud-related regulatory enforcement. 
Outside directors lack strong voting and negotiating power, enabling managers to still 
force through controversial proposals. Instead, I argue that their activism signals 
problems in corporate governance or in flawed market proposals by playing a 
whistleblowing function. This activism is expected to increase regulatory and public 
scrutiny, and predicts an increased incidence of fraud-related regulatory enforcement. 
To perform the analysis, I regress the variables of outside director activism on a dummy 
variable of regulatory enforcement against corporate fraud. I control for the 
endogeneity issue with the propensity score matching (PSM) approach and instrument 
variable analysis. I find that outside director activism can predict rather than deter the 
incidence of enforcement action. This finding suggests that protests by outside 
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directors are a signal to the markets and attract the attention of regulatory authorities, 
implying that outside directors have a whistleblowing function. In addition, I further 
divide the research sample by ownership type and find that the whistleblowing function 
is more pronounced in private companies. This shows that their whistleblower role is 
undermined by the controlling shareholders in politically connected SOEs.  
 I further test whether financial analysts and fund managers recognized the 
information signaled by director activism. I document that financial analysts and fund 
managers do react to the signals of dissenting opinions and voluntary resignations, as 
reflected in downgraded analyst reports and reduced fund ownership. I find that outside 
director activism enhances CEO accountability, as evidenced by the increasing 
sensitivity of CEO turnover and corporate fraud. The result is more pronounced in 
private companies and companies with more analyst coverage, implying that the public 
outrage can overcome CEO entrenchment. Overall, the finding suggests that despite 
the inability of outside directors to have a disciplinary effect on management teams, 
their whistleblowing can attract public attention and help the board fulfill its 
monitoring function. 
 This chapter makes the following contributions. First, I add a new dimension to 
research on outside directors by examining their activism. This is among the first few 
studies to focus on what outside directors do, rather than on who they are (e.g., 
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). Second, this chapter also adds to the literature on 
corporate fraud by providing original evidence on information dissemination from 
outside director to analysts and fund managers through outside director activism (see 
Dyck et al. 2011). These signals could trigger public outrage and help discipline CEOs. 
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on emerging markets by showing that outside 
directors find it more difficult to exert their influence on dominant state shareholders.  
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 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
institutional background and literature. Section 3.3 proposes the new action-based 
measure of outside director activism and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.4 
introduces the research design and sample. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results, 
and Section 3.6 presents the conclusions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 A Review of Outside Directors 
There are various motives for companies to appoint outside directors, such as 
monitoring and institutional needs. Each motive implies different roles and tasks for 
outside directors. The monitoring function is in place to deal with the agency problem 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; and Mizruchi, 
1983). Due to the separation of ownership and control, shareholders and company 
managers have diverging interests. Executives tend to act in their own self-interest 
rather than maximizing shareholder value. These different interests within boards leads 
to the introduction of outside directors to perform an independent monitoring function 
for shareholders (Dalton et al., 1999; Walsh and Seward, 1990). Another motive for 
companies to appoint outside directors refers to institutional theory (Scott, 1995; Peng, 
2004). From an organizational perspective, the appointment of outside directors may 
not be voluntary and is done to fit into the institution’s environment (Peng, 2004; 
Chizema and Kim, 2010). For example, Linck et al. (2009) show a sharp increase in 
the number of outside directors following the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. It is unlikely that many listed companies suddenly demanded more outside 
directors to enhance the monitoring function. If this is a case of “window dressing”, 
outside directors may not be able to fulfill their responsibilities even if they have the 
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capability. Therefore, examining the characteristics of outside directors is not 
sufficient for studying their effectiveness.  
 Outside directors also represent shareholders when they are performing the 
monitoring and consulting functions (Deutsch et al., 2011). To understand what 
motivates them to perform these functions, I determined three types of incentives for 
outside directors: reputation, pursuit of wealth, and liability avoidance. First, outside 
director earn good reputations by enhancing a company’s operations (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Linck et al., 2009). A straightforward reward for a good reputation is having 
multiple directorships (Ferris et al., 2003). Kaplan and Reishus (1990) document that 
outside directors have a fewer opportunities for obtaining additional directorships 
when their companies reduce dividend payments. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show 
that directors associated with instances of fraud and who have damaged reputations 
are less likely to be appointed by companies with good corporate governance. Sharma 
(2011) finds that outside directors build their reputations by actively ensuring dividend 
payments and in turn obtain more opportunities for additional directorships. Second, 
compensation provides outside directors with a direct incentive to act to maximize 
shareholder wealth (Linn and Park, 2005). Gilson (1990) and Harford (2003) show 
that compensation effectively ensures that outside directors will act on behalf of 
shareholder interests during hostile takeovers and times of financial distress. Johnson 
et al. (2007) find that outside directors who own shares in the company participate 
more actively in corporate strategic restructuring. Gong and Li (2011) find that equity-
based compensation encourages outside directors to seek more information about the 
company, and use this information to protect shareholder wealth. Finally, the 
avoidance of legal liability also serves as an incentive for outside directors. Potential 
lawsuits and legal liabilities are the major career risk for outside directors. They need 
51 
to be responsible to avoid legal sanction (Vafeas, 1999) for situations such as adverse 
financial stress caused by irresponsibility (Cheffins and Black, 2006). Yermack (2004) 
adds that outside directors are likely to depart in years when companies are performing 
poorly to avoid potential legal liabilities. However, Black et al. (2005) find that 
regardless of the existing legal system, there is limited out-of-pocket liability for 
outside directors in both common-law and civil-law countries. A higher out-of-pocket 
liability could not only deter outside directors from serving on the board but also make 
them concentrate on avoiding such liabilities (Black et al., 2005; Cheffins and Black, 
2006).  
 
3.2.2 Characteristic-based Measures of Outside Directors 
The studies in the existing body of literature mainly use static measures of the effects 
of outside director characteristics, such as their tenure, multiple directorships, 
background, expertise, and their presence in board meetings, but little has been done 
regarding outside director activism. Agency theory suggests that the degree of 
independence of outside directors determines how well they monitor company 
executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Studies mainly use the tenure of outside directors 
as a proxy of their independence (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Dalton et al., 2007), 
and argue that independence is weakened by the length of time served on the board. 
Bhagat and Black (1999) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that outside directors 
become “lapdogs” rather than “watchdogs” after serving on a board for a period of 
time.  
Resource dependence theory suggests that outside directors play another 
important role as advisors and resource providers to the board, and therefore, the 
quality of their service depends on their experience and knowledge (Masulis et al., 
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2012). It has been found that outside directors with professional backgrounds as 
scholars (Raheja, 2005; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2007), politicians (Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2005), accountants (Klein, 1998), and bankers (Yamori, 1998; Byrd and Mizruchi, 
2005) are better able to help companies.  
Multiple directorships is another important feature of outside directors. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that multiple directorships can serve as a proxy for a director’s 
ability because directors with good records as board members tend to be preferred by 
other companies. Booth and Deli (1995) add that outside directors with multiple 
directorships are involved in more businesses and can thus help companies obtain 
better access to partner companies. However, time is an issue for busy directors serving 
on more than one board. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) note that outside directors 
with multiple directorships could be too busy to prepare well for each board discussion. 
Adams et al. (2010) provide theoretical support for this argument that shows that the 
availability of outside directors is crucial for performing an effective monitoring 
function. 
Finally, the proportion of outside directors on boards is one of the most widely 
studied measures for evaluating their effectiveness. However, the empirical results for 
this are mixed. Klein (1998) documents an insignificant relationship between board 
composition and company performance, whereas Bhagat and Black (2002) find a 
negative relationship. An endogeneity problem may be the reason for the mixed results. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998 and 2003) argue that company performance may not be 
led by the appointment of outside directors. Instead, poor performance may lead 
companies to appoint more outside directors in order to enhance corporate governance.  
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3.3 Outside Director Activism and Hypothesis Development 
3.3.1 Outside Director Activism 
To study outside director activism, I focus on three of their behaviors: dissenting 
opinions, intentional absences, and voluntary resignations. Dissenting opinions are 
expressed by outside directors to the CEO and other executives in board meetings. An 
absence is intentional when outside directors fail to send a proxy to vote on their behalf 
when they cannot attend board meetings. Voluntary resignation refers to their 
voluntary departure from a board during their appointment period.  
Some recent research has started looking at these types of behaviors by outside 
directors. Regarding outside director opinions, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) 
studied the minutes of a group of Israeli companies and found that directors are more 
likely to play a monitoring role than an advisory role. Jiang et al. (2016) examine 
reputation concerns by studying the reasons why outside directors vote the way they 
do, and its impacts on the reputations of outside directors. Kim and Oh (2017) find that 
dissenting opinions by directors in Korea could affect company performance and 
reduce stock return volatility.  
Outside directors need to review the proposals put forward by management teams 
and express their opinions in board meetings. As Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate, the 
principal task of outside directors is to monitor and control management team 
decisions. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out that outside directors could talk 
with management teams before proposals are put to a vote in board meetings and 
advise on any necessary modifications. In China, CSRC requires that corporate 
secretaries send the directors any proposals to be discussed in board meetings at least 
10 days prior to the meeting in order to give them enough time to review the proposals 
and communicate with the management team. Therefore, if a dissenting opinion is still 
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presented in a board meeting, it is highly likely that the management team refused to 
modify the proposal as requested by the outside directors. Dissenting opinions protect 
outside directors by enabling them to avoid potential liabilities or legal risks caused by 
defective proposals.  
Regarding intentional board meeting absences by directors, Chou et al. (2013) 
studied a sample from Taiwan and found that high meeting attendance will benefit 
company performance, but high attendance with proxies representing directors will 
have an adverse effect. Regarding voluntary resignation of directors, Bar-Hava et al. 
(2013) found that outside directors resign from board positions to avoid the probability 
of company underperformance and to reduce damage to their reputations. Dewally and 
Peck (2009) show that when outside directors make public announcements of their 
resignations, it is mainly due to company underperformance or because the company 
has a weak board. This research study argues that resignations by outside directors 
could have a disciplinary impact for poor board performance. The studies mentioned 
above mostly focus on the causes and consequences of outside director behaviors. Few 
of them see these actions as a type of activism on the part of outside directors, or they 
only focus on one of these behaviors. In addition, most of these research studies are 
trying to examine the effectiveness of outside directors in their direct monitoring role. 
Few try to consider the whistleblowing activities of outside directors when they fail to 
discipline management teams. In the next section, I will explain why these three 
behaviors are not mere happenstance but instead indicate a certain activism on the part 
of outside directors. 
 Sonnenfeld (2002) states that attending board meetings is a basic requirement for 
outside directors, and their absence from meetings indicates a level of irresponsibility 
that harms reputations when this information is released in corporate announcements. 
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Intentional absence is defined as an incidence of absence from board meetings without 
designating a proxy to speak on their behalf in the meetings. The CSRC regulation 
indicates that when outside directors are not able to attend meetings, they could ask 
other outside directors to act as their proxy and vote or express opinions on their behalf. 
If the proxy sent by an outside director agrees to a problematic proposal, Chinese 
contract law (under a civil law system) requires that both the director and the proxy 
assume responsibility for the decision. The regulation also states that outside directors 
who are absent from three consecutive board meetings are subject to replacement in 
the next shareholder’s meeting. I argue that these intentional absences are an indication 
that an outside director wants to avoid both potential liabilities and confrontations with 
the CEO in board meetings. On one hand, outside directors face potential liabilities if 
they agree to problematic proposals. On the other hand, they could offend CEOs with 
their dissenting opinions. Although diligent work can enhance the reputation of an 
outside director (Fama and Jensen, 1983), having a good relationship with the 
management team also matters (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Therefore, an 
intentional absence could be the best choice in these situations. Later, I provide 
empirical evidence that the busyness of outside director is not significantly related to 
their absences from board meetings9.  
 Lastly, I use voluntary resignations from boards by outside directors as a proxy 
for their activism. An outside director’s voluntary resignation during his/her 
appointment period could be interpreted by shareholders as irresponsible behavior, 
which could jeopardize their reputations. The CSRC mandates a three-year outside 
director appointment period, and they cannot be reappointed more than once to ensure 
                                                             
9 Per Jiraporn et al. (2009), the busyness of an outside director could be measured by their multiple 
directorships. The second model with dependent variable “Intended Absence” in Table 3.3 shows that 
the coefficient of variable “Multiple Directorships” is 0.053 and the t-value is 1.29, which is 
insignificant and supports the irrelevancy of these two variables. 
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their independence. Again, I argue that the desire to avoid potential liabilities from 
problematic proposals drives the voluntary departure of outside directors when they 
conclude that they cannot stop management malpractice. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
note that directors of companies that commit fraud find it harder to be appointed to the 
boards of other companies.  
 
3.3.2 Hypothesis Development 
As discussed above, I argue that dissenting directors are less likely to play a 
disciplinary role to monitor managers. First, outside directors typically comprise one-
third of the board in Chinese listed companies and thus lack sufficient voting power to 
reject problematic proposals. Kaplan and Minton (2011) show that when management 
teams are more powerful than their boards, executives may ignore the board’s 
monitoring function. This situation could be more pronounced in China, where outside 
directors tend to be nominated by CEOs10 and where personal ties are highly valued. 
Second, there are opportunities for informal discussions prior to the board meetings.11 
Managers have the opportunity to know the opinions of outside directors in advance 
of the board meetings, and they also understand that any form of activism will be 
disclosed to the markets. If they have not been persuaded by outside directors and still 
choose to submit the proposal and force it through in board meetings, it is unlikely that 
any anticipated activism would alter their behaviors. As a result, I argue that activism 
by outside directors tends to fail in disciplining executives but serves to blow the 
                                                             
10 Despite not directly, research shows that CEOs are always involved in outside directors’ selection 
process. Early research such as Mace (1986) indicates that management team plays very important role 
in outside director select process, and Waldo (1985) shows that such process makes the independency 
of outside director skeptic. Such argument has been supported by recent research such as Carcello et al. 
(2011). 
11  In China, by the requirement of the CSRC, the board meeting proposal has to be sent to the 
management team 10 days before the meeting, and as Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) shows, outside 
directors will have chance to talk with management team before proposals being officially put to vote 
in board meetings, and could provide modification advise to management team if necessary. 
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whistle on potential company governance problems to alert the markets. Some of this 
information may attract the attention from regulatory authorities, outside investors, 
and even public media outlets, thereby increasing regulatory scrutiny. As a result, any 
company malpractice is more likely to be detected. I hereby propose the 
whistleblowing hypothesis as follows:  
H3.1: Outside director activism predicts a higher incidence of regulatory 
enforcement for fraud 
 
3.4 Sample and Research Design 
3.4.1 Data and Sample 
I collected the data from CSMAR (China Securities Market and Accounting Research), 
and the sample includes all A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges between 2005 and 2010, with a company-year observation of 7,24412. 
I identified 390 cases of dissenting opinions in board meetings. This is in line with the 
magnitude measured by Schewartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) that showed that board 
members disagree with the CEO only 2.5% of the time; their study was based on a 
much smaller sample of board meetings minutes from 11 Israeli government-owned 
businesses. From the resignation reports available in the stock exchanges, I also 
identified 197 voluntary resignations of board members prior to completion of their 
appointment periods. Figure 3.1 presents the breakdown by year and industry of board 
member activism, showing that it is evenly distributed across industries. The incidence 
                                                             
12 In 2011, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection published its policy “To standardize 
former officials taking roles as independent directors and independent supervisory directors in listed 
companies and fund management companies”, which persuaded outside directors with political 
backgrounds to resign from the boards of listed companies. Therefore, this research study chose to end 
data collection in 2011 to avoid the influence of this policy on voluntary resignations by outside 
directors. 
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of dissenting opinions (intentional absences) is higher among companies in the 
healthcare (financial) industries. 
[Please insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
3.4.2 Research Design 
To test the whistleblowing hypothesis, I apply the following probit regression model: 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=2    (3.1) 
The dependent variable is CSRC regulatory enforcement against fraud13. The one-
year lagged independent variable Activism denotes outside director activism in one of 
the following three forms: dissenting opinion, intentional absence, and voluntary 
resignation. I also control the characteristics of outside directors, including their 
average tenure, additional directorships, and the proportion of their representation on 
the board. The additional directorships refer to the number of directorships that outside 
director hold in other listed companies. I also control for board characteristics, 
including CEO duality, board size, board meeting frequency, supervisory board size 
and supervisory board meeting frequency. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 
one (1) if the CEO is also the board chair and equal to zero (0) otherwise. Board size 
denotes the total number of directors sitting on the board. For the company 
characteristics, I control for market value, price-to-book ratio and return on assets. The 
market value is calculated as the total shares outstanding at year-end multiplied by the 
year-end closing market price per share. Finally, I apply the industry and year fixed 
effects. I use the first two digits of the GICS codes for industry classification. All these 
                                                             
13 Regulatory enforcement against fraud in this thesis includes all types of fraud defined by the CSRC, 
including fabricated profits, false asset statements, falsified records (misleading statements), delayed 
disclosures, major information omissions, false disclosures, fraudulent listings, investment violations, 
unauthorized change in the use of funded money, unlawful use of company assets, insider trading, illegal 
stock trading, manipulation of stock prices, violation of guarantees, improper handling of general 
accounting records, and other violations. 
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data are collected from CSMAR database. If the coefficient of Activism is significantly 
positive, the hypothesis is supported.  
3.4.3 Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable Analysis  
There is a concern regarding endogeneity issues. For example, outside directors do not 
randomly exhibit activist behavior. Companies that behave opportunistically tend to 
experience more activism by outside directors and also tend to experience the 
subsequent enforcement actions. To address this concern and to resolve the nonrandom 
allocation of activism, I employ the Propensity Scoring Matching (PSM) method 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Malmendier and Tate, 2009) to construct a matching-
company sample and replicate the test by matching each company with outside 
directors demonstrating activism (treatment group) with another otherwise identical 
company with outside directors that could demonstrate activism but did not (control 
group). The reason for using this method is to predict the incidence of activism activity 
by their observable characteristics. For this, I use the following outside director 
features: board independence ratio, company-level average number of multiple 
directorships, and company-level average tenure of outside directors. I also use the 
following corporate governance quality measures: CEO duality, board meeting 
frequency, board size, supervisory board meeting frequency, supervisory board size, 
and the Herfindahl 10 index as a proxy for company characteristics to score each one 
of the protest variables. I employ the full sample for the PSM observations and apply 
the one-to-one matching criteria. After obtaining the score for each observation, I 
conduct a nearest-neighbor one-to-one sample match with the scores for the activism 
indicators. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that treated and control groups with 
similar scores will have almost identical distributions. Thus, if I compare the scores of 
matching companies, it actually transfers the sample into a randomized experiment 
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sample.  
 In addition to the propensity scoring matching, I also apply an instrument variable 
analysis to the matched sample to further address the endogeneity issue. As Whisenant 
et al. (2003) show, instrumental variable analysis is a very effective way of dealing 
with an endogeneity problem. Since the observations of activism behaviors are highly 
unbalanced, this study applies the instrumental analysis to the PSM-matched sample, 
which has fewer problems of partial observations in order to produce more robust and 
effective results. To conduct the instrumental analysis, I use two instrument variables: 
OD_Regulation and Ln_Od_Avg_Pay. OD_Regulation is a dummy variable equal to 
one (1) if the observation is in the year 2006 or later. This variable captures the legal 
status of outside directors. Before 2006, there were only a few nonlegal policies that 
required outside directors on boards of listed companies. In 2006, China’s modified 
corporate law stated for the first time that listed companies must hire outside directors, 
and the state council was required to create the corresponding regulation. After this 
fundamental legal document was released, many other regulations were issued by the 
CSRC that further enhanced the power of outside directors and increased their 
responsibilities. These legal changes are exogenous to the company characteristics but 
have an influence on outside director behavior, which makes it suitable to function as 
the instrumental variable.  
 Ln_Od_Avg_Pay is a continuous variable that equals the average salary of all 
outside directors, which captures a company’s salary level. Salary level shows the 
value and importance of a certain position (Mahoney, 1979). Therefore, the salary level 
exhibits the true rank and importance for the company of the outside director position. 
As such, it does influence the activism-related decisions of outside directors, and 
creates higher communication costs between outside directors and management teams, 
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producing greater potential for activist behavior. Moreover, the existing literature 
shows that cash compensation will not directly affect the incidence of fraud (Persons, 
2012), so the salary level correlated with activism behavior but not with fraud is 
selected as another instrumental variable. 
 
3.4.4. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables in a company-year sample. It 
shows that an average of 6.6% of companies are caught for fraudulent behaviors by 
the regulatory commission, and non-SOEs are more likely to be caught than SOEs. It 
also shows that on average, only 5.4% of companies have outside directors that have 
expressed dissenting opinions in board meetings. They are more likely to choose 
intentional absences (11.8% of the companies) when they do not agree with proposals. 
About 2.7% of the companies experienced voluntary resignations by outside directors 
during their appointment periods. In addition, the average percentage of outside 
directors on boards is 35.9%. The average additional directorships held by outside 
directors are 0.75. The average tenure of outside directors is approximately 4.9 years, 
and the median value is four years. Since the standard term in office for outside 
directors is three years, this result suggests that many companies renew the contracts 
of outside directors. However, this result is much lower than the average tenure of 8.9 
years for outside directors in the U.S. (Bar-Hava et al., 2013).  
[Please insert Table 3.1 about here] 
Table 3.2 presents the (Pearson) correlation matrix of variables in the company-
year sample. The dissenting opinions are positively related to intentional absences and 
resignations. They are all positively related to the incidence of regulatory enforcement. 
This supports the whistleblowing hypothesis that director activism failed to discipline 
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CEOs by deterring their misconduct. The negative correlation between multiple 
directorships and dissenting opinions is consistent with the finding in the study by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) that outside directors who “make trouble” for CEOs 
are less popular in the job market. The positive correlation of outside director tenure 
with dissenting opinions and resignations implies that since outside directors can only 
have their contracts renewed once, they become less concerned about their relationship 
with the management team and are more likely to vote against proposals submitted to 
the board during their second appointment periods.  
[Please insert Table 3.2 about here] 
    In addition, Table 3.3 presents the results of a regression analysis on the 
relationship between the traditional measure of the effectiveness of outside directors 
and outside director activism. Column 1 shows that the highest R-square is 0.205, 
suggesting the low explanatory power of traditional measures using outside director 
characteristics for outside director activism.  
[Please insert Table 3.3 about here] 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Baseline Results  
Table 3.4 presents the baseline results for the hypothesis test of the positive link 
between outside director activism on the incidence of regulatory enforcement. To 
avoid an inefficient t-value induced by potential heteroscedasticity, I cluster 
observations by industry and year to compute the robust standard error (Rogers, 1993). 
The significantly positive coefficients show that dissenting opinions (0.390), 
intentional absences (0.166), voluntary resignations (0.242), and activism (0.214) 
predict an increased incidence of regulatory enforcement for fraud. This supports the 
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whistleblowing hypothesis that outside directors fail to discipline CEOs and only 
signal governance problems that could potentially lead to future regulatory 
enforcement. It is also worth noting that multiple directorships and outside director 
tenure have been found to reduce the incidence of enforcement actions. This may be 
attributed to the fact that more established and experienced outside directors are more 
effective in enhancing governance quality. Finally, enforcement actions are less 
frequent among companies with concentrated ownership, larger companies and 
companies with better operating performance. The results are robust to the control of 
year and industry dummies.  
 To avoid a potential multicollinearity problem, the Yoder and Pettigrew-Crosby 
(1995) approach was followed to calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF) of each 
model. Initially, I found that the VIF is over 10, which exceeds the usual acceptable 
level. But this is due to the extremely high inflation value of the variable market value. 
When I replaced the market value with book value, the problem remains. I then 
excluded the market value and repeated the test, finding that the average VIF value 
dropped significantly to approximately 5.5, far lower than the borderline level. To 
solve a potential multicollinearity problem, I performed the analysis without the 
market value, finding that the coefficients for all activism variables are still significant, 
suggesting that the result is not biased by a multicollinearity problem14. 
[Please insert Table 3.4 about here] 
3.5.2 Robustness Checks  
As mentioned above, to address the potential endogeneity problem, I first construct a 
matching-company sample by using the Propensity Scoring Matching (PSM) method 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). In the matching-company 
                                                             
14 Please see the results in Appendix 3.A2. 
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sample, each company with outside directors demonstrating activism (treatment group) 
is matched with another otherwise identical company with outside directors that could 
demonstrate activism but did not (control group). I use all the control variables to 
predict the incidence of each activism proxy. The results are reported in Table 3.5, 
columns 1-4. Consistent with the baseline results, the coefficients for the activism 
indicators remain significantly positive. Moreover, to further ensure the robustness of 
the results regarding the potential endogeneity, I also employ two instrumental 
variables (OD_Regulation and Ln_Od_Avg_Pay) to conduct the two-stage 
instrumental variable analysis on the PSM sample. These results are presented in Table 
5, columns 5-7 and are still consistent with the baseline results that show the 
whistleblower role of outside directors, further supporting Hypothesis 1b.  
[Please insert Table 3.5 about here] 
 In addition, I believe that different levels and frequencies of activism should have 
different impacts on fraud. To identify this effect, I create the level variables of 
Ind_Adj_Total_Dissenting, Ind_Adj_Total_Resignation and Ind_Adj_Absence_Ratio 
as alternative proxies to the dummy activism variables in the baseline analysis. The 
Ind_Adj_Total_Dissenting variable equals the industry-adjusted number of dissenting 
behaviors for a company in one year; Ind_Adj_Total_Resignation equals the industry-
adjusted number of directors that resigned from the board of a company in one year; 
and Ind_Adj_Absence_Ratio equals the industry-adjusted ratio of outside director 
intentional absences from board meetings to the total number of meetings outside 
directors are expected to attend. Table 6 presents the results of re-examining the 
models, showing that the coefficients of these industry-adjusted level variables have a 
significant positive relationship with the probability of regulatory enforcement for 
fraud, again suggesting that the frequency and level of activism could blow the whistle 
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on management.  
[Please insert Table 3.6 about here] 
 
3.5.3 Director Activism and State Ownership 
State-owned enterprises and the commonplace state-controlled enterprises are 
important institutional features in China and have important implications for corporate 
governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Shleifer (1998) argue that government 
ownership deteriorates the quality of governance. Hou and Moore (2010) contend that 
state ownership undermines the rigor of regulatory scrutiny to detect fraud. Therefore, 
I expect that state ownership may also undermine the whistleblower role of outside 
directors. To assess this prediction, I divide the sample into non-SOEs (i.e., privately 
owned companies) and SOEs (state-controlled companies), and replicate the test. The 
results are presented in Table 3.7. Consistent with the main results from Table 4, the 
coefficients for the activism indicators for non-SOEs are significantly positive and 
much larger than in the SOEs, showing that the whistleblower role of outside directors 
is more prevalent in privately owned companies. This result aligns with the existing 
literature regarding the lenient regulatory oversight (Hou and Moore, 2010) of SOEs.  
[Please insert Table 3.7 about here] 
 
3.5.4 Director Activism and Financial Intermediaries 
Since activist behavior is communicated in relevant corporate announcements, I 
explore whether and how information about director activism is perceived and reacted 
to by financial intermediaries such as financial analysts and mutual fund managers. 
Ding et al. (2017) suggest that corporate disclosures could enhance analyst awareness 
of corporate governance quality and potential risks. Sharma (2004) suggests that 
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institutional investors are sensitive to signals regarding corporate governance that 
could determine future performance. Analyst research is a critical input for the 
investment decisions of institutional investors. I therefore expect that the 
whistleblower role of outside directors is more pronounced among companies with 
greater analyst coverage. To assess this prediction, I divide the sample into companies 
with analyst coverage that is higher and lower than the median level to see whether the 
transparency brought by analysts could have a different impact on outside director 
activism. Table 3.8 presents results that show that outside director activism can better 
predict regulatory enforcement for fraud in companies with greater analyst coverage, 
which indicates the importance of information transparency for the effectiveness of 
the outside monitoring function. 
[Please insert Table 3.8 about here] 
 I believe that financial analysts and fund managers can interpret the information 
signaled by activist behavior. Financial analysts react to this behavior by lowering their 
“buy” recommendations in analyst reports, and mutual fund reacts by reducing their 
holdings. To assess this prediction that financial intermediaries respond to the activism 
of outside directors, I apply the panel OLS regression model with fixed-effect as 
follows:  
    𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=2           (3.2) 
 where the dependent variable is fewer “buy” recommendations in analyst reports 
as a result of outside director activism, which reflects a downgrade in analyst 
recommendations. The information regarding analyst recommendations was obtained 
from CSMAR. Since this database does not contain information on the dates when 
various types of activism were communicated, I could not perform an event study. The 
same set of control variables for board or company characteristics and operating 
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performance is controlled as in Equation (1). If the financial intermediaries recognize 
the information signaled by activism, I expect to observe an increase in the number of 
downgraded analyst reports.  
 The results of this test are presented in Table 3.9. The coefficients for the 
dissenting opinions and the integrated activism measure are significantly positive, 
indicating that downgraded financial recommendations are a consequence of outside 
director activism. Financial analysts react to dissenting opinions more actively than to 
intentional absences and resignations.  
[Please insert Table 3.9 about here] 
 In addition, I also examine the impact of activism on fund ownership by using the 
following model, with fund ownership information collected from CSMAR. 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚 × 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑡  
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=4           (3.3) 
 Fund denotes the change in ownership ratio for the current year compared to the 
previous year. Analyst is the change in analyst reports for the current year compared 
to the previous year. The interaction term shows how the analyst coverage strengthens 
the sensitivity between outside director activism and reduction in fund ownership. 
Table 3.10 presents the regression results. The coefficients for analyst coverage are all 
positively significant at 1% in each column, which confirms that analyst research is an 
important input to institutional investor decision-making. More importantly, the 
coefficients of the interaction term of activism with analyst coverage change are 
significantly negative. This implies that fund managers react to activism by reducing 
ownership in the companies, with less information asymmetry reflected by higher 
analyst coverage.  
[Please insert Table 3.10 about here] 
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3.5.5 Director Activism and CEO Accountability 
I expect that activism influences the accountability of CEOs, reflected by the 
sensitivity between CEO turnover and regulatory enforcement. The studies in the 
existing literature suggest that outside directors play a role in replacing ineffective 
CEOs. For example, Kini et al. (1995) and Guo and Masulis (2012) show that outside 
directors have fewer economic ties to CEOs and can therefore be more objective 
regarding CEO turnover, thereby enhancing CEO accountability. Weisbach (1988) 
finds that CEOs are more likely to be replaced after poor performance by companies 
dominated by outside directors. Regarding the evidence from China, Chen et al. (2016) 
indicate that there is greater sensitivity between CEO turnover and corporate fraud 
when the fraud is likely to provoke public outrage.  
  I therefore argue that the whistleblowing information signaled by outside director 
activism could bring about public scrutiny and enhance CEO accountability regarding 
corporate fraud. To assess this prediction about the impact of activism on CEO 
accountability, I apply for the following probit model: 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑡 × 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑡 +
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=4 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀                          (3.4) 
 where the dependent variable is CEO turnover, which is set to one (1) if a CEO is 
replaced during the year, and zero (0) otherwise. I obtained the CEO turnover data 
from the CSMAR database. I only kept the data sample for nonroutine turnover and 
excluded turnover due to health issues and retirement, as well as turnover for CEOs 
over the age of 65. The explanatory variable Fraud is set to one (1) if the company 
experienced regulatory enforcement for fraud, and zero (0) otherwise. The focus of the 
test is the interaction term of activism and fraud, for which I expect to observe a 
significantly positive coefficient. The same set of control variables used in Equation 
(3.1) are also incorporated here to control for the possible effects of governance quality, 
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and company characteristics or performance.   
 Table 3.11 presents the results of this test. As shown in Table A, the coefficients 
for Fraud are positively correlated with CEO turnover, showing that experiencing 
regulatory enforcement for fraud is likely to lead to CEO replacement. While the 
activism proxies are not significant on their own, the interaction of dissenting opinions 
and fraud in Column 1 is significantly positive, showing that the director activism can 
increase the probability of CEO replacement in companies committing fraud that were 
subject to enforcement action. This result supports the argument that the whistleblower 
role of outside directors triggers public attention or even outrage by outside investors 
and exerts pressure on the board to replace a CEO.  
 To further explore the issue of CEO replacement, I divided the research sample by 
ownership type (SOEs and non-SOEs), and level of analyst coverage. Kato and Long 
(2006) and Chen et al. (2016) suggest that CEOs are more entrenched in state-owned 
enterprises. In addition, companies controlled by state shareholders can receive 
preferential treatment from banks, enabling them to rely less on outside investors. 
Therefore, public scrutiny or outrage may exert less pressure on the boards of SOEs to 
replace problematic CEOs. In addition, I use analyst coverage as a proxy for the 
information environment that fosters the dissemination of whistleblowing information. 
I predict that the impact of outside director activism is more pronounced among 
companies with greater analyst coverage. Panel B of Table 3.11 presents the results. 
As I expected, the coefficient for the interaction term of enforcement action and 
dissenting opinions is only significant for the non-SOE (private) sample, which 
supports the finding in Table 3.7 about the further insights on the role played by 
controlling state shareholders. It shows that the public scrutiny triggered by outside 
director activism has a larger impact on CEO accountability in non-SOEs. Columns 3 
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and 4 present the results for the samples partitioned by level of analyst coverage. The 
interaction term of enforcement action and dissenting opinions is only significant in 
the sample with high analyst coverage, suggesting that outside director activism is 
more likely to exert pressure on the CEOs of more transparent companies. Overall, 
these results suggest that although outside directors cannot directly discipline the 
CEOs, their whistleblowing function through the market mechanisms could alert 
outside investors and put executives under more severe scrutiny. 
[Please insert Table 3.11 about here] 
3.6 Conclusion 
The existing literature exhibits mixed results regarding the effectiveness of outside 
directors. This chapter sheds light on the debate on the role of outside directors by 
examining their behaviors. I proposed the following indicators of outside director 
activism: dissenting opinions expressed in board meetings, intentional absences 
without sending a proxy, and voluntary resignations during the appointment period. I 
provided original evidence of the whistleblower role of outside directors in that their 
activism can predict the incidence of regulatory enforcement for fraud and that this is 
captured by financial intermediations. Financial analysts lower company ratings in 
their reports, and mutual funds reduce their shareholdings in the companies. The 
results are robust after using PSM to control the potential sample self-selection bias 
problems, as well as the instrumental variable approach. I further divided the research 
sample by ownership type and found that this effect is more pronounced in non-SOE 
companies, suggesting that the regulatory authorities are less sensitive to the signals 
sent by outside director activism in SOE companies when conducting fraud inspections. 
Finally, I demonstrated that outside director activism could exert pressure on the board 
and strengthen the sensitivity between fraud and CEO turnover. This result is more 
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pronounced in non-SOEs with less CEO entrenchment and greater analyst coverage. 
Overall, the findings suggest that although outside directors cannot direct regulate the 
management team behavior, their whistleblowing function disseminates information 
to regulators and market participants, effectively placing executives under scrutiny. 
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Figure 3.1 
 
This table presents a yearly and industry breakdown of the three protest behaviors of our firm level sample. The sample 
period covers 2005-2010. The industry classification is based on the first 2 digits of GICS. The activism measures are 
defined in Table 1. Fraud is a dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against fraud 
and 0 otherwise. Dissent is a dummy variable assigned to 1 if at least one outside director expressed dissenting opinions 
in board meetings during the year, and 0 otherwise. Absence is a dummy variable assigned to 1 if outside directors are 
absent in board meetings and fail to send a voting proxy during the year, and 0 otherwise. Resign is a dummy variable 
assigned to 1 if at least one outside director resigned during their term in office, and 0 otherwise. Activism is a combined 
dummy variable assigned to 1 if any of the Dissent, Absence or Resign assigned to 1, and 0 otherwise. Other variables 
are defined in Table 1. 
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Tables for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the research sample. It reports the number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation, median, and first and third quartile values of all the main variables used in this chapter. Detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. 
 Variable N Mean Std Dev. P25 Median P75 
（1） Fraud 7148 0.066 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（2） Fraud(SOE=0) 2827 0.091 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（3） Fraud(SOE=1) 4321 0.050 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（4） Dissenting Opinion 7148 0.053 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（5） Intended Absence 7148 0.118 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（6） Resignation 7148 0.032 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（7） Activism 7148 0.181 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（8） Board Independence 7148 0.359 0.051 0.333 0.333 0.375 
（9） CEO Duality 7148 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（10） Multiple Directorship 7148 0.749 0.673 0.250 0.667 1.200 
（11） Outside Director Tenure 7148 4.924 1.415 4.000 5.000 6.000 
（12） Board Meeting Frequency 7148 8.912 3.531 7.000 8.000 10.000 
（13） Board Size 7148 9.255 1.922 9.000 9.000 10.000 
（14） Supervisory Board Size 7148 3.980 1.338 3.000 3.000 5.000 
（15） 
Supervisory Board Meeting 
Frequency 
7148 4.552 1.775 3.000 4.000 6.000 
（16） Ownership Concentration 7148 0.030 0.072 0.000 0.002 0.012 
（17） Price to Book Ratio 7148 3.857 21.241 1.829 3.200 5.312 
（18） ROA 7148 0.121 37.318 -0.020 0.000 0.015 
（19） Ln(Market Value) 7148 21.816 1.195 21.016 21.731 22.501 
（20） SOE 7148 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000 
（21） Sell 7148 -0.058 3.020 -1.000 0.000 1.000 
（22） Report 7148 1.719 9.737 -1.000 0.000 3.000 
（23） Fund_Change 7148 0.516 5.593 -0.534 0.000 1.327 
（24） CEO Turnover 7148 0.159 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000 
（25） Leverage 7148 4.543 64.651 1.475 2.380 4.180 
（26） Od_Regulation 7148 0.845 0.362 1.000 1.000 1.000 
（27） Od_Avg_Pay 7107 45120.720 48193.640 30000.000 40000.000 50400.000 
（28） Fund_Hold_Pct 7148 4.397 7.396 0.000 0.579 5.624 
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Table 3.2 Pairwise correlation matrix 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the research sample. Detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23]  [24]  
[1]Fraud 1.000                        
[2]Dissenting Opinion 0.080* 1.000                       
[3]Intended Absence 0.046* 0.052* 1.000                      
[4]Resignation 0.044* 0.017 0.044* 1.000                     
[5]Activism 0.075* 0.505* 0.775* 0.355* 1.000                    
[6]Board 
Independence 
0.008 -0.021 0.000 -0.019 -0.015 1.000                   
[7]CEO Duality 0.028 0.015 -0.012 0.022 0.002 0.074* 1.000                  
[8]Multiple 
Directorship 
-0.056* -0.036* -0.013 -0.010 -0.030* -0.007 -0.038* 1.000                 
[9]Outside Director 
Tenure 
-0.075* 0.033* 0.061* -0.114* 0.032* -0.101* -0.108* -0.018 1.000                
[10]Board Meeting 
Frequency 
0.025 0.018 0.100* 0.030 0.094* 0.041* -0.038* 0.028 -0.050* 1.000               
[11]Board Size -0.061* 0.006 0.049* -0.002 0.045* -0.271* -0.128* -0.027 0.084* -0.028 1.000              
[12]Supervisory 
Board Size 
-0.035* 0.014 0.038* -0.010 0.033* -0.103* -0.117* -0.020 0.080* -0.042* 0.373* 1.000             
[13]Supervisory 
Board Meeting 
Frequency 
-0.003 -0.006 -0.045* 0.026 -0.030 0.045* 0.037* 0.012 -0.199* 0.331* -0.026 -0.009 1.000            
[14]Ownership 
Concentration 
-0.025 -0.065* -0.070* 0.006 -0.081* 0.052* -0.042* 0.068* -0.131* 0.006 0.009 0.031* 0.087* 1.000           
[15]Price to Book 
Ratio 
0.022 -0.048* -0.020 0.014 -0.032* 0.009 0.024 0.014 -0.040* 0.010 -0.012 0.004 0.030 0.021 1.000          
[16]ROA 0.010 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.026 -0.024 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 1.000         
[17]Ln(Market Value) -0.105* -0.014 -0.081* -0.006 -0.066* 0.061* -0.051* 0.113* -0.082* 0.178* 0.206* 0.170* 0.191* 0.248* 0.012 0.004 1.000        
[18]SOE -0.080* -0.016 0.023 -0.028 0.011 -0.083* -0.197* 0.034* 0.235* -0.060* 0.221* 0.285* -0.109* 0.092* -0.015 -0.004 0.139* 1.000       
[19]Sell -0.008 0.059* 0.014 -0.003 0.040* -0.009 -0.003 -0.013 0.076* 0.021 -0.001 0.012 -0.029 -0.091* 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.026 1.000      
[20]Report -0.029 0.039* -0.006 -0.014 0.011 -0.008 -0.005 0.022 0.044* 0.039* 0.056* 0.039* 0.013 -0.009 0.029 0.000 0.198* 0.018 0.286* 1.000     
[21]Fund_Change -0.009 -0.021 0.000 -0.020 -0.016 -0.017 0.001 -0.016 0.023 -0.050* -0.004 -0.006 -0.035* -0.044* 0.001 0.003 -0.090* -0.022 -0.082* 0.129* 1.000    
[22]CEO Turnover 0.067* 0.023 0.029 0.025 0.031* 0.033* -0.039* -0.018 -0.011 0.089* -0.039* -0.014 0.031* -0.025 -0.029 0.029 -0.055* 0.000 0.010 -0.016 0.006 1.000   
[23]Leverage -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 0.048* -0.010 0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.014 -0.012 -0.011 0.005 0.004 1.000  
[24]Fund_Hold_Pct -0.071* -0.007 -0.042* -0.016 -0.034* -0.005 -0.017 0.081* 0.001 0.094* 0.080* 0.037* 0.096* 0.069* 0.037* -0.002 0.445* 0.046* 0.016 0.206* -0.262* -0.066* -0.005 1.000 
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Table 3.3 Outside director characteristics and activism 
This table presents the association between traditional outside director characteristics measures and activism. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. OD_scholar_r, 
OD_acc_r, D_law_r, OD_engineer_r, OD_economists_r denotes the percentage of outside director are scholars, 
accounting professions, lawyers, engineers as well as economists respectively, detailed definitions of the rest 
variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. 
 
 
  
 
Dissenting Opinion 
Intended 
Absence 
Resignation Activism 
Board Independence -0.569 1.582*** -1.709** 0.911* 
 (-0.76) (2.61) (-2.02) (1.78) 
Multiple Directorship -0.088* 0.053 -0.055 0.008 
 (-1.68) (1.29) (-0.95) (0.23) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.078*** -0.009 -0.220*** -0.066*** 
 (-2.70) (-0.37) (-6.98) (-3.34) 
OD_scholar_r 0.067 -0.118 -0.240* -0.094 
 (0.54) (-1.28) (-1.79) (-1.20) 
OD_acc_r -0.121 -0.416** -0.111 -0.316** 
 (-0.55) (-2.16) (-0.42) (-1.98) 
OD_law_r 0.247 -0.179 -0.235 -0.079 
 (0.86) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.45) 
OD_engineer_r -0.191 -0.229 -0.216 -0.145 
 (-0.78) (-1.06) (-0.84) (-0.82) 
OD_economists_r -0.125 0.004 0.500* -0.019 
 (-0.42) (0.02) (1.77) (-0.09) 
CEO Duality 0.097 0.025 0.033 0.079 
 (1.09) (0.33) (0.36) (1.29) 
OD_Age -0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.000 
 (-0.73) (1.09) (0.48) (-0.12) 
Board Meeting Frequency -0.000 0.075*** 0.026** 0.057*** 
 (-0.02) (8.87) (2.38) (7.49) 
Board Size -0.012 0.040** -0.019 0.026* 
 (-0.59) (2.47) (-0.78) (1.86) 
Supervisory Board Size 0.038 0.054** 0.001 0.048** 
 (1.52) (2.41) (0.04) (2.42) 
Supervisory Board Meeting Frequency 0.041** -0.024 -0.038 -0.013 
 (2.01) (-1.43) (-1.64) (-0.84) 
Ownership Concentration 0.493 -0.007 -0.742 0.004 
 (0.69) (-0.01) (-1.24) (0.01) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.078** -0.138*** -0.156*** -0.137*** 
 (-2.07) (-4.70) (-3.74) (-5.18) 
Price to Book Ratio -0.018* -0.003 0.017** -0.003 
 (-1.87) (-0.40) (2.08) (-0.42) 
ROA 0.357 -0.261 0.060 -0.017 
 (1.00) (-1.00) (0.15) (-0.08) 
Leverage -0.014* -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 
 (-1.70) (-0.32) (-1.22) (-1.08) 
SOE -0.059 0.090 0.092 0.076 
 (-0.78) (1.43) (1.13) (1.39) 
Constant 0.205 -0.769 3.353*** 0.708 
 (0.24) (-1.10) (3.26) (1.14) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.205 0.091 0.114 0.079 
No. of Observations 5607 5607 5590 5607 
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Table 3.4 Outside director activism and enforcement actions against fraud 
This table presents the association between outside director activism and regulatory enforcement against fraud. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. Detailed definitions 
of all the variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. 
 
  
                                                                                                   Fraud 
Dissenting Opinion 0.390***    
 (4.09) 
   
Intended Absence  0.166**   
 
 (2.51)   
Resignation   0.242**  
 
  (1.98)  
Activism    0.214*** 
 
   (3.68) 
Board Independence 0.203 0.154 0.215 0.169 
 (0.38) (0.28) (0.40) (0.31) 
Multiple Directorship -0.086** -0.089** -0.088** -0.088** 
 (-2.18) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-2.24) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.067*** -0.065*** 
 (-2.99) (-3.14) (-3.01) (-2.97) 
CEO Duality -0.080 -0.076 -0.077 -0.078 
 (-1.24) (-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.21) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.016** 0.014* 0.016** 0.013 
 (1.98) (1.71) (1.98) (1.62) 
Board Size -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.01) (-0.17) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.51) 
Supervisory Board Meeting Frequency -0.024 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 
 (-1.52) (-1.34) (-1.40) (-1.36) 
Herfindahl 10 Index -1.381*** -1.339*** -1.335*** -1.334*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.80) (-2.80) (-2.79) 
Fund_Hold_Pct -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (-2.41) (-2.38) (-2.41) (-2.39) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.171*** -0.166*** 
 (-5.57) (-5.58) (-5.63) (-5.48) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (1.27) (1.21) (1.17) (1.23) 
ROA -0.334 -0.317 -0.319 -0.328 
 (-1.35) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.34) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-1.11) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
SOE -0.159*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.166*** 
 (-2.91) (-2.98) (-3.01) (-3.02) 
Constant 2.569*** 2.610*** 2.574*** 2.509*** 
 (3.59) (3.67) (3.63) (3.56) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.059 0.056 0.056 0.058 
VIF 12.29 12.33 12.30 12.32 
VIF(Without Ln(Market Value) 5.57 5.57 5.56 5.58 
No. of Observation 7147 7147 7147 7147 
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Table 3.5 Robustness checks  
This table presents the association between outside director activism and regulatory enforcement against fraud. 
Two instrument variables are defined as follows. OD_Regulation is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
observation is at 2006 or later. Ln_Od_Avg_Pay is a continuous variable equals to the average salary of all 
outside directors. Other variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of 
significance. 
 Fraud 
 PSM Matching Sample PSM Matching Sample With IV 
Dissenting Opinion 0.402***    1.880***    
 (2.63)    (5.12)    
Intended Absence  0.192**    1.732***   
  (1.99)    (8.94)   
Resignation   0.690***    1.852***  
   (2.99)    (12.61)  
Activism    0.307***     
    (3.87)     
Board Independence 0.018 0.150 -2.142 -0.031 0.920 0.637 -0.836  
 (0.01) (0.16) (-0.78) (-0.04) (0.79) (1.07) (-0.57)  
Multiple Directorship 0.043 -0.144* 0.399** -0.089 0.030 -0.025 0.251***  
 (0.39) (-1.77) (2.30) (-1.47) (0.41) (-0.42) (2.82)  
Outside Director Tenure -0.190*** -0.163*** 0.306*** -0.089*** -0.070 -0.057* 0.055  
 (-3.16) (-3.80) (2.80) (-2.58) (-1.37) (-1.84) (1.08)  
CEO Duality -0.391* -0.046 -0.551* -0.086 -0.135 -0.010 -0.123  
 (-1.85) (-0.33) (-1.79) (-0.80) (-1.03) (-0.12) (-0.87)  
Board Meeting Frequency -0.024 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.004 0.013 0.001  
 (-1.10) (1.16) (0.25) (1.44) (0.22) (1.37) (0.06)  
Board Size 0.053 0.029 -0.199** 0.013 0.028 0.029 -0.073  
 (1.23) (0.93) (-2.00) (0.55) (1.10) (1.60) (-1.41)  
Supervisory Board Size -0.092 -0.089** -0.143 -0.040 -0.040 -0.100*** -0.044  
 (-1.35) (-1.99) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-1.03) (-2.74) (-0.79)  
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
0.027 -0.038 0.103 -0.017 0.010 -0.015 0.007  
(0.60) (-1.19) (1.58) (-0.67) (0.39) (-0.70) (0.16)  
Herfindahl 10 Index -0.674 -5.538** -4.626* -4.678*** -3.326** -3.298** -1.872*  
 (-0.36) (-2.57) (-1.82) (-3.86) (-2.12) (-2.22) (-1.87)  
Fund_Hold_Pct -0.021 -0.023* 0.004 -0.027*** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.016  
 (-1.56) (-1.85) (0.23) (-2.61) (-1.07) (-2.60) (-0.77)  
Ln(Market Value) -0.031 -0.033*** -0.042* -0.008 -0.004 -0.021*** -0.016**  
 (-1.49) (-2.64) (-1.79) (-1.02) (-0.43) (-2.59) (-2.17)  
Price to Book Ratio -0.240*** -0.273*** -0.598*** -0.204*** -0.033 -0.137*** -0.266**  
 (-2.60) (-3.98) (-3.66) (-4.18) (-0.41) (-2.81) (-2.48)  
ROA 0.033*** 0.006 -0.076*** 0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.037**  
 (2.64) (0.52) (-3.69) (0.00) (0.22) (-0.76) (-2.10)  
Leverage -0.282 -0.422 -0.661 -0.430 -0.386 -0.143 -0.777*  
 (-0.42) (-1.13) (-0.86) (-1.26) (-0.89) (-0.56) (-1.68)  
SOE -0.124 -0.027 0.065 -0.143 -0.159 -0.033 0.053  
 (-0.85) (-0.23) (0.28) (-1.61) (-1.40) (-0.48) (0.37)  
Constant 4.511** 5.539*** 12.978*** 3.342*** -0.990 2.025 6.424  
 (2.11) (3.56) (3.32) (2.94) (-0.61) (1.62) (.)  
Instrument Variables 
    
Dissenting 
Opinion 
Intended 
Absence 
Resignation 
Od_Regulation     0.784*** -0.251*** 0.718***  
     (5.80) (-3.31) (3.08)  
Ln_Od_Avg_Pay     -0.244** -0.224*** -0.217*  
     (-2.36) (-4.09) (-1.68)  
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.155 0.148 0.358 0.107     
No. of Observations 762 1689 360 2599 734 1620 372  
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Table 3.6 Industry adjusted activism and enforcement actions against fraud 
This table presents the association between outside director activism and regulatory enforcement against fraud. 
Ind_Adj Total Dissenting opinion is an ordinary variable equals to the industry adjusted value of the amount of 
outside director expressed dissenting opinions in board meetings during the year. Ind_Adj Intended absence 
Ratio is a percentage equals to the industry adjusted value of the percentage of outside directors that are absent 
in board meetings and fail to send a voting proxy during the year. Ind_Adj Total Resignation is an ordinary 
variable equals to the amount of outside director resigned during their term in office during a year. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.A1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. 
 
  
 Fraud 
Ind.Adj Total Dissenting Opinion 0.440*** 0.378***     
 (4.65) (3.94)     
Ind.Adj Intended Absence Ratio   1.813*** 1.077*   
   (2.78) (1.65)   
Ind.Adj Total Resignation     0.339*** 0.221** 
     (3.07) (1.98) 
Board Independence  0.201  0.178  0.219 
  (0.38)  (0.33)  (0.41) 
Multiple Directorship  -0.086**  -0.087**  -0.089** 
  (-2.18)  (-2.20)  (-2.25) 
Outside Director Tenure  -0.066***  -0.068***  -0.067*** 
  (-2.99)  (-3.12)  (-3.01) 
CEO Duality  -0.080  -0.075  -0.077 
  (-1.24)  (-1.16)  (-1.19) 
Board Meeting Frequency  0.016**  0.016*  0.016** 
  (1.99)  (1.92)  (1.99) 
Board Size  -0.001  -0.000  0.000 
  (-0.07)  (-0.03)  (0.01) 
Supervisory Board Size  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012 
  (-0.50)  (-0.50)  (-0.50) 
Supervisory Board 
Meeting Frequency 
 -0.024  -0.022  -0.023 
 (-1.51)  (-1.38)  (-1.40) 
Herfindahl 10 Index  -1.378***  -1.350***  -1.340*** 
  (-2.88)  (-2.83)  (-2.81) 
Fund_Hold_Pct  -0.011**  -0.011**  -0.011** 
  (-2.41)  (-2.41)  (-2.41) 
Ln(Market Value)  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 
  (-1.11)  (-1.14)  (-1.14) 
Price to Book Ratio  -0.171***  -0.171***  -0.171*** 
  (-5.58)  (-5.61)  (-5.63) 
ROA  0.007  0.007  0.007 
  (1.25)  (1.21)  (1.15) 
Leverage  -0.331  -0.318  -0.313 
  (-1.34)  (-1.29)  (-1.26) 
SOE  -0.160***  -0.164***  -0.165*** 
  (-2.91)  (-2.98)  (-3.01) 
Constant -1.778*** 2.585*** -1.777*** 2.598*** -1.780*** 2.579*** 
 (-13.24) (3.62) (-13.13) (3.65) (-13.16) (3.64) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.014 0.059 0.010 0.055 0.011 0.0554 
No. of Observations 7147 7147 7147 7147 7145 7145 
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Table 3.7 State controlling shareholder and the effect of activism  
This table presents the role of outside director activism in the split sample of SOEs (state-owned enterprises) 
and non-SOEs (i.e. private firms). Variables are defined in Appendix 3.A1. All z statistics are reported and 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% 
levels of significance. 
 Fraud 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
Dissenting Opinion 0.290**    0.493***    
 (2.13)    (3.55)    
Intended Absence  0.061    0.271***   
  (0.63)    (2.75)   
Resignation   0.221    0.293*  
   (1.22)    (1.80)  
Activism    0.091    0.342*** 
    (1.12)    (3.93) 
Board Independence 0.208 0.176 0.239 0.187 0.113 0.094 0.118 0.086 
 (0.27) (0.22) (0.31) (0.24) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) 
Multiple Directorship -0.140** -0.141** -0.141** -0.141** -0.047 -0.051 -0.048 -0.049 
 (-2.30) (-2.32) (-2.35) (-2.33) (-0.88) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 -0.017 
 (-3.26) (-3.36) (-3.27) (-3.31) (-0.75) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.60) 
CEO Duality -0.125 -0.128 -0.125 -0.129 -0.038 -0.027 -0.032 -0.031 
 (-1.07) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.11) (-0.47) (-0.34) (-0.40) (-0.38) 
Board 
Meeting Frequency 
0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.007 
(1.60) (1.49) (1.52) (1.44) (0.99) (0.75) (1.10) (0.64) 
Board Size -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.006 
 (-0.71) (-0.77) (-0.73) (-0.78) (0.23) (0.33) (0.40) (0.25) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 
 (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.86) 
Supervisory Board 
Meeting Frequency 
-0.065*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.023 
(-2.76) (-2.67) (-2.65) (-2.67) (0.90) (1.04) (0.92) (1.03) 
Herfindahl 10 Index -1.720*** -1.707*** -1.678*** -1.703*** -1.081 -0.978 -1.030 -0.975 
 (-2.66) (-2.64) (-2.60) (-2.63) (-1.45) (-1.33) (-1.40) (-1.32) 
Fund_Hold_Pct -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-2.12) (-2.13) (-2.15) (-2.13) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-1.09) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.197*** -0.194*** -0.203*** -0.190*** 
 (-3.77) (-3.79) (-3.76) (-3.75) (-4.32) (-4.28) (-4.46) (-4.20) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.53) (0.44) (0.39) (0.43) (1.19) (1.28) (1.21) (1.34) 
ROA -0.543 -0.541 -0.517 -0.537 -0.203 -0.171 -0.203 -0.208 
 (-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.20) (-1.24) (-0.65) (-0.56) (-0.65) (-0.68) 
Leverage -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.27) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.03) 
Constant 2.551*** 2.596*** 2.500*** 2.545*** 2.841*** 2.791*** 2.923*** 2.684** 
 (2.69) (2.75) (2.67) (2.71) (2.61) (2.59) (2.71) (2.49) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.042 0.038 0.036 0.043 
No. of Observations 4314 4314 4314 4314 2826 2826 2826 2826 
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Table 3.8 Analyst coverage and the effects of activism 
This table presents the role of outside director activism in the split sample of high level of Analyst Followings 
and low level of Analyst followings calculated by the industry mean value in each year. Analyst Following 
denote the number of financial analysts who write reports for the firm in a given year. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix 3.A1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
industry and year level.*, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. 
 Fraud 
 High Analyst Following Low Analyst Following 
Dissenting Opinion 0.393*** 
   0.365*    
 (3.60) 
   (1.87)    
Intended Absence 
 0.184**    0.080   
 
 (2.38)    (0.59)   
Resignation 
  0.252*    0.216  
 
  (1.68)    (1.08)  
Activism 
   0.251***    0.089 
 
   (3.70)    (0.80) 
Board Independence 0.886 0.800 0.891 0.841 -1.027 -1.007 -1.006 -1.015 
 (1.35) (1.21) (1.35) (1.28) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.18) 
Multiple Directorship -0.077 -0.082 -0.082* -0.082 -0.103* -0.102 -0.099 -0.101 
 (-1.54) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.64) (-1.60) (-1.62) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.082*** -0.040 -0.042 -0.038 -0.040 
 (-2.96) (-3.09) (-3.03) (-2.94) (-1.15) (-1.21) (-1.10) (-1.16) 
CEO Duality -0.170** -0.165** -0.164** -0.167** 0.061 0.065 0.062 0.064 
 (-2.09) (-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.06) (0.57) (0.61) (0.59) (0.60) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.016* 0.014 0.017* 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 
 (1.69) (1.47) (1.73) (1.33) (0.74) (0.61) (0.66) (0.62) 
Board Size 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.011 -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.026 
 (0.67) (0.60) (0.72) (0.55) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.92) (-0.96) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.027 
 (-0.96) (-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.98) (0.74) (0.76) (0.79) (0.76) 
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
-0.019 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.030 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 
(-1.00) (-0.85) (-0.89) (-0.82) (-1.06) (-0.97) (-1.00) (-1.00) 
Herfindahl 10 Index -1.971*** -1.921*** -1.910*** -1.916*** -0.676 -0.647 -0.647 -0.648 
 (-2.96) (-2.90) (-2.89) (-2.89) (-1.03) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-0.98) 
Fund_Hold_Pct -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (-3.07) (-3.04) (-3.06) (-3.05) (0.45) (0.48) (0.45) (0.47) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.180*** -0.173*** -0.126** -0.130** -0.126** -0.128** 
 (-5.32) (-5.28) (-5.35) (-5.17) (-1.97) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-2.00) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 
 (0.39) (0.36) (0.28) (0.38) (1.94) (1.89) (1.90) (1.88) 
ROA -0.247 -0.234 -0.245 -0.249 -0.911 -0.875 -0.857 -0.877 
 (-0.95) (-0.90) (-0.94) (-0.97) (-1.37) (-1.30) (-1.28) (-1.31) 
Leverage -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.34) (-1.33) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
SOE -0.104 -0.105 -0.110 -0.108 -0.248*** -0.256*** -0.254*** -0.256*** 
 (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.59) (-1.56) (-2.76) (-2.83) (-2.82) (-2.82) 
Constant 2.612*** 2.628*** 2.620*** 2.511*** 1.689 1.807 1.663 1.748 
 (3.24) (3.29) (3.27) (3.15) (1.16) (1.24) (1.16) (1.21) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.076 0.073 0.072 0.076 0.057 0.054 0.055 0.055 
No. of Observations 4659 4659 4659 4659 2479 2479 2479 2479 
  
86 
Table 3.9 Analyst recommendations and outside director activism 
This table presents the impact of outside director activism on analyst reports. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 3 A1. The sample period covers 2005–2010 and clustered at the firm level. All z statistics are reported 
and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. 
 
 Sell 
Dissent 0.501*** 
   
 (3.25) 
   
Absence 
 0.036   
 
 (0.30)   
Resign 
  -0.054  
 
  (-0.29)  
Activism 
   0.245** 
 
   (2.45) 
Board Independence 0.388 0.376 0.359 0.432 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.38) (0.46) 
Multiple Directorship -0.115* -0.126* -0.126* -0.122* 
 (-1.66) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.76) 
Outside Director Tenure 0.231*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.238*** 
 (6.44) (6.75) (6.73) (6.66) 
CEO Duality 0.059 0.064 0.063 0.066 
 (0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.51) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 (4.46) (4.51) (4.55) (4.35) 
Board Size 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.023 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.68) (0.63) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.044 
 (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.64) 
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
-0.069*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.068** 
(-2.64) (-2.69) (-2.71) (-2.57) 
Herfindahl 10 Index -4.260*** -4.366*** -4.373*** -4.283*** 
 (-6.81) (-7.00) (-7.01) (-6.87) 
Ln(Market Value) 0.155*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 
 (3.12) (3.47) (3.45) (3.46) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (4.82) (4.77) (4.78) (4.80) 
ROA 1.183*** 1.153*** 1.149*** 1.193*** 
 (3.02) (2.94) (2.93) (3.04) 
Leverage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (-5.88) (-5.89) (-5.90) (-5.71) 
Constant -5.020*** -7.525*** -7.506*** -5.346*** 
 (-4.01) (-4.98) (-4.96) (-4.29) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.032 
No. of Observations 7148 7148 7148 7148 
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Table 3.10 Outside director protests and change in fund ownership 
This table presents the impact of outside director activism on fund ownership. Fund_Change is the annual 
change of the fund ownership measured by the difference of the ratio of shares held by mutual fund in the 
current year minus the ratio in the previous year. The Interaction Term capture the interaction between report 
and Dissent, Absence, Resign and Report, respectively. Other variables are defined in Appendix 3.A1. The 
sample period covers 2005–2010. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. 
 
 Fund_Change 
Dissent -0.369    
 (-1.48) 
   
Absence  -0.217   
 
 (-0.92)   
Resign   0.212  
 
  (0.58)  
Activism    -0.283 
    (-1.51) 
Report 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 
 (8.29) (7.78) (8.09) (7.90) 
Interaction Term  -0.066** 0.028 -0.013 -0.012 
 (-2.04) (0.67) (-0.17) (-0.46) 
Board Independence -0.587 -0.527 -0.437 -0.571 
 (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.28) 
Multiple Directorship -0.346** -0.331** -0.331** -0.336** 
 (-2.34) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.27) 
Outside Director Tenure 0.012 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.16) (-0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
CEO Duality 0.103 0.104 0.106 0.098 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34) 
Board Meeting Frequency -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.133*** 
 (-4.36) (-4.39) (-4.48) (-4.34) 
Board Size -0.067 -0.070 -0.069 -0.066 
 (-0.82) (-0.86) (-0.84) (-0.81) 
Supervisory Board Size 0.058 0.064 0.058 0.057 
 (0.44) (0.49) (0.44) (0.44) 
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
0.079 0.079 0.081 0.077 
(1.50) (1.50) (1.54) (1.46) 
Herfindahl 10 Index 0.741 0.880 0.883 0.755 
 (0.69) (0.83) (0.83) (0.71) 
Ln(Market Value) -1.241*** -1.261*** -1.255*** -1.255*** 
 (-10.27) (-10.38) (-10.39) (-10.41) 
Price to Book Ratio -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (-0.74) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-0.90) 
ROA 0.327 0.313 0.315 0.330 
 (0.90) (0.86) (0.86) (0.90) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.42) (1.38) (1.40) (1.34) 
Constant 28.900*** 29.365*** 27.817*** 29.255*** 
 (5.55) (5.59) (5.63) (5.61) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.054 
No. of Observations 7148 7148 7148 7148 
 
  
88 
Table 3.11 Outside director activism and CEO accountability 
This table presents the impact of outside director activism on the sensitivity of CEO turnover on corporate 
fraud, the main results are presented in Panel A, a split sample results by state ownership and analyst followings 
is presented in Panel B, the calculation on analyst following level is same as Table 3.8. All variables are defined 
as the same in Appendix 3.A1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. 
 
Panel A 
  
 CEO Turnover 
Dissenting Opinion -0.012    
 (-0.14) 
   
Intended Absence  0.022   
 
 (0.39)   
Resignation   0.090  
 
  (0.79)  
Activism    0.001 
 
   (0.02) 
Fraud 0.231*** 0.278*** 0.258*** 0.232*** 
 (3.18) (3.72) (3.67) (2.89) 
Interaction Term 0.405** 0.044 0.411 0.176 
 (2.00) (0.25) (1.42) (1.21) 
Board Independence 0.919** 0.920** 0.940** 0.930** 
 (2.33) (2.32) (2.38) (2.35) 
Multiple Directorship -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.026* -0.027* -0.025 -0.026 
 (-1.69) (-1.71) (-1.57) (-1.64) 
CEO Duality -0.203*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.201*** 
 (-3.71) (-3.69) (-3.68) (-3.68) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (6.79) (6.69) (6.72) (6.73) 
Board Size -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 
 (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.41) (-1.42) 
Supervisory Board Size 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
(1.99) (2.04) (2.06) (2.03) 
Herfindahl 10 Index 0.148 0.151 0.162 0.148 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.51) (0.47) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.094*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.77) (-4.72) (-4.77) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.15) (0.24) 
ROA 0.100 0.105 0.108 0.103 
 (0.51) (0.54) (0.55) (0.53) 
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) 
Constant 0.352 0.348 0.300 0.339 
 (0.77) (0.76) (0.65) (0.74) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 
No. of Observations 7147 7147 7147 7147 
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Panel B 
 CEO Turnover 
 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
High Analyst 
Following 
Low Analyst 
Following 
Dissenting Opinion 0.028 -0.052 -0.063 0.167 
 (0.25) (-0.33) (-0.60) (0.99) 
Fraud 0.164 0.301*** 0.213** 0.261** 
 (1.59) (2.86) (2.46) (2.07) 
Interaction Term 0.068 0.631** 0.509** -0.308 
 (0.21) (2.18) (2.24) (-0.49) 
Board Independence 0.750 0.738 1.252*** 0.398 
 (1.48) (1.14) (2.62) (0.57) 
Multiple Directorship -0.050 0.043 0.006 -0.058 
 (-1.39) (0.94) (0.17) (-1.22) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.045** -0.015 -0.035* -0.023 
 (-2.18) (-0.61) (-1.92) (-0.83) 
CEO Duality -0.043 -0.281*** -0.190*** -0.254*** 
 (-0.52) (-3.74) (-2.89) (-2.68) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 
 (4.72) (5.05) (5.09) (4.65) 
Board Size -0.002 -0.052** -0.008 -0.023 
 (-0.13) (-2.51) (-0.62) (-1.20) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.006 -0.011 0.011 -0.004 
 (-0.36) (-0.30) (0.54) (-0.18) 
Supervisory Board  
Meeting Frequency 
0.045*** 0.000 0.018 0.031 
(3.13) (0.01) (1.32) (1.63) 
Herfindahl 10 Index 0.079 -0.833 0.110 0.240 
 (0.21) (-1.29) (0.27) (0.46) 
Ln(Market Value) -0.077*** -0.149*** -0.125*** 0.010 
 (-3.26) (-3.77) (-5.45) (0.24) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.46) (0.20) (-0.22) (1.16) 
ROA -0.235 0.340 0.161 -0.264 
 (-0.76) (1.45) (0.73) (-0.57) 
Leverage -0.000 0.001** 0.001* -0.000 
 (-0.56) (1.97) (1.78) (-0.82) 
Constant 0.071 1.331 0.973* -1.956** 
 (0.13) (1.38) (1.82) (-2.03) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.024 0.070 0.039 0.037 
No. of Observations 4321 2826 4659 2488 
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Appendix 3.A1 Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Dissenting Opinion A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if there is at least one outside director issued 
dissent opinion to board proposal during the board meeting in the year, 0 otherwise. 
Intended Absence 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if at least one outside director is absent in 
board meetings and fail to send a voting proxy, and 0 otherwise.  
Resignation 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if at least outside director resigned during their 
term in office, and 0 otherwise.  
Activism 
A combined dummy variable assigned to 1 if any of the Dissenting opinion, 
Intended absence or Resignation assigned to 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Outside Director Tenure The average number of years that all outside directors serving in the office 
Multiple Directorship The average number of outside director holding additional directorships 
Board Independence Number of outside directors divided by the board size.  
Board Meeting Frequency  Number of times corporate board meetings took place in a financial year. 
Board Size Number of directors on the firm’s board at the end of the financial year. 
Supervisory Board Size 
Number of directors on the firm’s supervisory board at the end of the financial 
year. 
Supervisory Board 
Meeting Frequency 
Number of times supervisory board meetings took place in a financial year. 
CEO Duality 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, 0 otherwise. 
Fraud  
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm received at least one 
enforcement against fraud by the regulator during the financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
Analyst Following Total number of analysts covering the firm during the financial year.  
No. of Mutual Funds Number of Mutual Funds as the shareholder of the firm in a fiscal year. 
Ownership Concentration  The Herfindahl Index of the largest 10 shareholders 
Price to Book Ratio 
Book value divided by the market value of the firm at the end of the financial 
year.  
Ln(Market Value)  
Natural logarithm of the total market value of the firm at the end of the financial 
year.  
Leverage Total debt divided by total asset of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
ROA 
Industry adjusted return on equity, i.e. net income divided by the average total 
equity of the current and last fiscal year minus the annual industry mean value. 
Sell 
A variable measures the difference of the number of analyst report that rate the 
firm as “Hold” or “Sale” minus the number in the previous year. 
Report The total number of analyst report covering the firm during the financial year 
Fund_Change 
A variable measures the annual change of the fund ownership measured by the 
difference of the ratio of shares held by mutual fund in the current year minus 
the ratio in the previous year. 
Fund_Hold_Pct The percentage of share hold by fund investors during the financial year 
CEO Turnover 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CEO is replaced at least once in 
the year, 0 otherwise. 
SOE  
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the government is the controlling 
shareholder in the firm, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3.A2 Outside director activism and enforcement actions against fraud without firm 
value control variables 
This appendix table presents the association between outside director activism and regulatory enforcement 
against fraud. Variables are defined in Table 1. All z statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the industry and year level. *, **, and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance. Detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix 3.A1. 
  
                                                                                                   Fraud 
Dissenting Opinion 0.412***    
 (4.43) 
   
Intended Absence  0.194***   
 
 (2.90)   
Resignation   0.240**  
 
  (2.10)  
Activism    0.241*** 
 
   (4.24) 
Board Independence -0.086 -0.142 -0.069 -0.118 
 (-0.17) (-0.29) (-0.14) (-0.24) 
Multiple Directorship -0.100*** -0.103*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.79) (-2.77) (-2.76) 
Outside Director Tenure -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.074*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.68) (-3.55) (-3.47) 
CEO Duality -0.072 -0.069 -0.068 -0.071 
 (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-1.12) 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.007 
 (1.36) (1.02) (1.31) (0.94) 
Board Size -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 
 (-0.95) (-1.02) (-0.86) (-1.05) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 
 (-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.99) 
Supervisory Board Meeting Frequency -0.025 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 
 (-1.60) (-1.42) (-1.51) (-1.43) 
Herfindahl 10 Index -1.529*** -1.490*** -1.482*** -1.485*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.35) (-3.34) (-3.33) 
Fund_Hold_Pct -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (-4.94) (-4.89) (-4.94) (-4.85) 
Price to Book Ratio 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.95) (0.91) (0.83) (0.93) 
ROA -0.350 -0.329 -0.336 -0.343 
 (-1.29) (-1.23) (-1.24) (-1.29) 
Leverage -0.197*** -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.202*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.85) (-3.85) (-3.85) 
SOE -0.829*** -0.763** -0.840*** -0.796** 
 (-2.59) (-2.41) (-2.65) (-2.52) 
Constant 2.569*** 2.610*** 2.574*** 2.509*** 
 (3.59) (3.67) (3.63) (3.56) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.059 0.056 0.056 0.058 
VIF(Without Ln(Market Value) 5.57 5.57 5.56 5.58 
Observation 7147 7147 7147 7147 
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Chapter 4 Does Tenure Matter: Role of the Corporate 
Secretary in Chinese Listed Firms15 
4.1 Introduction 
Issues related to corporate governance have gained significant prominence with 
respect to accounting, finance and management research in last two decades, especially 
due to an increase in corporate frauds (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and financial 
liberalization of emerging markets (Bekaert et al., 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
Extant literature on limiting incidence of corporate frauds primarily talks about various 
monitoring mechanisms that promote overall governance quality and board 
effectiveness (Dyck et al., 2010). However, the empirical studies show that the impact 
of the governance quality is mixed for both external and internal monitors (Beasley, 
1996; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). Notwithstanding the findings 
of a negative relation between the level of board independence and incidence of 
corporate fraud (Beasley, 1996; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007), I have seen cases like 
Enron; where even 80 percent outside director expertise on the board was unable to 
prevent an accounting fraud (Ghoshal, 2005). The case of Enron was primarily due to 
the ineffectiveness of the internal governance mechanism; rather than the lack of 
disciplinary capabilities of the related stakeholders (Cohan, 2002). Limited time and 
lack of proper information communication are the key factors that constrain the outside 
directors from properly conducting their job of an effective monitor (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).  
                                                             
15 The modified version of this chapter is accepted by Accounting Horizon and expected to be printed 
in March 2019 
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I believe that the coherence of good corporate governance may not solely rely on 
the monitors, but also on the party who plays an important role in supporting their 
function (Cohan, 2002; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; McNulty and Stewart, 2015; 
Xing et al., 2017). Therefore, instead of focusing on different external monitors and 
other members of the top-management team (e.g., Bamber et al., 2010; Geiger and 
North, 2006; Bird et al., 2015; etc.), in this chapter I concentrate on corporate 
secretaries, whose role overtime has evolved from a ‘humble clerk’ to the key 
governance officer of a firm.16 Despite providing little monitoring function directly, 
corporate secretary plays a key role in establishing a methodical board process by 
forming effective information channel between insiders and outsiders of the firm, 
while simultaneously providing guidance that facilitate the board on the issue of 
compliance to enhance the governance outcome (Xing et al., 2017; McNulty and 
Stewart, 2015). 
This chapter focuses on the Chinese market which, despite being one of the fastest 
growing economies internationally, has significantly underdeveloped legal and 
financial system (Allen et al., 2005). With little support from the legal and institutional 
environment, the role of the corporate secretary in ensuring the governance quality 
becomes even more critical. Furthermore, Chinese stock market regulatory authorities 
require firms to release the in-meeting opinion of outside directors, which makes China 
as a good and unique sample to quantitatively study the effectiveness of corporate 
secretary on the outside directors’ board room behavior. Most importantly, I focus on 
the Chinese sample due to unique and clearly outlined role and responsibilities of the 
corporate secretary in China. Unlike the developed markets, which have been liberal 
                                                             
16 McNulty and Stewart (2015) summarizes the role and responsibilities of the corporate secretary in 
the U.K., while Xing et al. (2017) gives a detailed summary about the tasks of corporate secretary in 
China. 
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in defining the tasks of a corporate secretary in publicly listed firms, China has a 
detailed and standardized regulatory setup to ensure that the corporate secretaries in 
different firms and under different corporate settings follow the same set of regulatory 
obligations. In addition, corporate secretaries in China are exposed to great risk of 
disciplinary penalties, administrative sanctions, and even legal liabilities in cases of 
misconduct.17 The clearly defined and unified roles of corporate secretaries across 
firms with the addition of litigation risk indicate that corporate secretaries in China are 
likely to play more effective role in improving the governance quality.  
All the publicly listed firms in China are required by law to appoint a corporate 
secretary (popularly known as board secretary in China) as a member of the top 
management team. Chinese regulators expect the corporate secretaries to promote and 
sustain good governance practice by implementing effective and lawful board process, 
maintaining quality information flow among directors, management team and other 
stakeholders, as well as educating and prompting the directors and executives to fulfil 
their fiduciary duties and to abide regulatory requirements. In a broader framework, 
these expectations are shared by regulators among a number of developed and 
                                                             
17 There have been many cases where corporate secretaries in China were punished due to failing to 
properly execute their duties, or involving in fraudulent activities. For example, in the year of 2012 only, 
corporate secretaries in 18 firms received the disciplinary penalties from the stock exchanges, and 
corporate secretaries in another 12 firms received the administrative sanctions from the CSRC (i.e., 
China Securities Regulatory Commission). The following are some of the representative or notable 
cases: On Sept. 16, 2003, due to fraudulent financial reporting, Ningxia Yinchuan Intermediate People's 
Court sentenced Ding Gongmin, the board secretary and chief accountant of YinGuangXia (stock code 
000557), for 2.5 years with a fine of up to RMB 80,000. The former board secretary, Dong Bo, was also 
sentenced for 3 years with a fine of RMB 100,000. In 2006, the CEO of YiLiGuFen (stock code 600887) 
was sentenced to 6 years due to embezzlement while at the same time, the corporate secretary 
ZhangXianZhu and another three top managers also received 1-3 years of jail sentences as the 
accessories to the embezzlement of funds. In December 2008, the corporate secretary of 
STLianYou (stock code 000691) received a public censure for failing to ensure the vote avoidance of 
the affiliated directors in deciding the transactions that may involve the related-party. In July 2011, the 
corporate secretary of WuLiangYe (stock code 000858), Peng Zhifu, was fined RMB 100,000 along 
with a disciplinary warning given by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for failing to disclose the firm’s 
major investments and losses in security markets. Peng Zhifu had to resign from the corporate secretary 
position after 12 years of service in the firm and was also banned from acting as a corporate secretary 
for any firm for next three years.  
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developing countries. To start with, similar to China, the role of the U.K. corporate 
secretary defined in the Corporate Governance Code of 2012 is not limited to that of 
an administrative officer, but also as a professional who assists the flow of credible 
and quality information both within the board, and between the outside directors and 
management team. Also in the U.K., all the directors are entitled to the advice of 
corporate secretary for professional decision-making at the board level and for overall 
governance purposes. Regulators in other countries like Singapore, Russia, and South 
Africa have similar requirements for their corporate secretaries. In addition, like China, 
in Australia the corporate secretary should be readily accessible to all the board 
directors, and accountable for all the governance issues through the board chairman. 
In India, corporate secretaries are also expected to act as a legal officer, while 
simultaneously acting as the conscience seeker of the company to monitor the behavior 
of the management team. 
Despite the aforementioned similarities, according to Xing et al. (2017), the 
corporate secretaries in China also differ from those in western countries since their 
duties in China are more demanding. They are also in charge of investor relationships 
and jointly responsible with CFO for information disclosure while in many other 
countries, such as the U.S., these are mostly the duties of CEOs and CFOs. 
Furthermore, corporate secretaries, instead of the General Counsels, act as the liaison 
between firms and different regulatory bodies in China. More importantly, the 
corporate secretaries in China report directly to board of directors instead of CEO or 
General Counsels. As I have discussed, they also undertake legal and regulatory duties 
and they are subject to greater litigation risk relative to their peers in other countries.  
In order to maintain the generality of the analysis, I focus in this chapter the 
functions of the corporate secretary that are shared by other countries and summarize 
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them within three distinct roles, namely company clerk, boundary spanner, and guiding 
and facilitating role.18  
First, the corporate secretary in many countries is expected to act as the company 
clerk, who although is not directly involved in decision making process, but is crucial 
in deciding the quality of the board processes. Dalton and Dalton (2005) point out that 
the impediments to effective boardroom process can be easily resolved by a carefully 
determined board meeting agenda and also by providing directors with board materials 
well in advance of the meeting, thereby leaving sufficient time for boardroom 
discussion and debate. Corporate secretaries are responsible for scheduling the board 
meeting and managing the meeting agenda. Acting in this administrative capacity 
affords them the potential to exert a considerable degree of influence and control over 
the physical and temporal setting of the board meeting, which can be critical for its 
effectiveness (McNulty and Stewart, 2015). In addition, ensuring that the director 
attend meeting with adequate related information is also one of the key job descriptions 
of the corporate secretary. The quality of their work in this role is also closely 
associated with the capacity of the board for good decision making.  
Second, as McNulty and Stewart (2015) show, in addition to the company clerk 
role, corporate secretaries are also required to play the boundary spanning role to 
ensure quality information flow to the outside directors. Information constraints can 
severely hinder the ability of even highly talented board members to effectively 
execute the monitoring role and to evaluate the management and firm’s strategy 
(Jensen, 1993). Since good information flow is one of the key attributes for effective 
board processes and the outside director activism (Payne et al., 2009; Duchin et al., 
                                                             
18 Xing et al (2017) has analyzed the impacts of corporate secretaries in China on the quality of financial 
disclosure. I will leave the discussion or any empirical analysis on corporate secretaries’ impact on 
investor relation to future research.  
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2010), the ability of the corporate secretary to summarize, filter, interpret, draw 
inference from and distribute ‘the right information to the right person at the right 
time’ is crucial in ensuring the effective performance of the outside directors and the 
board in general. 
Third, in recent years, in many countries the corporate secretaries are taking an 
additional responsibility of guiding and facilitating the board (McNulty and Stewart, 
2015). All the board members are expected to have a clear understanding about the 
company compliance code as well as their duties and responsibilities before 
undertaking tasks. In the U.S., although it is not mandatory as in China, the corporate 
secretary in many listed firms often takes the dual role of the general counsel who 
guides and disciplines the firm on legal and compliance matters (Kwak et al., 2012). 
Besides, in some emerging countries like China and India, lately corporate secretaries 
not only conduct the guiding and facilitating role, but are also required to monitor the 
behavior of the executives and board members, and can directly report to the regulators 
if they identify any inappropriate behavior by the senior management team without 
obtaining the formal consent from the CEO or the board. Simply put, this mechanism 
restricts the possibility of illegal collusion between the outside directors and insiders, 
thereby not only negating the possibility of principal-agent conflict, but also the 
agency conflict between shareholders and outside directors (Kumar and 
Sivarmakrishnan, 2008; Deutsch et al., 2011). 
To sum it all up, these discussions show that the quality of corporate secretaries’ 
work may have great impact on the firm-level governance quality. The role of a 
corporate secretary is no longer that of a ‘humble clerk’ who is merely expected to 
follow orders from the management team. Rather, they act as the person who advocates 
the collective conscience of the company regarding efficient corporate governance 
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(Xing et al., 2017; Kwak et al., 2012; McNulty and Stewart, 2015). 
Since appointing a corporate secretary is mandatory for the A-share listed firm in 
China, I empirically study their importance on governance quality by examining the 
impact of their in-firm tenure. The empirical results show that the corporate secretaries 
with longer in-firm tenures in their job exhibit a better understanding of the firm and 
relevant skills which have a direct influence in reducing the board meeting frequency, 
outside director in-meeting dissent, and most importantly incidence of corporate fraud 
and related lawsuits. In addition, except the outside director dissent opinion, the impact 
of corporate secretary tenure on board meeting efficiency and internal control quality 
is equally effective on the SOEs and the non-SOEs. As a robustness check, I employ 
the instrument variable analysis and the PSM method to address any potential 
endogeneity issue. In a subsample analysis, I also control for additional factors that 
reflect the unique setting of the governance environment for firms in China. All of the 
conclusions remain. Lastly, I examine the impact of corporate secretary tenure on 
outside director absence from board meeting, Modified Audit Opinion (MAO), analyst 
coverage, and number of mutual funds investing in the firm as alternate measures of 
firm-level governance outcome. All the results are consistent with the main hypotheses.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on corporate governance by 
focusing on the role of corporate secretary. The empirical results about the importance 
of the corporate secretary on positive governance outcome directly confirm the 
theoretical foundation proposed in McNulty and Stewart (2015) and empirical test with 
respect to management earnings forecast by Xing et al., (2017). More generally, the 
findings of this chapter advocate the research on corporate governance to extend from 
the effectiveness of monitors to the parties who may directly influence and channelize 
such effectiveness. Additionally, using the corporate secretary tenure as the proxy for 
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their effectiveness on governance related factors, I add new evidence to the existing 
literature (see Miller, 1991; Thomas et al.; 1991; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993) on the 
importance of executive tenure towards their job performance and risk tolerance 
I believe that the findings are of interest to not only Chinese regulators and 
policymakers, but also those countries where the corporate secretaries share the similar 
roles and responsibilities of a corporate secretary in China. The evidence presented is 
also of interest to retail investors who are generally oblivious of the day to day 
activities of the firm, and are likely to be blindsided in case of a corporate fraud (e.g.: 
Enron in 2001, Worldcom in 2002, AIG in 2005, Satyam Computers in 2009, etc.). By 
appointing a competent and experienced corporate secretary, firms can not only 
mitigate the possibility of a corporate fraud, but also improve the board process, and 
assist in reducing principal-agent conflict. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 The Importance of Management Tenure 
Previous studies document the organizational tenure of the manager as an important 
factor that directly influences their performance and level of risk tolerance. With 
respect to job performance, upper echelons theory suggests that managerial tenure has 
significant impact on organizational outcome–strategic decision making and 
organizational performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Cannella, 
1993). Sturman (2003) shows that the organizational tenure gained from working in a 
specific job will not only help the employee in enhancing their knowledge, but also 
have a unique positive impact on their performance. The empirical research has 
demonstrated a positive impact of CEO tenure on the firms’ acquisition strategy and 
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international expansion since longer tenured CEOs have better expertise, knowledge 
and commitment (Herrmann and Datta, 2002; Jaw and Lin, 2009). Regarding the level 
of risk tolerance, through a survey study, Clinard (1983) shows that the middle 
management with shorter tenure exhibit a higher likelihood of being involved in illegal 
activities since they are not only more aggressive, but are also inclined to focus on 
quick profit maximizing strategies. This survey study also documents that the CEOs 
with a longer tenure are more likely to become ‘stale in the saddle’ i.e. unwilling to 
take risk. Consistent with Clinard (1983), both Miller (1991) and Thomas et al. (1991) 
find that CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to adopt less risky firm strategies. 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) demonstrate that experienced managers reduce the 
probability of organizational risk taking. 
Xing et al., (2017) report that the responsibilities of corporate secretaries are way 
more demanding and legally binding in China compared to the western markets. A 
corporate secretary’s tenure in the firm would be a good proxy for his/her performance, 
risk tolerance, and effectiveness in improving governance quality. In the following 
sub-sections, I develop the hypotheses on how tenured corporate secretary have better 
capacity of enhancing board meeting efficiency, provide better boundary spanning 
function, as well as reduce the incidence of corporate fraud and lawsuit. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate Secretary Tenure and Board Process Efficiency 
Compared with other frequently mentioned factors such as director shareholding, 
independent ratios, CEO duality or board size, board process could be even more 
influential in determining the board effectiveness (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). As 
discussed above, the basic function of the corporate secretary is to act as a company 
clerk by engaging in the board meeting process. The potential impact of corporate 
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secretary on the efficiency of board process is suggested in several studies. Keil and 
Nicholson (2005), for their research on board and director evaluation, considers the 
corporate secretary as an important corporate governance personnel in the firm. Dalton 
and Dalton (2005) mention that the CEO and the corporate secretary need to establish 
an appropriate agenda for the board to ensure that all directors could timely receive the 
meeting material. Wan and Ong (2005) include corporate secretary in their research on 
board meetings in Singapore, because their interviewees recommended that the 
corporate secretary is important for the board meeting process. 
I capture the efficiency of the board meetings by the board meeting frequency in 
the empirical analysis. As Pye and Pettigrew (2005) show “…[Outside Director] may 
meet only six times a year, yet their decision-making is considered vital to their 
organizations and organizing. Much of their work takes place either behind closed 
doors or ‘back-stage’. ” This explains that good director work does not require 
frequent board meetings. Using the U.S. data, Vafeas (1999) found that more frequent 
board meetings can significantly harm the firm value and is positively correlated with 
the weakness of internal control. Goh (2009) also argues that high frequency of 
corporate board meeting indicates the magnitude of the problems being faced by the 
firm. 
In context of the Chinese market, Chen et al. (2006) find that board meeting 
frequency is positively related to the incidence of corporate fraud. They argue that the 
firms that commit frauds have more board meetings because the directors realize some 
acts or decisions are borderline legal, so there is more debate about executing these 
decisions, resulting in more meetings. Consistent with Chen et al. (2006), although 
Xing et al. (2017) find a significant positive relation between the frequency of board 
meetings in China and the frequency of earnings forecast by the management, they 
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find an insignificant effect of meeting frequency on actual quality, accuracy and the 
information content of the earnings forecast released by the board. This clearly shows 
that in the Chinese setting, frequent board meetings do not signal increased vigilance 
and oversight of the top management of the firm. 
To the extent that the board room efficiency can be captured by the board meeting 
frequency, I expect tenured corporate secretary in China to enhance the board process 
efficiency and to reduce the frequency of corporate board meeting. Although the 
corporate secretary does not decide the frequency of board meetings, an experienced 
and diligent corporate secretary should have a better understanding of the dynamics in 
the board room, knowledge of the firm, and the attributes of various directors. They 
are more likely to provide a more comprehensive picture of the key issues to be 
discussed in the board meeting and better utilize the board meeting time for 
constructive dialogue between management and directors. In principle, they should 
have better capacities to increase the quality of the meeting, and reduce the meeting 
inefficiency as well as the number of necessary meetings. Therefore, based on the 
above argument and literature, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H4.1: Corporate secretary with longer tenure reduces the board meeting 
frequency. 
4.2.3 Corporate Secretary Tenure and Pre-meeting Negotiation between 
Outside Directors and Executives 
As emphasized in McNulty and Stewart (2015), the corporate secretary also acts as a 
boundary spanner who delivers information to the outside parties including the outside 
directors who, although suffer adversely from information asymmetry, are 
conventionally considered as the centerpiece for monitoring a firm’s decision making 
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process (Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008). 19  From the governance space 
perspective, information is critical for outside directors’ effectiveness, especially when 
they lack relevant industry knowledge (Dass et al., 2014). Therefore, corporate 
secretary as a boundary space spanner should communicate information between the 
insiders and outside directors, thereby helping the later to participate in effective 
decision-making process. 
Following Jiang et al. (2016), I use the outside director in-meeting dissent 
behavior to capture the effectiveness in corporate secretary’s boundary spanning role. 
Firstly, the in-board meeting opinion of outside directors (e.g., outside director dissent) 
is a good reflection of outside directors’ behavior in the monitoring process. Adams et 
al. (2010) argue that instead of asking the question of ‘who they are’, it will be wiser 
for the studies on outside directors to ask the question of ‘what they do’. The dissent 
opinion of the outside directors in board meetings is an excellent variable that partially 
capture ‘what they do’. Secondly, the dissent opinion of the outside directors could be 
a potential indicator for the quality in the corporate secretary’s boundary spanning 
work. It indicates inadequate pre-meeting negotiations / communications between the 
directors and management team (Dalton and Dalton, 2005), which leaves the outside 
directors with an only choice to say ‘No’ publicly to proposals that the executives insist 
in pursuing. 
Since the corporate secretary acts as the boundary spanner between the outside 
directors and the management team, those with longer tenure with the firm should be 
able to better digest, understand, deliver and explain the information between the two 
                                                             
19  Due to the knowledge-work complexity, level of market competition, economic conditions and 
change in the flat-work structure, organizational teams are required to coordinate interdependently by 
linking the inside of the team with the outside environment (Marrone, 2010). Such interdependent work 
linkage, both within the organization or across the boundary to the outside parties is termed as boundary 
spanning (Ancona, 1990). 
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parties before the meeting. This will help the management team to enhance the positive 
outcome of the pre-meeting negotiation with the outside directors, so that, if possible, 
they can reach an agreement before the meeting commences. As Finkelstein and 
Mooney (2003) states, effective information flow could avoid the outside directors to 
stand-up and challenge the CEOs in public; i.e. the incidence of in-meeting dissent 
will be reduced. 
Contrarily, the incidence of in-meeting dissent could also reduce if the collusion 
behavior exists between the corporate secretary and the executives. That is the 
corporate secretary may withhold critical information from the outside independent 
directors prior to the board meeting, with the aim of reducing their expression of 
dissenting opinions in meetings. However, in China, the corporate secretaries are 
appointed by the board of directors rather than the CEO. They have important legal 
and regulatory duties and they act as the liaison between firms and different regulatory 
bodies which subject them to greater litigation risks arising from irresponsible 
information disclosure (Xing et al., 2017) or any other misconduct. I believe that 
reduced dissent should is more likely to reflect the good quality of boundary spanning 
work rather than the result of collusion behavior of the corporate secretary.20 Based 
on this discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H4.2: Corporate secretary with longer tenure reduces the incidence of outside 
director in-meeting dissent opinion. 
                                                             
20 If the collusion hypothesis dominates, then I would expect to find the dissent opinion to be negatively 
correlated with the firm’s fraudulent behaviour. That is, less dissent opinion is expressed in the board 
meetings due to insufficient information, and the outside directors fail to play their monitoring role. The 
preliminary results however show that the dissent opinions of the outside directors are positively 
correlated with the fraudulent behaviour of the firms suggesting that outside directors play the role of 
whistle blower through their dissent opinions.   
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4.2.4 Corporate Secretary Tenure and Internal Control Outcomes 
Jensen (1993) shows that internal control mechanisms headed by the board of directors 
is a critical part of corporate control. Apart from the two key roles discussed above, 
corporate secretaries also assist in improving the internal control of the firm. For 
example, corporate secretary facilitates the board members in their function by either 
training or guiding the directors on compliance and legal matters, or as legally obliged 
in China and India, undertake a disciplinarian role on the decisions of the managers 
and directors. Additionally, in countries such as U.S., the corporate secretary 
sometimes serves as the Chief Legal Officer of the firm, which helps shaping the firm’s 
corporate governance quality (Bird et al., 2015).  
To empirically examine the impact of corporate secretary on the quality of 
internal control, I focus their impact on corporate fraud and lawsuit, both of which are 
largely induced by poor internal control (Persons, 2006; Beasley, 1996). Caplan (1999) 
shows that management frauds are more likely to appear in firms with weaker internal 
controls. Bell and Carcello (2000) have also documented a direct linkage between the 
quality of internal control and the incidence of accounting fraud. Aharony et al. (2015) 
and Liu (2016) argue that lawsuits are likely to be caused by directors’ and executives’ 
failure in identifying the potential legal risk and also due to ineffective internal control. 
I argue that the longer tenured corporate secretary could better enhance the 
internal control qualities and reduce the incidence of fraud and lawsuit. This argument 
is largely motivated by the following rationales: First, as Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
shows, tenure is related to managerial performance. Longer tenure indicates that the 
corporate secretary has better knowledge and understanding of the firm-specific 
compliance and legal issues, thereby guiding and facilitating the board in proper 
decision making process. Second, management tenure generally appears to have a 
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positive association with the level of risk aversion of the senior management (Clinard, 
1983; Miller, 1991; Thomas et al., 1991; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and it is likely 
that corporate secretaries will be no exception. A lower tolerance for risk will cause 
them to be less averse to any activities that may lead managers to conduct fraud or 
expose the firm to legal risk. Third, longer tenured corporate secretary who has better 
understanding of the operations, business strategies, financial status, market 
competition, and management activities of the firm should have better ability in 
summarizing, filtering, interpreting and most importantly communicating the 
information to both internal and external board members in order to assist them in 
monitoring the management team, and steer the firm away from potential legal 
liabilities.  
At last, literature documents that managerial tenure is positively associated with 
managers’ bargaining power (Chava et al., 2010; Salas, 2010). It is expected that longer 
tenured corporate secretaries are not only more skilled, but also have greater power, 
resources and support to effectively oversee and facilitate the actions of the 
management and board. They are also better motivated to conduct their duties and 
reduce the incidence of corporate fraud or lawsuit to protect their personal reputation 
and career. Alternatively, a corporate secretary with long tenure may use the increased 
bargaining power to engage in self-benefiting entrenchment activities. However, 
although CEO compensation in China is directly dependent on a firm's reported 
earnings (Firth et al., 2006), hence motivating them to undertake fraudulent activities 
to boost the firm earnings, this is not the case when it comes to the compensation of 
other executives in China (Huang and Zhang, 1998; Mengistae and Xu, 2004). In 
China, the primary role of the corporate secretary is that of a facilitator among board-
members, executives, shareholders, and regulators and it is unlikely that they will 
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directly benefit from the fraudulent behavior. Consistent with this, Xing et al. (2017) 
find that corporate secretaries who issue high-quality and less optimistically biased 
earnings forecast receive significantly higher compensation in China. Based on these 
discussions, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H4.3: Corporate secretary with longer tenure reduces the incidence of corporate 
fraud and lawsuit. 
 
4.3 Variable Description and Methodology 
4.3.1 Variable Description 
In this chapter, I test the hypotheses using a sample of A-share Chinese firms listed on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Following Hou and Moore (2010) and Chen 
et al. (2006), the data is sourced from CCER, CSMAR, and Wind Info. These databases 
are popular sources for the firm-level accounting, financial, board and legal data for 
Chinese listed firms. The sample period commences in 2004 and extends through 2012. 
To eliminate the influence of outliers, I winsorize the variables at both top and bottom 
one percent of their respective distributions. After matching all the available firm-level 
data, excluding the missing values, and addressing the lead-lag requirement of the 
model specification, I end up with 13,164 firm-year observations. Appendix 4.A1 
provides detailed definition for each variable used in this chapter. 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter. 
Average tenure of the corporate secretary in the sample is 5.057 years, with 2 and 7 
years at the first and third quartiles. The board size in the sample is relatively similar 
across firms with 9 to 10 members in the range of first and third quartiles, who on 
average (median) meet 8.878 (8.0) times annually. The median (third quartile) board 
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independence of 0.333 (0.375) with a low standard deviation of 0.05 clearly implies 
that most Chinese firms only hire one in three outside directors on their board. This is 
primarily to meet the minimum requirement mandated by the regulators in China. Next, 
in the sample, most of the proposals presented in the board meetings are agreed upon 
by outside directors as their dissent behavior appears only in 3.4% cases. On an 
average, 5.3% outside directors are absent in board meetings. There are about 10.6% 
and 8.1% of the firm-year observations in the sample that have experienced lawsuit 
and regulatory enforcement against corporate fraud respectively. I observe that 14.5% 
of the firm-years report actual fraudulent behavior which is higher than the incidence 
of regulatory enforcement against fraud. This is due to the fact that some of the 
fraudulent behavior exists for more than one year. There appears to be a significant 
firm-level variation in analyst coverage, with no analyst coverage during a fiscal year 
at 25th percentile and up to 9 analysts covering a firm at 75th percentile of the sample 
distribution. The variation in the number of mutual funds investing in the firm is also 
significant, with 1 mutual fund holding the firm in their portfolio at 25th percentile and 
19 mutual funds holding the firm at the 75th percentile. Mean ownership concentration 
of the largest ten shareholders is 56.7%; suggesting that the ownership of Chinese 
firms is highly concentrated. About 14.9% of firm-year observations experienced 
corporate secretary turnover over the sample period, suggesting a relatively high 
mobility of the corporate secretary position. Finally, 52.4% of the firm-years in this 
chapter are classified as SOEs i.e. have government as a controlling shareholder. This 
reflects an almost equal distribution between SOEs and Non-SOEs in this chapter The 
corporate secretaries in China sometimes take other management positions in the firm. 
As reported in Table 1, the corporate secretary can simultaneously hold an additional 
dual position of a senior executive such as CEO or VP, or the CFO of the firm. In the 
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sample of 13,164 firm-years, from 2004 to 2012, I find that the corporate secretary can 
undertake a dual role of senior executive of the firm in 24% cases, and lastly as the 
CFO of the firm in only 8.2% cases.  
[Please insert Table 4.1 about here] 
In Table 4.2, I report the correlation coefficients among different variables used 
in this chapter. The results show a significant negative correlation between the 
corporate secretary tenure and corporate fraud (-0.06), lawsuit (-0.06), outside director 
dissent (-0.04), and annual board meeting frequency (-0.09). These significant negative 
correlation coefficients are consistent with the baseline hypotheses. 
[Please insert Table 4.2 about here] 
4.3.2 Methodology 
To test the three hypotheses, I use the following models: 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡       (4.1) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                              (4.2) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                        (4.3) 
The Board Meeting Frequency is the number of times corporate board meeting 
took place in a financial year t for firm j. Dissent is a dummy variable which equals to 
1 if there is at least one outside director issued different opinions towards the board 
proposal during the board meeting of firm j in year t, 0 otherwise. Fraud_Lawsuit is a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if either the firm received a regulatory enforcement 
against fraud or a lawsuit was filed against the firm j in year t, 0 otherwise. On the 
right hand side of the equation, the key explanatory variable ln(Secretary Tenure) 
represents the natural logarithm of the number of years the corporate secretary has 
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served in the said position up to year t with firm j. 
The three basic models also incorporate an array of firm-level control variables 
which may have a significant influence on board processes. The first group of control 
variables capture the conventional firm-level financials and accounting parameters 
such as firms’ growth opportunities (BTMV), size (Ln(Market Value)), outstanding debt 
(Leverage), profitability (Sales Growth), and relative profitability (Adjusted ROE). I 
also control for the age of the firm (Ln(Firm Age)). The second group of firm-level 
control variables represents governance indicators. At the board-level, I control for the 
total number of directors on the firms’ board (Board Size), the proportion of outside 
directors on the firms’ board (Board Independence), and CEO Duality. For equation 
4.2 and equation 4.3, I also include the Board Meeting Frequency as the control 
variable. Besides, following Jiang et al. (2016), I add the outside director dissent 
behavior (Dissent) as governance related control variable in Model 4.3. Finally, the 
third group of control variables represent market-related features, including trading 
liquidity of the firm (Equity Turnover) and a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm is audited by one of the big four accounting firms (Big4 Auditor). The number of 
analysts covering a firm in a financial year (Analyst Coverage) is also included in the 
third group in equation 4.3 to account for the impact of analyst coverage as the outside 
monitor. In regressions with continuous variables as the dependent variables, I use the 
firm fixed effect model and control the year dummies. In regressions when dependent 
variables are dummies, I apply the probit model and control the industry and year 
effects. Furthermore, since there is a potential lag between the actual incidence of fraud 
and the regulatory enforcement against the fraud, following Hou and Moore (2010) I 
use a 1-year lead for the dependent variable (Fraud_Lawsuit) in equation 4.3 in order 
to address the potential endogeneity concerns.  
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4.4 Empirical Evidence for the Three Main Hypotheses 
4.4.1 Full Sample Results 
The results about the impact of corporate secretary tenure on the board meeting 
frequency, outside director dissent opinion and the incidence of corporate fraud and 
lawsuit are reported in Table 4.3. Columns 1 and 2 report that the coefficients of 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) are significantly negative at 1% level, both with (t-stat.=-7.84) 
or without (t-stat.=-8.10) the control variables. These basic results are consistent with 
hypothesis H4.1, i.e. the board meeting frequency is negatively associated with the 
corporate secretary tenure.  
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.3, I can see that consistent with H4.2, the 
coefficients for Ln(Secretary Tenure) are significantly negative at 1% level with (t-
stat.=-3.31) or without (t-stat.=-4.24) the control variables, indicating that tenure of 
the corporate secretary is negatively associated with the incidence of outside director 
dissent during the board meeting. This supports the conjecture that longer tenured 
secretary can play a better role of boundary spanning to promote a more effective 
communication and pre-meeting negotiations between the executives and outside 
directors. This is likely to motivate executives to propose a low risk project with an 
approach for shareholder wealth maximization, resulting in outside directors to raise 
less dissent opinions during the board meetings.  
Lastly, the results for the impact of corporate secretary tenure on the incidence of 
corporate fraud and lawsuit are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.3. The coefficients 
for Ln(Secretary Tenure) are significantly negative at 1 percent level for both without 
(t-stat.=-6.87) and with (t-stat.=-3.69) control variables respectively. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that longer tenured corporate secretaries are more likely 
to induce a better quality of internal control and result in lower incidence of fraud and 
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lawsuit. These findings are also consistent with the risk-averse notion of Clinard (1983) 
and Miller (1991), which suggests that the tenured corporate secretary is less likely to 
comply with the risky activities of the executives. 
[Please insert Table 4.3 about here] 
4.4.2 Results in SOE and Non-SOE Subsamples 
In vein with Allen et al (2005), there may be significant difference between state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and private sector listed firms (Non-SOEs), and the 
governance in SOEs is always seen as less efficient (Cornett et al., 2010). For example, 
the governance structure of Chinese SOEs needs to ensure that the Chinese Communist 
Party organization has significant influence on their decisions (Wang, 2014), which 
makes the decision making process more complicated. In addition, the motivation of 
management team in SOEs may differ from those in Non-SOEs. Many executives in 
SOEs have political positions (Jiang and Kim, 2015), and they may eventually return 
to the government as officers after their tenure with the firm (Firth et al., 2006; Conyon 
and He, 2011). In this case, these politically connected executives may be more 
incentivized by political promotion rather than financial compensation. For them, the 
financial performance of the firm is sometimes less important than production targets 
(White, 2000), and their decisions may put other social objectives ahead of the 
shareholder wealth (Fan et al., 2007). Finally, the regulatory environment for SOEs is 
also different from Non-SOEs. Hou and Moore (2010) shows that, possibly due to the 
mutual affiliation of the SOEs and the regulatory commission, the probability of the 
listed SOEs receiving regulatory enforcement against fraud decreases as the proportion 
of state holding increases.  
Motivated by the potential difference between SOEs and Non-SOEs, I investigate 
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whether the impact of corporate secretary tenure differs in SOEs versus in Non-SOEs. 
To start with, I rerun the regressions specified in Table 4.3 with SOE and Non-SOE 
subsamples respectively and report the results in Table 4.4. I then conduct the Chow 
tests for the three models, and find that the set of coefficients for each model are 
significantly different between SOEs and non-SOEs suggesting that the governance 
environments are indeed different in these two subsamples. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that the impacts of corporate secretary tenure differ. In Table 4.4, I 
report the Chi2 statistics and relevant P-values that indicate whether the coefficients 
on Ln(Secretary Tenure) are significantly different between SOEs and Non-SOEs. I 
can see that the impact of secretary tenure on Board Meeting Frequency and 
Fraud_Lawsuit are both significant in two subsamples and there is no significant 
difference between SOEs and Non-SOEs. This suggests that the corporate secretaries’ 
impact in increasing board meeting efficiency and quality of internal control are quite 
pervasive irrespective of the ownership structure of the firm. These results provide 
strong supports to hypotheses 1 and 3. 
However, for the Outside Director Dissent, I can see that the coefficient on the 
secretary tenure is not significant in SOEs, and the difference of that between SOEs 
and Non-SOEs is significantly different from zero. The dissent behavior of outside 
directors in the board meetings is an indicator of the poor quality of pre-meeting 
negotiation, and the ineffectiveness of the corporate secretary in facilitating this 
negotiation process in SOEs may be due to following reasons: first, SOEs are likely to 
put greater emphasis on other social objectives in addition to the shareholder wealth, 
and the outsider directors may propose dissent opinions when they believe the 
proposals are not in the best interest of the shareholders. Second, as I have discussed, 
many of the executives in SOEs also hold positions in government, and they may be 
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seeking political promotion rather than the recognition from the market (Jiang and Kim, 
2015). Their willingness and incentives to communicate and take advice from outside 
directors is less than those executives in the non-SOEs. Third, some SOEs are highly 
hierarchy oriented communities, however long their tenure is, corporate secretaries in 
these firms may have far less bargaining power while dealing with the executives with 
government backgrounds. Consequently, their ability to conduct good boundary 
spanning role suffers. 
 [Please insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 
4.5 Further Addressing the Endogeneity Concern 
In prior analysis, although I use a 1-year lead for Fraud_Lawsuit as the dependent 
variable to address the potential endogeneity issues in the research sample, I still 
cannot ignore the fact that the corporate secretary is an insider who is likely to know 
and resign (hence influence tenure) before the ongoing corporate fraud is revealed by 
the regulators. To further address the endogeneity problem, I adopt three approaches, 
namely the propensity score matching (PSM), the instrumental variable (IV) 
regression analysis, as well as using additional control variables to check the 
robustness of the findings. 
4.5.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Method 
I conduct the PSM on the three models that examine the main hypotheses. Existing 
literature recommends the PSM approach as a superior econometric method which 
could provide more accurate and effective matching results (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Conniffe et al., 2000; Drucker and Puri, 2005). To implement the matching 
115 
process, for each of the dependent variable in Table 4.3, I first distinguish the sample 
into treated and control subsamples and then calculate the propensity score with the 
independent variables (except corporate secretary tenure) as the matching criteria.21 
After the matching process, I obtain 4,750 and 892 as well as 4,522 observations for 
models predicting board meeting frequency, dissent opinion and fraud and lawsuit 
respectively.22 I then re-run the regression on the propensity score matched samples. 
Results in Table 4.5 show that, in the propensity score matched samples; the 
coefficients of corporate secretary tenure remain significant with the same sign with 
those in Table 4.3. 
[Please insert Table 4.5 about here] 
4.5.2 Instrument Variable Analysis 
In addition to the PSM analysis, I also employ the instrument variable (IV) analysis 
which is widely used by research in accounting and finance areas (Weber and 
Willenborg, 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003) to address the endogeneity concern. In this 
chapter, following previous studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007; Leary and Roberts, 
2014; Xia, 2014), I use the average corporate secretary tenure for the industry in which 
a particular firm belongs to as the value of the instrument variable for the firm.23 The 
                                                             
21 For the variable Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit, I take observations with value equals to 1 as the master 
sample and observations with value equals to 0 as the control sample. For the variable Board Meeting 
Frequency, since it is a categorical variable, I take observations with meeting frequency greater than or 
equal to 12 as the master sample (i.e., 17.70% of the observations). Following the advice in Shipman et 
al. (2017), to maximize the treatment effect, I drop observations with number of meeting frequency 
between 8 and 12, and use observations with number of meeting frequency lower than or equal to 8 (i.e., 
52.06% of the observations) as the control sample for matching. I also tried different cutoff points of 
meeting frequency (e.g., greater than or equal to 14 as the master sample and less than or equal to 6 as 
the control sample), the conclusions remain. 
22 I perform a 1 to 1 match to find the observations with nearest score in the matching sample to the 
master sample. 
23 In line with Leary and Roberts (2014), I calculate the industry average corporate secretary tenure for 
a firm in a year by excluding the firm’s own value of corporate secretary tenure in the year itself to 
remove the potential endogenous relationship between the mean industry tenure and the tenure of the 
specific firm-year observation. 
116 
reason I construct such variable as the instrument is because the industrial average 
length of corporate secretary tenure reflects the industrial specific job market 
environment for corporate secretaries. According to the theory of work adjustment, 
how fit an individual to the organization will decide their working tenure (Bertz and 
Judge, 1994). The job market for Chinese corporate secretaries is not professionalized 
and corporate secretaries are usually someone promoted within the firm and someone 
who are familiar with the firm or the industry where the firm operates. During the 
sample period between 2004 and 2012, only a small proportion of the Chinese 
corporate secretaries act as professionalized corporate secretaries who may change 
jobs across industries. In this case, the industry average corporate secretary tenure 
strongly reflects the working environment, supply of corporate secretary human capital 
and the level of competition within the industry.24 Furthermore, the industry average 
of corporate secretary tenure should have little relation with the dependent variables 
such as the particular firm’s board meeting frequency, outside director dissent or fraud 
or lawsuit. Even if there might exist a slight pattern in terms of these second stage 
dependent variables across industries which may cause a small proportion of the 
industry average corporate secretary tenure to be endogenous, the impact of this 
possibility is eliminated through the industry dummies included in both the first stage 
and second stage regressions.25 The results for the two stage regressions are shown in 
Table 4.6. It could be found that all the coefficients of corporate secretary tenure 
remain significant after control for potential endogenous issue, which further support 
                                                             
24 In the meantime, since I dropped the specific firm-year corporate secretary tenure when calculating 
the industry average, the instrument is exogenous from the specific firm. 
25 By conduct the instrument analysis, all other control variables in the second stage regression has been 
added into the first stage analysis as control variables. Moreover, as the tenure of corporate secretary is 
an ordinary variable which suffers from potential autoregressive issue, following Beck and Katz (1995) 
I add the lagged value of Ln(corporate secretary tenure) to the first step regression to eliminate this 
problem. 
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the main results. 
[Please insert Table 4.6 about here] 
4.5.3 Robustness Checks with Additional Country-specific Variables 
In this section, I include a wider range of explanatory variables in the analysis in order 
to reduce the potential problem of omitted variables as well as to consider some unique 
features of the Chinese firms. For example, in SOEs, many of the senior executives 
such as CEO or CFO had prior experience of working in the government. As I have 
discussed, this may influence both the effectiveness of the corporate secretaries and 
the governance quality of the relevant firms. I include two dummy variables, namely 
CEO Political Connection and CFO Political Connection, to reduce the impacts of 
this feature. In addition, in the research sample, corporate secretaries also act as CFOs 
in circa 8 percent of firm-year observations. This apparently gives them greater power 
in influencing the quality of the information disclosure which may have implications 
on the firm’s governance quality as well as the boundary spanning role of the corporate 
secretaries. I therefore control the dual role of the corporate secretary with Duality 
CFO which equals to one if the corporate secretary is also the CFO of the firm, and 
zero otherwise. Furthermore, I include two dummy variables to capture whether a SOE 
is a central SOE or a local SOE, and Cash Flow Volatility to capture the business risk 
of the firm. I also add a variable that measures the corporate secretary’s salary to 
control any potential impacts it may have on governance quality. At last, descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.1 shows that most of the Chinese firms have 33.33% of the outside 
directors, resulting in negligible variation with Board Independence variable.26 To 
better capture a firm’s initiative in bringing more outside directors than required by 
                                                             
26 Since 2001, the CSRC (i.e., China Securities Regulatory Commission) requires that the Chinese 
listed firms have at least one third of the board members to be outside directors. 
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the regulatory requirements, I replace Board Independence with a variable (i.e. 
Independence Dummy) which equals to one if the board independence ratio is greater 
than 33.33%, and zero otherwise.  
 In Table 4.7, I report the results for regressions with the aforementioned country- 
and firm-specific variables. Due to the limitation of data, this renders us with more 
than 50% reduction in the number of observations. Despite this, I can see that the 
coefficients on Ln(Secretary Tenure) are all significantly negative. These are consistent 
with the results for the full sample reported in Table 4.3.  
[Please insert Table 4.7 about here] 
4.6 Further Analysis 
4.6.3 Alternative Measures of Internal Control on Governance Outcomes 
In this last sub-section, I investigate the influence of corporate secretary tenure on 
several alternative measures of firm-level internal control quality. Firstly, I split the 
Fraud_Lawsuit variable used in Table 4.3 into two components Fraud and Lawsuit, 
and use both of them as dependent variable separately. Secondly, since the variable 
Fraud actually corresponds to the time when the fraudulent behavior is identified by 
the regulators, I also test the relation between the variable Fraud Happen, which is 
based on the actual time of fraudulent behavior, with the corporate secretary tenure. 
Thirdly, to observe the governance outcome from market’s perspective, I use the 
variable Modified Auditor Opinion (MAO) which captures the change in auditor’s 
opinion towards the firm as an alternative measure of internal control quality.  
 The empirical results based on the above models are shown in Table 4.9. It could 
be found from columns 1 to 8 that corporate secretary tenure is negatively related to 
each of these dependent variables, either with or without the control variables. These 
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results further support the conclusion that tenured corporate secretary could help 
enhance the internal control outcome of the firm. 
[Please insert Table 4.9 about here] 
 
4.6.1 Alternative Measure of Board Meeting Efficiency and Boundary 
Spanning to Outsider Directors 
While testing the main hypotheses, I find that the corporate secretary tenure has 
significant impact in reducing the Board Meeting Frequency and Dissent. This 
supports the argument that tenured secretary are more proficient in organizing effective 
board meetings and playing the boundary spanning role. However, one may argue that 
the higher board meeting frequency not only reflect an effective board process, but 
also the fact that board members are more actively conducting their jobs (Vafeas, 1999), 
or the fact that corporate secretaries are diligently doing their jobs. In addition, the 
dissent behavior of outside directors is not the only consequence of the inefficient pre-
meeting negotiation and information delivery to outside directors. To provide further 
evidence to support H2 and H3, I use a third variable – the outside directors’ board 
meeting absent behavior defined as the total number of outside directors absent from 
the board meeting divided by the total number of meetings the outside directors are 
required to attend, to test corporate secretary’s impact in improving board processes 
and pre-meeting negotiation.27 
I argue that the absence of outside directors from the board meetings could also 
reflect the capabilities of corporate secretary on conducting their role for board process 
                                                             
27 I consider representative’s attendance in lieu of the outside director as an absence behaviour since it 
also represents the ineffectiveness of meeting organization and information transmission. Such 
representative attendance could have adverse effect on governance outcome (Chou et al, 2013). 
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management as well as boundary spanning to outside directors. Adams and Ferreira 
(2008) suggest that the major task for the outside directors is to attend the board 
meetings, their choice to be absent from the board meetings is less likely to be 
discretionary. Rather the absence may be caused by reasons such as scheduling conflict 
or disagreement with the proposals to be discussed in the board meetings. The former 
may occur if board meetings are not well scheduled, or when the meeting materials are 
not timely dispatched to board members which leave the outside directors insufficient 
time to prepare for the meeting. The disagreements on the board meeting proposals 
may happen when there is inadequate and ineffective pre-meeting 
negotiation/communication between the outside directors and the management team. 
Although the absence behavior may potentially harm the outside directors’ reputation, 
it may be a better strategy for them to avoid agreeing to potentially risky proposals that 
they have not fully evaluated, or even publicly contradicting with the executive 
decision and offend the CEOs. 
The results which are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.8 show that the 
corporate secretary’s tenure within the firm is negatively associated with the outside 
director absence ratio either with or without the control variables. The results support 
the notion that longer tenured corporate secretaries improve the board process and the 
information flow and communication between the outside directors and the 
management team. 
[Please insert Table 4.8 about here] 
4.6.2 Corporate Secretary’s Tenure and The Quality of Boundary Spanning 
to External Monitors 
Next, to further test the influence of corporate secretary tenure on their boundary 
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spanning function, I take the advantage of the Chinese setting where corporate 
secretaries (rather than the CEO or CFO) are contractually and legally obligated to 
take an additional responsibility of the head of firm’s investor relations. This regularity 
requirement allows us to empirically examine whether the corporate secretary tenure 
is influential in their boundary spanning function to parties such as the security 
analysts and institutional investors. For instance, I can investigate whether the 
corporate secretary can increase a firm’s analyst coverage and the number of 
institutional investors investing in the firm.  
 The literature has documented the security analysts as an important intermediary 
between the firm and market in reducing the information asymmetry and increasing 
the market-wide scrutiny of the firm as well as the governance outcome (Yu 2008; Sun, 
2009; Armstrong et al., 2015). Intuitional investors such as mutual funds, due to their 
accessibility of superior information and exit threat, are considered as better monitors 
compared to retail investors (Chemmanur et al., 2009; Chiang et al., 2010; Tong et al., 
2013). They also limit managerial expropriation. Therefore, the potential relationship 
of corporate secretary with respect to analyst coverage and number of institutional 
investors may not only reflect the quality of their boundary spanning role, but also 
support the notion that tenured corporate secretary, through their impact on analyst 
coverage and institutional investors, could exert an external governance pressure on 
the management team.  
From columns 3 to 6 of Table 4.8, I can see that the corporate secretary’s tenure 
with the firm is positively associated with both the number of analysts covering the 
firm and the number of mutual funds holding the firm in their portfolio. Overall, these 
results support the notion that tenured corporate secretary could play a better boundary 
spanning role, even to analysts and investors. Moreover, to the extent that the analysts 
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and institutional investors act as an effective monitor, this result also supports the 
notion that tenured corporate secretary could further enhance the external governance 
outcomes. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically examines the impact of corporate secretary’s tenure on 
corporate governance quality of the A-share listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
The results show that corporate secretary’s tenure is negatively associated with the 
board meeting frequency, outside director in-meeting dissent behavior, as well as the 
propensity of fraud and lawsuits. These results support the theoretical foundation laid 
by McNulty and Stewart (2015), which shows that the corporate secretary can have a 
significant influence on internal governance quality of the firm. The main findings are 
robust to potential endogeneity issues. I also test the impact of tenure on outside 
director’s absence from the board meeting, analyst coverage and number of mutual 
fund, as well as an array of different internal quality control measures. All results are 
consistent with the main findings. 
These findings are critically important for academics, regulators, policy-makers 
and practitioners (both institutional and individual investors) alike who have varied 
vested interests in firm-level internal control and board efficiency. Overall, I try to 
partially address the growing concern of how to improve the governance outcome in 
the wake of enhanced public, media, and regulatory scrutiny of the boardroom working. 
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Tables for Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of variables for Chinese A-share listed firms used in this chapter 
from 2004 to 2012. It reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, median, and first and third 
quartile values of all the main variables used in this chapter. Detailed definitions of all the variables are reported 
in Appendix 4.A1. 
 Variable N Mean Std Dev. P25 Median P75 
(1) Secretary Tenure 13,164 5.057 3.388 2.000 4.000 7.000 
(2) Board Size 13,164 9.271 1.975 9.000 9.000 10.000 
(3) Board Meeting Frequency 13,164 8.878 3.366 7.000 8.000 11.000 
(4) Board Independence 13,164 0.361 0.052 0.333 0.333 0.375 
(5) Dissent 13,164 0.034 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(6) Absence 13,164 0.053 0.076 0.000 0.028 0.083 
(7) Fraud 13,164 0.081 0.272 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(8) Lawsuit 13,164 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(9) Fraud Happen 13,164 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(10) Modified Auditor Opinion 13,164 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(11) Analyst Coverage 13,164 6.076 8.647 0.000 2.000 9.000 
(12) No. of Mutual Funds 13,164 16.904 29.060 1.000 4.000 19.000 
(13) Secretary Turnover 13,164 0.149 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(14) CEO Duality 13,164 0.156 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(15) Ownership Concentration 13,164 0.567 0.158 0.457 0.578 0.683 
(16) BTMV 13,164 
0.449 
 
 
 
.449 
0.290 0.231 0.392 0.608 
(17) Ln(Market Value) 13,164 22.152 1.279 21.301 21.972 22.762 
(18) Leverage 13,164 0.615 7.818 0.340 0.504 0.646 
(19) Sales Growth 13,164 0.226 0.571 -0.011 0.143 0.323 
(20) Adjusted ROE 13,164 0.000 0.178 -0.038 0.008 0.065 
(21) Equity Turnover 13,164 3.569 2.826 1.550 2.864 4.826 
(22) Firm Age 13,164 13.264 4.711 10.000 13.000 16.000 
(23) Big4 Auditor 13,164 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(24) SOE 13,164 0.524 0.499 1.000 1.000 0.000 
(25) Duality CEO or VP 13,164 0.240 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(26) Duality CFO 13,164 0.082 0.275 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(27) Dependence Dummy 6,307 0.983 0.130 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(28) Central SOE 6,307 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(29) Local SOE 6,307 0.363 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 
(30) CEO Political Connection 6,307 0.182 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(31) CFO Political Connection 6,307 0.065 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(32) Adjusted Secretary Salary  6,307 5.655 22.945 -8.610 0.000 13.305 
(33) Cash Flow Volatility 6,307 3.180 8.028 0.455 0.982 2.407 
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Table 4.2 Pairwise correlation matrix 
This table reports the pairwise correlation matrix for main variables from 2004 to 2012. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 4.A1. * indicates significance at 
1% level. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] 
[1]Fraud  1.00                       
[2]Lawsuit  0.06* 1.00                      
[3]Fraud Happen 0.44* 0.05* 1.00                     
[4]Modified Auditor Opinion 0.11* 0.21* 0.13* 1.00                    
[5]Dissent 0.04* 0.09* 0.05* 0.09* 1.00                   
[6]Absence -0.01 0.12* -0.01 0.10* 0.09* 1.00                  
[7]Ln(Secretary Tenure)  -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* -0.04* -0.04* -0.02 1.00                 
[8]Board Independence 0.02 -0.04* 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.10* -0.05* 1.00                
[9]Board Meeting Frequency 0.06* 0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.02* -0.11* -0.09* 0.06* 1.00               
[10]Board Size -0.06* -0.01 -0.04* -0.03* 0.01 0.16* 0.04* -0.29* -0.03* 1.00              
[11]CEO Duality 0.05* -0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.00 -0.07* -0.04* 0.08* -0.00 -0.14* 1.00             
[12]Ownership Concentration -0.04* -0.05* -0.08* -0.05* 0.00 0.03* -0.10* 0.00 -0.02 0.08* -0.05* 1.00            
[13]BTMV -0.07* -0.05* -0.07* -0.08* -0.05* 0.03* 0.04* -0.03* -0.02 0.13* -0.07* 0.02 1.00           
[14]Ln(Market Value)  -0.07* -0.16* -0.09* -0.11* -0.05* -0.05* 0.09* 0.07* 0.20* 0.33* 0.20* 0.14* 0.10* 1.00          
[15]Leverage 0.00 0.04* 0.00 0.08* 0.00 0.03* -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 1.00         
[16]Sales Growth 0.00 -0.02 -0.03* -0.08* 0.00 0.02 -0.05* 0.01 0.06* 0.00 0.00 0.12* -0.07* 0.08* -0.02 1.00        
[17]Adjusted ROE -0.01 -0.11* 0.00 -0.10* -0.03* -0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.05* 0.03* -0.03* 0.11* -0.08* 0.06* 1.00       
[18]Equity Turnover 0.05* -0.06* 0.10* 0.01 -0.03* -0.11* 0.04* 0.04* 0.06* -0.14* 0.14* -0.51* -0.17* -0.13* 0.00 -0.10* 0.03* 1.00      
[19]Ln(Firm Age) 0.05* 0.01 0.06* 0.01 -0.04* -0.13* 0.06* 0.05* 0.14* -0.06* 0.12* -0.33* -0.11* 0.13* 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.16* 1.00     
[20]Big4 Auditor -0.05* -0.04* -0.07* -0.02* -0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.20* 0.03* 0.17* 0.09* 0.39* 0.00 -0.01 0.03* -0.15* -0.03* 1.00    
[21]Analyst Coverage -0.04* -0.15* -0.07* -0.10* -0.08* -0.10* 0.05* 0.05* 0.12* 0.20* 0.14* 0.25* -0.06* 0.61* -0.01 0.05* 0.11* -0.17* 0.03* 0.23* 1.00   
[22]No. of Mutual Funds -0.06* -0.11* -0.08* -0.08* -0.05* -0.04* 0.07* 0.06* 0.12* 0.23* 0.12* 0.17* -0.06* 0.71* -0.01 0.05* 0.09* -0.23* 0.05* 0.28* 0.77* 1.00  
[23]Secretary Turnover 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 -0.70* 0.03* 0.10* -0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03* 0.02* 0.05* 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04* -0.04* 1.00 
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Table 4.3 Effect of corporate secretary tenure on governance quality 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure on a firm’s Board 
Meeting Frequency, Outside Director Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 
to 2012. Columns 1 and 2 use the OLS fixed-effect method and clustered at firm and year level, columns 3, 4, 
5, and 6 use probit regression and clustered at industry and year level. R2 and Wald Chi2/F-value values across 
all the regression models are reported. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective robust 
t-statistics. To reduce endogeneity problem, all independent variables in columns 5 and 6 are lagged by one 
year. In addition, the variable Dissent used in column 6 is a predicted value from column 4. Detailed definitions 
of all variables are reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 Board Meeting Frequency Outside Director Dissent Fraud_Lawsuit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.365*** -0.351*** -0.139*** -0.109*** -0.134*** -0.076*** 
 (-8.10) (-7.84) (-4.24) (-3.31) (-6.87) (-3.69) 
Board Independence  -0.086  -0.156  -0.071 
  (-0.10)  (-0.29)  (-0.22) 
Board Size  -0.023  0.011  0.008 
  (-0.75)  (0.77)  (0.89) 
CEO Duality  0.071  -0.023  -0.088*** 
  (1.37)  (-0.60)  (-3.70) 
Ownership 
Concentration  
 0.833*  -0.085  -0.464*** 
  (1.69)  (-0.37)  (-3.60) 
BTMV   -0.293*  -0.221*  -0.607*** 
  (-1.82)  (-1.83)  (-7.49) 
Ln(Market Value)  0.720***  -0.082**  -0.040* 
  (8.03)  (-2.52)  (-1.91) 
Leverage  0.002***  -0.002**  0.019 
  (3.37)  (-2.34)  (1.51) 
Sales Growth  0.019  -0.053  -0.027 
  (0.42)  (-1.10)  (-1.03) 
Adjusted ROE  -0.012  -0.018  -0.037*** 
  (-0.48)  (-1.01)  (-2.82) 
Equity Turnover  -0.022*  -0.029*  0.010 
  (-1.71)  (-1.89)  (1.50) 
Ln(Firm Age)  -0.104  -0.002  0.153*** 
  (-0.23)  (-0.03)  (2.90) 
Big4 Auditor  -0.053  -0.176  -0.107 
  (-0.35)  (-1.45)  (-1.33) 
Board Meeting 
Frequency 
   0.028***  0.024*** 
   (3.40)  (4.45) 
Dissent      4.087*** 
      (3.85) 
Analyst Coverage      -0.015*** 
      (-5.80) 
Constant 10.330*** -6.743*** -2.101*** -0.399 -0.486*** 0.269 
 (119.22) (-3.09) (-16.94) (-0.50) (-6.43) (0.56) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 
R2 0.132 0.145 0.174 0.185 0.029 0.077 
Chi2/F-Value 139.01*** 67.01*** 513.39*** 589.02*** 356.70*** 656.24*** 
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Table 4.4 Effect of corporate secretary tenure on governance quality by ownership type 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure on a firm’s Board 
Meeting Frequency, Outside Director Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit for Chinese A-share listed SOE and non-
SOE firms from 2004 to 2012. Columns 1 and 2 use the OLS fixed-effect method and clustered at firm and 
year level, columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 use probit regression and clustered at industry and year level. R2 and Wald 
Chi2/F-value across all the regression models are reported. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are 
their respective robust t-statistics. To reduce endogeneity problem, all independent variables in columns 5 and 
6 are lagged by one year. In addition, the variable Dissent used in column 6 is a predicted value from column 
4. The row Coefficients Difference in Ln(Secretary Tenure) reflect the Chi2 and p-value of the coefficient 
differences of Ln(Secretary Tenure) by seemingly unrelated test. Detailed definitions of all variables are 
reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
Outside Director Dissent Fraud_Lawsuit 
 Non-SOEs 
(1) 
SOEs 
(2) 
Non-SOEs 
(3) 
SOEs 
(4) 
Non-SOEs 
(5) 
SOEs 
(6) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.411*** -
0.312*** 
-0.196*** -0.035 -0.073** -0.075** 
 (-5.56) (-5.59) (-3.91) (-0.79) (-2.47) (-2.57) 
Board Independence 0.463 -0.358 -0.292 0.131 -0.062 -0.147 
 (0.36) (-0.33) (-0.37) (0.18) (-0.14) (-0.30) 
Board Size -0.036 -0.011 0.043* -0.009 0.024* -0.001 
 (-0.71) (-0.27) (1.86) (-0.47) (1.82) (-0.07) 
CEO Duality 0.185** -0.012 -0.032 -0.015 -0.084*** -0.075** 
 (2.30) (-0.18) (-0.57) (-0.29) (-2.60) (-2.12) 
Ownership Concentration  1.068 0.578 -0.140 -0.065 -0.569*** -0.316 
 (1.47) (0.86) (-0.42) (-0.20) (-3.28) (-1.60) 
BTMV  -0.206 -0.339 -0.243 -0.167 -0.829*** -0.420*** 
 (-0.82) (-1.61) (-1.39) (-1.00) (-7.12) (-3.78) 
Ln(Market Value) 0.851*** 0.591*** -0.145*** -0.032 -0.059* -0.000 
 (6.10) (4.99) (-2.90) (-0.73) (-1.93) (-0.01) 
Leverage 0.002*** -0.010 -0.008 0.014 0.012 0.071 
 (3.45) (-1.03) (-0.37) (1.58) (1.10) (1.43) 
Sales Growth -0.006 0.053 -0.095 -0.012 -0.012 -0.047 
 (-0.10) (0.78) (-1.52) (-0.16) (-0.35) (-1.14) 
Adjusted ROE -0.034 0.002 -0.036 0.000 -0.057*** -0.013 
 (-0.90) (0.05) (-1.49) (0.02) (-3.08) (-0.67) 
Equity Turnover -0.021 -0.021 -0.051** -0.009 0.012 0.010 
 (-1.18) (-1.20) (-2.24) (-0.44) (1.32) (1.02) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.054 -0.073 0.066 -0.078 0.040 0.238*** 
 (0.07) (-0.13) (0.52) (-0.72) (0.54) (3.12) 
Big4 Auditor 0.147 -0.174 0.071 -0.350** 0.059 -0.272** 
 (0.57) (-0.98) (0.38) (-2.31) (0.54) (-2.46) 
Board Meeting Frequency   0.032*** 0.023** 0.021*** 0.027*** 
   (2.74) (2.00) (2.80) (3.48) 
Analyst Coverage     -0.013*** -0.021*** 
     (-3.47) (-5.24) 
Dissent     3.610** 3.813** 
     (2.38) (2.39) 
Constant -10.644*** -4.992* 0.616 -1.238 1.019 -0.978 
 (-3.41) (-1.91) (0.50) (-1.12) (1.51) (-1.31) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 6,266 6,898 6,266 6,898 6,266 6,898 
R2 0.147 0.147 0.216 0.173 0.066 0.089 
Chi2/F-Value 28.805*** 42.358**
* 
346.928**
* 
322.691
*** 
283.86*** 413.26**
* Coefficients difference in 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) 
Chi2=1.24 
P-Value=0.2659 
Chi2=5.85 
P-Value=0.0156 
Chi2=0.00 
P-Value=0.9549 
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Table 4.5 Effect of corporate secretary tenure using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
This table reports the results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure on a Board Meeting Frequency, 
Outside Director Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit using the propensity score matched (PSM) samples. Columns 1 
uses the OLS fixed-effect method and clustered at firm and year level, columns 2 and 3 use probit regression 
and clustered at industry and year level. R2 and Wald Chi2/F-value across all the regression models are reported. 
Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at firm-level. To 
reduce endogeneity problem, all independent variables in column 3 are lagged by one year. In addition, the 
variable Dissent used in column 3 is a predicted value from column 2. Detailed definitions of all variables are 
reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
Outside Director Dissent Fraud_Lawsuit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.444*** -0.182*** -0.064** 
 (-4.43) (-2.91) (-2.40) 
Board Independence 1.325 0.482 -0.435 
 (0.67) (0.49) (-1.08) 
Board Size 0.097 0.012 0.010 
 (1.34) (0.49) (0.83) 
CEO Duality 0.105 -0.014 0.054* 
 (0.75) (-0.21) (1.74) 
Ownership Concentration  1.639 0.179 0.051 
 (1.50) (0.42) (0.31) 
BTMV  0.060 0.124 -0.058 
 (0.17) (0.58) (-0.62) 
Ln(Market Value) 0.593*** 0.028 -0.004 
 (3.11) (0.54) (-0.17) 
Leverage 0.230 0.147 0.007 
 (0.59) (1.15) (0.72) 
Sales Growth -0.084 -0.133* -0.025 
 (-0.93) (-1.83) (-0.81) 
Adjusted ROE -0.094 0.042 -0.007 
 (-1.39) (1.42) (-0.42) 
Equity Turnover -0.050* -0.029 0.005 
 (-1.90) (-1.05) (0.08) 
Ln(Firm Age) 1.177 -0.008 -0.095 
 (1.14) (-0.05) (-0.84) 
Big4 Auditor 0.007 0.168 0.147 
 (0.02) (0.72) (0.25) 
Board Meeting Frequency  -0.007 -0.002 
  (-0.50) (-0.30) 
Dissent   0.241 
   (0.17) 
Analyst Coverage   0.000 
   (0.06) 
Constant -8.009* -0.595 -0.064** 
 (-1.77) (-0.45) (-2.40) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 4,750 892 4,522 
R2 0.046 0.020 0.003 
Chi2/F-Value 5.08*** 21.93*** 18.88*** 
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Table 4.6 Effect of corporate secretary tenure using instrument variable analysis  
This table reports the 2-stage regression results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure with a firm 
on Board Meeting Frequency, Outside Director Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit for Chinese A-share listed firms 
from 2004 to 2012. To address the potential endogeneity problem, the instrument variable Industry 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) and all the controlling variables in stage two regressions, are included in the first stage 
of the estimation. Moreover, to remove the potential autoregressive in the corporate secretary tenure, we also 
added the lagged value of Ln(Secretary Tenure) in the first stage regression. In panel A, we report the 
coefficients on the instrument variable only. In Panel B, we report the results for the second stage regressions. 
Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at industry-level. 
Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively.  
Panel A: Coefficients on the Instrument Variable in First Stage Regressions 
 Ln(Secretary Tenure) 
Industry  
Ln(Secretary Tenure) 
0.073*** 0.055** 0.073*** 0.044* 0.073*** 0.047* 
 (2.87) (2.11) (2.87) (1.66) (2.87) (1.78) 
Panel B: Second Stage Regression Results 
 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
Outside Director 
Dissent 
Fraud_Lawsuit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.264*** -0.403*** -
0.176*** 
-0.140*** -
0.164*** 
-0.123*** 
 (-2.87) (-4.31) (-3.38) (-2.66) (-4.39) (-3.35) 
Board Independence  -0.122  -0.264  -0.050 
  (-0.12)  (-0.47)  (-0.13) 
Board Size  -0.094***  0.004  0.006 
  (-2.89)  (0.28)  (0.59) 
CEO Duality  0.058  -0.026  -0.057** 
  (1.01)  (-0.67)  (-2.21) 
Ownership Concentration  -0.129  -0.062  -0.620*** 
  (-0.29)  (-0.26)  (-3.97) 
BTMV  -0.079  -0.154  -0.789*** 
  (-0.38)  (-1.28)  (-7.60) 
Ln(Market Value)  0.504***  -0.066**  -0.032 
  (8.61)  (-1.98)  (-1.29) 
Leverage  -0.000  -0.002**  0.077 
  (-1.01)  (-2.57)  (1.35) 
Sales Growth  0.242***  -0.027  -0.004 
  (4.43)  (-0.54)  (-0.13) 
Adjusted ROE  -0.236  -0.359***  -0.375*** 
  (-1.21)  (-3.14)  (-4.79) 
Equity Turnover  0.014  -0.034**  0.001 
  (0.79)  (-2.08)  (0.12) 
Ln(Firm Age)  0.440***  -0.002  0.273*** 
  (2.76)  (-0.02)  (4.27) 
Big4 Auditor  -0.093  -0.172  -0.105 
  (-0.40)  (-1.41)  (-1.12) 
Board Meeting Frequency    0.025***  0.036*** 
    (3.06)  (5.74) 
Dissent      0.473*** 
      (6.35) 
Analyst Coverage      -0.019*** 
      (-4.95) 
Constant 8.863*** -1.629 -
2.060*** 
-0.589 -
0.922*** 
-0.581 
 (24.86) (-1.02) (-14.74) (-0.72) (-9.79) (-1.03) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 12,864 12,864 12,864 12,864 12,864 12,864 
Chi2/F-test 88.83*** 52.63*** 497.07**
* 
566.51*** 597.92**
* 
921.11*** 
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Table 4.7 Effect of corporate secretary tenure with additional control variables 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of duration of corporate secretary’s work tenure with a firm on Board 
Meeting Frequency, Outside Director Dissent and Fraud_Lawsuit for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2012. 
Columns 1 uses the OLS fixed-effect method and clustered at firm and year level, columns 2 and 3 use probit regression 
and clustered at industry and year level. Model specifications and methods are similar to the ones reported in Tables 3 but 
with additional control variables. The significant drop of observation is due to the missing data from the dataset of these 
additional variables. To reduce endogeneity problem, all independent variables in column 3 are lagged by one year. In 
addition, the variable Dissent used in column 3 is a predicted value from column 2. Values in parenthesis below each 
coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at firm-level. Wald Chi2 and F-values across all the regression 
models are reported. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
Outside Director Dissent Fraud_Lawsuit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.192** -0.195*** -0.077** 
 (-2.25) (-2.59) (-2.21) 
Independence Dummy  -0.761*** -0.011 -0.080 
 (-2.75) (-0.03) (-0.55) 
Board Size -0.021 -0.012 0.012 
 (-0.40) (-0.45) (0.93) 
CEO Duality 0.057 -0.096 -0.053 
 (0.49) (-0.89) (-1.13) 
Ownership Concentration  1.004 -0.628 -0.698*** 
 (1.39) (-1.55) (-4.26) 
BTMV  -0.428* -0.282 -0.676*** 
 (-1.66) (-1.00) (-6.07) 
Ln(Market Value) 0.717*** -0.094 0.003 
 (5.53) (-1.14) (0.09) 
Leverage -0.048** 0.019 0.057 
 (-2.33) (0.98) (1.55) 
Sales Growth 0.035 0.088 0.041 
 (0.51) (1.12) (1.11) 
Adjusted ROE 0.090 0.008 -0.105* 
 (1.09) (0.08) (-1.88) 
Equity Turnover -0.036** -0.050* 0.000 
 (-2.33) (-1.73) (0.05) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.869 0.165 0.005 
 (-0.91) (0.88) (0.06) 
Big4 Auditor -0.239 -0.369 -0.236** 
 (-1.26) (-1.00) (-2.04) 
Board Meeting Frequency  0.040*** 0.027*** 
  (2.77) (3.66) 
Dissent   -4.418 
   (-1.37) 
Analyst Coverage   -0.020*** 
   (-5.26) 
Central SOE -0.195 -0.235 -0.108 
 (-0.29) (-1.33) (-1.51) 
Local SOE -0.023 -0.021 -0.212*** 
 (-0.03) (-0.19) (-4.05) 
CEO Political Connection 0.107 0.121 0.086 
 (0.48) (1.03) (1.53) 
CFO Political Connection -0.204 0.128 0.265*** 
 (-0.61) (0.63) (2.77) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.013 0.012* 0.004 
 (-0.94) (1.66) (1.17) 
Adjusted Secretary Salary 0.002 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.59) (0.80) (-0.27) 
Duality CFO -0.274 -0.314 0.061 
 (-0.74) (-1.35) (0.77) 
Constant -3.239 0.267 -0.145 
 (-0.85) (0.15) (-0.19) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 6,307 6,307 6,307 
R2 0.059 0.081 0.062 
Chi2/F-Value 13.02*** 111.14*** 247.82*** 
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Table 4.8 Effect of corporate secretary tenure on alternative measures of board meeting 
efficiency and boundary spanning to outsider directors  
This table reports the regression results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure on a firm’s Outside 
Director Absence Ratio, Analyst Coverage and No. of Mutual Funds for Chinese A-share listed firms from 
2004 to 2012. All columns use the OLS fixed-effect method clustered at firm-level. R2 and F-value values 
across all the regression models are reported. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective 
robust t-statistics. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 Outside Director Absence 
Ratio 
Analyst Coverage No. of Mutual Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Secretary Tenure) -0.002* -0.002* 0.177* 0.242*** 0.728** 0.464* 
 (-1.65) (-1.70) (1.69) (2.58) (2.16) (1.94) 
Board Independence  -0.040*  -0.100  4.685 
  (-1.74)  (-0.06)  (1.24) 
Board Size  0.002*  0.091  0.078 
  (1.85)  (1.29)  (0.46) 
CEO Duality  -0.000  0.088  -0.313 
  (-0.18)  (0.87)  (-1.24) 
Ownership 
Concentration  
 -0.013  3.092***  -10.729*** 
  (-1.06)  (2.96)  (-3.83) 
BTMV   -0.000  -1.314***  -11.542*** 
  (-0.10)  (-3.53)  (-11.33) 
Ln(Market Value)  -0.004*  4.624***  12.683*** 
  (-1.94)  (21.21)  (19.37) 
Leverage  0.000***  0.011***  0.022*** 
  (11.25)  (9.12)  (10.43) 
Sales Growth  0.001  -0.586***  -1.565*** 
  (0.76)  (-7.96)  (-7.60) 
Adjusted ROE  -0.002*  0.063*  0.101 
  (-1.66)  (1.73)  (1.11) 
Equity Turnover  -0.000  -0.147***  -0.812*** 
  (-1.12)  (-6.67)  (-11.11) 
Ln(Firm Age)  -0.011  3.303***  -3.213 
  (-0.87)  (3.01)  (-1.20) 
Big4 Auditor  -0.001  0.082  2.154* 
  (-0.25)  (0.21)  (1.87) 
Board Meeting 
Frequency 
   0.048**  -0.037 
    (2.22)  (-0.63) 
Analyst Coverage      1.373*** 
      (24.87) 
Constant 0.068*** 0.177*** 3.090*** -
106.918*** 
11.383*** -
259.596***  (30.35) (2.89) (17.40) (-20.97) (19.38) (-17.38) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 
R2 0.136 0.140 0.237 0.360 0.197 0.517 
F-Value 82.96*** 62.94*** 94.32*** 61.34*** 74.35*** 89.29*** 
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Table 4.9 Effect of corporate secretary tenure on alternative internal quality control 
governance measures 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of corporate secretary’s work tenure on a firm’s Fraud, 
Fraud Happen, Lawsuit, and Modified Auditor Opinion for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2012. 
All columns use probit regression with fixed effects. R2 and Wald Chi2 values across all the regression models 
are reported. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at 
industry-level. To reduce endogeneity problem, all independent variables are lagged by one year. In addition, 
the variable Dissent is a predicted value from column 2 of Table 3. Detailed definitions of all variables are 
reported in Appendix 4.A1. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 Fraud Fraud Happen Lawsuit Modified Auditor 
Opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(Secretary 
Tenure) 
-0.116*** -0.081*** -0.076*** -0.053** -0.120*** -0.047* -0.116** -0.104** 
(-5.51) (-3.57) (-3.38) (-2.25) (-4.74) (-1.76) (-2.56) (-2.09) 
Dissent  1.619  0.007  4.926***  -1.788 
  (1.35)  (0.01)  (3.98)  (-0.89) 
Board 
Independence 
 -0.177  -0.056  0.127  0.083 
  (-0.51)  (-0.14)  (0.31)  (0.11) 
Board Meeting   0.020***  0.013**  0.026***  0.030** 
Frequency  (3.45)  (2.17)  (3.91)  (2.33) 
Board Size  0.004  0.032**  0.001  0.006 
  (0.35)  (2.45)  (0.07)  (0.28) 
CEO Duality  -0.049*  -0.086***  -0.073***  -0.081* 
  (-1.71)  (-2.81)  (-2.72)  (-1.85) 
Ownership 
Concentration  
 -0.238*  -0.205  -0.581***  -0.690** 
  (-1.77)  (-1.28)  (-3.60)  (-2.33) 
BTMV   -0.355***  -0.151*  -0.734***  -0.995*** 
  (-4.17)  (-1.69)  (-7.19)  (-5.67) 
Ln(Market Value)  -0.077***  -0.140***  0.022  -0.051 
  (-3.25)  (-5.21)  (0.87)  (-0.81) 
Leverage  -0.001  -0.002*  0.019*  -0.001 
  (-0.70)  (-1.74)  (1.85)  (-0.49) 
Sales Growth  -0.049  -0.010  -0.047  -0.210** 
  (-1.56)  (-0.39)  (-1.35)  (-2.49) 
Adjusted ROE  -0.028*  -0.039***  -0.028**  -0.045** 
  (-1.72)  (-2.84)  (-2.04)  (-2.55) 
Analyst Coverage  -0.009***  -0.006**  -0.020***  -0.050*** 
  (-3.32)  (-2.03)  (-5.30)  (-3.41) 
Equity Turnover  0.012  0.013*  0.014*  -0.006 
  (1.60)  (1.72)  (1.83)  (-0.46) 
Ln(Firm Age)  0.035  0.125*  0.226***  0.171 
  (0.60)  (1.79)  (3.39)  (1.39) 
Big4 Auditor  -0.175*  -0.293***  -0.054  -0.008 
  (-1.82)  (-3.12)  (-0.56)  (-0.04) 
Constant -0.863*** 0.925* -1.027*** 1.600*** -1.100*** -1.906*** -2.264*** -0.959 
 (-11.18) (1.73) (-10.75) (2.65) (-12.83) (-3.19) (-13.77) (-0.67) 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of 
Observations 
13,163 13,163 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 13,164 
R2 0.039 0.065 0.013 0.040 0.073 0.133 0.071 0.164 
Chi2 255.85*** 422.52*** 95.52*** 231.99*** 573.81*** 812.88*** 169.24*** 264.75*** 
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Appendix 4.A1 Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Ln(Secretary Tenure)  
Natural logarithm of the number of years a corporate secretary has served in the said 
capacity with the firm. 
Board Meeting Frequency  Number of times corporate board meetings took place in a financial year. 
Outside Director Dissent 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if there is at least one outside director issued 
dissent opinion to board proposal during the board meeting in the year, 0 otherwise. 
Fraud_Lawsuit 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm received at least one enforcement 
against fraud by the regulator or were involved in the lawsuit during the financial year, 
0 otherwise. 
Fraud  
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm received at least one enforcement 
against fraud by the regulator during the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
Fraud Happen 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if at least one fraud happened in the firm in the 
fiscal year, 0 otherwise. 
Lawsuit  
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm was involved in at least one lawsuit 
during the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
Outside Director Absence 
Ratio 
The ratio of outside director absence behavior from the board meeting. It is equal to the 
total number of outside directors absent from board meeting (including representative 
attendance) divided by the total meeting outside directors are required to attend during 
the financial year. 
Analyst Coverage Total number of analysts covering the firm during the financial year.  
No. of Mutual Funds Number of Mutual Funds as the shareholder of the firm in a fiscal year. 
Modified Auditor Opinion 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm receives modified auditor opinions in 
the year, 0 otherwise. 
Board Independence  Number of outside directors divided by the board size.  
CEO Duality 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 
otherwise. 
Board Size Number of directors on the firm’s board at the end of the financial year. 
Ownership Concentration  Ownership concentration of the ten largest shareholders in the firm. 
BTMV  Book value divided by the market value of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Ln(Market Value)  Natural logarithm of the total market value of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Leverage Total debt divided by total asset of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Sales Growth Growth in sales during the financial year compared to the previous year. 
Adjusted ROE 
Industry adjusted return on equity, i.e. net income divided by the average total equity of 
the current and last fiscal year minus the annual industry mean value. 
Equity Turnover  Trading turnover ratio of the firm’s stock during the financial year.  
Ln(Firm Age) Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was founded / incorporated. 
Big4 Auditor 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the auditor of the firm is one of the Big-4 
accounting and auditing firms in the year, 0 otherwise. 
SOE  
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the government is the controlling shareholder 
in the firm, 0 otherwise. 
Duality CEO or VP 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the corporate secretary of the firm is also the 
CEO or Vice President, 0 otherwise. 
Duality CFO 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the corporate secretary of the firm is also the 
CFO, 0 otherwise. 
Adjusted Secretary Salary 
Annual salary of corporate secretary minus the annual industry average level, in RMB 
10,000. 
Central SOE A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the company is a central SOE, 0 otherwise 
Local SOE A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the company is a local SOE, 0 otherwise 
CEO Political Connection 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CEO has the experience working in the 
government, 0 otherwise 
CFO Political Connection 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CFO has the experience working in the 
government, 0 otherwise 
Independence Dummy 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the percentage of outside director in board 
exceeds 33% of the total board members, otherwise equals to 0. 
Industry Ln(Secretary 
Tenure) 
Equals to the annual industry average secretary tenure, exclude the observation value 
itself. 
Cash Flow Volatility 
Equals to the standard deviation of the operating cash flows in previous eight quarters 
at the end of the year. 
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Chapter 5 Does Director Interlock with Shareholder Firms’ 
Boards Create Value? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms 
5.1 Introduction 
Directors form an important part of the modern corporate governance mechanism. 
Research focuses on various characteristics of directors, including their independence, 
personal characteristics, and experience. Among those features, the interlocking of 
director has received a lot of attention in the areas of management and finance. Director 
interlock is described by Fich and White (2005) as “a person is on the board of 
directors of two or more corporations, providing a link or interlock between them”. 
That is, when directors taking multiple directorships in different companies, it forms a 
bridge between them.28  Existing research shows director interlock might not only 
provide better information channels and lower environmental uncertainty (Beckman 
and Haunschild, 2002) but also bring problems of lower independence and director 
availability (Core et al, 1999). The empirical research shows a positive (Horton et al., 
2012; Phan et al., 2003), negative (Devos et al., 2009; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) or 
no impact of director interlock on firm performance and governance quality (Fligstein 
and Brantley, 1992). To explain these mixed results, Zona et al. (2018) developed a 
combined framework by fitting both agency theory and resource dependence theory 
into their research, and concluded that differences in target interlock firm 
characteristics could determine whether director interlock benefits the firm. 
 Inspired by Zona et al. (2018), by focusing on firms with specific characteristics, 
                                                             
28 Following Han et al. (2017), I define director interlock as follows: “If one firm had a common director 
with another firm, those firms were considered as interlocked partners.” Directors taking other roles 
(e.g CEOs) in other firms are not considered as being interlocked in this research. 
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this chapter further investigates the impact from one unique group of interlocked firms, 
that is, the shareholders. Shareholders are the ultimate beneficiary of firm operations 
and the principals who monitor the management agents; thus, taking a dual role as 
director of a listed firm and a director of a firm that holds shares in it should have an 
effect on firm performance and governance quality. To capture such an impact, I 
construct the shareholder interlocked director ratio (SIDR) which is measured as the 
percentage of directors on the board of a listed firm who also take a dual role as a 
director on the board of its shareholders. I first examine whether the SIDR affects firm 
performance, and find that it is positively correlated with the industry-adjusted return 
on assets, suggesting such interlock is a good source of resource dependence. Then, I 
examine whether the governance quality is affected by such interlocking, finding a 
negative relationship between the SIDR and both regulatory enforcement against fraud 
and the probability of being involved in a lawsuit, suggesting that a better monitoring 
function is provided by the interlock relationship. In addition, I present several 
additional tests, including instrumental variable (IV) analysis, propensity score 
matching (PSM) analysis, alternative measures of the SIDR, and the impact of the 
SIDR on tunneling behavior, outside director attendance and shareholder voting 
behaviors. These results further support the main findings. 
 This chapter makes the following contributions to the literature. First, this chapter 
opens a new dimension to study the indirect impact of shareholder on corporate 
governance via these multi-appointed directors. Moreover, in line with the notion of 
Zona et al. (2018), this chapter finds that directors with specific background 
(shareholders) could provide consistent impact on governance quality. Third, this 
chapter finds alternative factor that could affect firm performance and probability 
involving in fraud and lawsuits. In addition, this chapter provides new evidence on the 
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governance and performance differences between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs. 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The literature review and 
hypothesis development are presented in section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the data 
and models. The main results are demonstrated and discussed in section 5.4. Several 
additional tests are presented in section 5.5. A brief conclusion is drawn in section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1 The Importance of Director Interlock 
The nature of corporate board has received extensive attention in the literature. A 
recent review work by Johnson et al. (2013) has summarized the research angles on 
boards beyond independence, director interlock being one of them. Director interlock 
is described as occurring “when a person is on the board of directors of two or more 
corporations, providing a link or interlock between them” (Fich and White, 2005). 
Existing literature has documented extensive evidence on the importance of 
interlocked directors, and both good and bad consequences. On the good side, from 
the view of resource dependence theory (Emerson, 1976), it is argued that interlocked 
directors could bring outside resources to the firm from their external positions (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), reduce environmental uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004), 
enhance the information environment (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002), and make the 
directors better at performing the corporate governance practice (Palmer et al., 1993). 
Moreover, social theory and social embeddedness theory (Granovetter, 1985) 
demonstrate that economic decisions and behaviors are largely influenced by social 
relations. As Han et al. (2017) show, director interlock could provide firms with good 
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connections, which reduce the cost of information transmission (Haunschild, 1993). 
Moreover, the reputation effect driven by multiple directorships also explains the 
impact of interlock. Early studies such as Fama and Jensen (1983) show that the more 
companies outside directors are serving at the same time in their multiple directorships, 
the more able they should be. This is because, if outside directors show a good 
performance track record, they will be favored by more firms, and hired by more 
boards. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), Booth and Deli (1996) show that 
directors with multiple directorships are involved in more businesses, and could help 
firms gain easier access to partner companies, to further enhance their businesses. 
 While the good side of interlocking is supported by the above literature, there is 
another group of research, looking at this from the aspect of agency theory, which 
suggests that interlocked directors are less independent and have few incentives to 
monitor management teams, as they wish to avoid social sanctions from their director 
network (Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal and Khanna, 2003; Zona et al., 2018), which may 
increase the agency cost and depress performance (Dalton et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
interlocking of directors may lessen their effectiveness by adding to the workload of 
their peer directors and distracting them from their jobs (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Adams et al. (2010) provide theoretical support for this 
argument, showing the busyness of outside directors will harm their effectiveness.  
 
5.2.2 Shareholder Interlocked Directors 
From the above existing literature, it can be seen that director interlocks do have a 
significant influence, either good or bad, on firm operations, and according to Zona et 
al. (2018) the impact should be largely dependent on the relationship between and 
nature of the interlocked firms a director is serving simultaneously. Following this 
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notion, I focus on one specific group of interlocked firms, that is, the shareholders. 
Shareholders are proven to be a very important factor linked to corporate governance 
quality and performance (McCahery et al., 2016). Therefore, I believe that, when 
directors also holds multiple directorships on the boards of the firm’s shareholders, 
they should be able to express more shareholder-specific views to the firm, which will 
alter the governance and performance outcomes of the firm. As demonstrated by Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Ertimur et al. (2008), shareholders are rarely directly involved 
in the firm’s operations, either because the separation of ownership and control means 
that only certain proposals have to go through the shareholders’ meeting, or because 
the law or company articles require a complex process in order for shareholders’ 
proposals to be implemented regarding issues that a board will normally handle. 
However, if there are interlocked directorships between two firms, this could be seen 
as an additional channel for shareholders to communicate and express their ideas, 
directly and more efficiently, which should improve firm performance in terms of both 
operations and governance, and in turn help to protect shareholder wealth.   
 To capture such an impact, a good proxy is required. Based on a review of the 
literature, I decided to construct the SIDR, as mentioned earlier, calculated as the 
percentage of directors of a listed firm who have interlocked directorships in its 
shareholder’s board. As the outcomes of a board will rely on director voting, this 
percentage-based proxy could well reflect the impact of shareholder interlocked 
director seats on the board and on firm performance and governance outcomes. Later 
in this section I will discuss how this might happen, in developing the hypotheses. 
 
5.2.3 Shareholder Interlocked Directors and Firm Performance 
First, I would like to see whether the SIDR affects firm performance. The literature 
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frequently investigates how boards might affect firm performance. Board 
independence is one of the most frequently used measures of evaluating this (Bhagat 
and Black, 2001; Klein, 1998). Among other measures, director compensation, board 
demographic diversity, and board members’ foreign experience have all been shown 
to affect firm performance (Brick et al., 2006; Erhardt et al., 2003; Masulis et al., 2012). 
Drawing attention to board director interlock specifically, research has already 
demonstrated that this can significantly affect firm performance (Brown and Maloney, 
1999; Ferris et al., 2003; Harris and Shimizu, 2004). It is argued that multiple 
directorships could bring to the firm resources from stakeholders such as suppliers and 
customers (Booth and Deli, 1996). Moreover, the higher the level at which directors 
are engaged in the external environment, the better resources they may bring to the 
firm, and the more they may increase firm performance (Jackling and Johl, 2010). 
Such an argument is also applied to shareholder interlocked directors. I believe that, 
due to the resources brought by shareholders, higher SIDR should alter firm 
performance. Becht et al. (2009) argue that institutional investor engagement could 
significantly help firms outperform their peers. Andres (2008), looking at the aspect of 
family business, argues that, when the founding family as the largest shareholder is 
also represented on the board, the firm performance will be distinguishable from that 
of other firms. Therefore, if I narrow down the definition of interlocked firms to that 
related to the shareholders, the resource provision function of interlocked directors 
should be more comprehensive, with directors not only getting better support from the 
shareholders, but also make the firm better understanding and meeting the shareholders’ 
needs. Thus, it will create an extra channel between the shareholder and the listed firm 
for information exchange, with the director acting as a boundary spanner and 
enhancing firm performance (McNulty and Stewart, 2015).  
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 Moreover, despite research such as Lipton and Lorsch (1992) arguing that the 
largest problem for directors who serve on multiple boards is a lack of time to carry 
out their jobs, which may reduce the firm performance, it is also argued that, if the 
firms have the same or aligned natures, the workload should be much lower than 
expected (Kiel et al., 2005). In line with this notion, the directors of firms that hold 
shares in the listed firm, with expertise in areas specific to the listed firm, or experience 
handling post-investment management for listed firms, may largely be free from the 
problem of distraction caused by the additional workload, and the additional resources 
and knowledge brought may compensate for any such distraction.  
 Based on the above arguments, I empirically analyze the effect of the SIDR on 
firm performance by following Eisenberg et al. (1998) and using the industry-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for performance. I propose the following hypothesis: 
H5.1: A higher SIDR leads to a higher industry-adjusted ROA. 
 
5.2.4 Shareholder Interlocked Directors and Governance Outcomes 
As well as firm performance, governance outcomes are also an important aspect of the 
firm’s operations and the shareholders’ wealth. Internal control is crucial for corporate 
governance and shareholders’ wealth. The failure of internal control could lead to firms 
being involved in lawsuits or subject to regulatory enforcement regarding fraud 
(Persons, 2006). Corporate boards, as the most important governance mechanism, play 
a very important role in enhancing the quality of internal control. However, literature 
on the relationship between corporate boards and the incidence of fraud show mixed 
results (Beasley, 1996; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Uzun et al., 2004). Although 
research such as Beasley (1996) argue that independent board could significantly 
reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud, others, such as Schnatterly (2010), 
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demonstrate that the board has only a limited impact on management team behavior. 
It has even been found that the presence of different types of committees has no impact 
(Beasley, 1996) or even a negative impact on the incidence of fraud (Uzun et al., 2004). 
 Such mixed results lead to the question of whether the board can constrain the 
opportunistic/self-serving CEO behaviors. Regarding the issue of CEO-board power, 
the literature refers to various determinants of this relationship, including CEO equity 
holdings (Westphal and Zajac, 1995), CEO duality (Zajac and Westphal, 1996), board 
insider ratio (Westphal and Zajac, 1995), and director-CEO relative tenure (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996).  
 In addition to the above factors, by taking a dual role on a shareholder firm’s board 
not only represent themselves, but also a specific shareholder, and could thereby carry 
higher bargaining power. Thus, when a board has more shareholder interlocked 
directors, it should have stronger bargaining power, and the CEO’s behaviors could be 
more effectively constrained by the board’s monitoring.  
 Another possible explanation derives from the theory of information. A low-
quality information environment and poor transmission efficiency to shareholders is 
one of the most serious obstacles to effective board monitoring. Links with outside 
parties, meanwhile, could significantly reduce the transparency issue. For example, 
Hillman et al. (1999) show that links established between a firm and the government 
could significantly reduce the related uncertainties by improving information channels. 
In the same way, the presence of a shareholder interlocked director who is acting as a 
boundary spanner (Kiel et al. 2005; McNulty and Stewart, 2015; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989) could also deliver information directly between the listed firm and its 
shareholders, enhance transparency and efficiency, make shareholder monitoring and 
guidance more accountable, and therefore reduce the probability of lawsuits and the 
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occurrence of fraud.  
 In addition, a critical issue of director effectiveness is the degree of independence 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), even for outside directors. Bhagat and Black (1999) 
suggest that, no matter the independence level of outside directors when they initially 
begin sitting on a board, after a certain period of tenure, they will become a “lapdog” 
rather than a “watchdog”. The reason is their fear of offending the management team. 
However, since the shareholder interlocked director has power from the shareholders, 
they should be more independent and have a better chance of conducting the 
monitoring job effectively. Based on the above arguments, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H5.2: A higher SIDR reduces the probability of a firm being involved in a lawsuit 
or a regulatory enforcement against to fraud. 
5.3 Data and Sample 
5.3.1 Data 
To conduct the empirical research, a firm-year panel data sample of all the A-share 
listed firms in China between 2004 and 2015 was used. In line with major research on 
the Chinese market (Chen et al., 2006; Hou and Moore, 2010), the CSMAR and CCER 
datasets which are the most widely used datasets were used to source research data. In 
order to avoid biased results caused by extreme data points, I winsorized all data at the 
top and bottom 1% of the dataset. After taking out the observations with missing values, 
16,431 observations remained. The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are 
shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The definitions of all the variables can be found in 
Appendix 5.A1. 
 Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean value shows 
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that about 12% of observations in the sample of this research contain fraud. The mean 
of SIDR is about 15.9%, with a standard deviation of 16.59% and a 25th percentile of 
0, which shows that the variation of SIDR is relatively large across different firms and 
years. The median value of Board Independence is 0.367 with a standard deviation of 
0.0526 and a 75th percentile of 0.4, implying that most of the firms in China have 
boards comprising one third outside directors to meet the minimum requirement 
imposed by the China Security Regulatory Commission. Board Size is very similar 
across firms and years, with a 25th percentile of 8 and a 75th percentile of 9. Sales 
Growth has a very big standard deviation; this may be driven by the extreme values at 
the two tails. 
[Please insert Table 5.1 about here] 
 Table 5.2 presents the correlation coefficients of all the variables. The largest 
correlation 0.86 is observed between Top 10 Hold and Shareholder Vote PCT, but these 
two variables will be on different sides of the equation. The second largest correlation 
is 0.57, which is observed between Leverage and BTMV, suggesting that there is no 
significant multicollinearity problem in the models.  
[Please insert Table 5.2 about here] 
 
5.3.2 Models 
In order to perform the analysis of H5.1 and H5.2, the following models were used: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘                                          (5.1) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑘+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘                  (5.2) 
 where 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑘 on the left-hand side of equation 5.1 is a continuous variable 
capturing the industry-adjusted return on assets of firm j at year k. 
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𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑘+1 on the left-hand side of equation 5.2 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if there is at least one enforcement against fraud by the regulator or lawsuit 
against firm j at year k+1. I lead the year of the dependent variable by 1 to resolve the 
potential endogeneity problem. 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 on the right-hand side of both equations is a 
percentage that captures the shareholder interlocked director ratio, which is equal to 
the number of directors with additional directorships on the boards of shareholder 
firms, divided by the board size. Moreover, two groups of control variables are 
included on the right-hand sides of equations 5.1 and 5.2. The first group captures the 
governance characteristics of the firm, and includes Independence Ratio, Board 
Meeting Freq., Board Size and CEO Duality. Independence Ratio captures the 
percentage of outside directors on the board. Board Meeting Freq. equals the number 
of board meetings held within the particular year. CEO Duality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the firm during the given year, and 
otherwise equal to 0. The second group of control variables captures the fundamental 
characteristics of the firm, and includes BTMV, Ln(Market Value), Top 10 Hold, Sales 
Growth and Leverage. BTMV measures the book to market ratio, Ln(Market Value) 
measures the log of the total market value of the firm, Top 10 Hold equals the sum of 
the percentage of shares held by the top ten shareholders, Sales Growth equals the 
growth rate in the firm’s revenue compared to last year, and Leverage equals the ratio 
of debt to total assets. The Model 5.1 is estimated by panel OLS method with firm 
fixed effect and year fixed effect, and the Model 5.2 is estimated by the probit method 
with industry and year fixed effect. 
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5.4 Results and Interpretations 
5.4.1 Impact of SIDR on Firm Performance and Governance Quality 
Table 5.3 reports the panel OLS with fixed effect regression results for the relationship 
between the SIDR and the Ind ROA, as well as the probit regression results between 
SIDR and fraud and lawsuits. For the Ind ROA results, the coefficient of SIDR is 2.439 
with t-value 2.89 (column 1), which is significant at the 1% level, and the results 
remain significant after controlling for the various governance and fundamental 
variables in column 2. Since the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted return on 
assets, apart from the key factor SIDR, only the board size and the book to market ratio 
are significantly related to it. The results suggest that a higher presence of shareholder-
director interlock could bring resources from shareholder and enhance firm 
performance, which supports H5.1. For the impact of the SIDR on governance quality, 
in column 3, the coefficient is -0.426, which is significantly negative at the 1% level, 
and the coefficient remains significant at the same level in column 4 after controlling 
for the fundamental and governance factors. These results suggest that, as the 
shareholder-director interlock increases, the probability that a company faces 
regulatory enforcement against fraud or a lawsuit will be lower, which supports H5.2. 
This result is in line with the notion that director interlock could improve the 
interchange of information between each of the interlocked firms, which would 
enhance communication efficiency and reduce information asymmetry, increase the 
cost for the management team of engaging in fraud, and thereby reduce the probability 
of regulatory enforcement against fraud. This result might also be supported by the 
notion of bargaining power, where the interlocked director has directing rights in the 
shareholder company, which empowers the interlocked director in the listed firm and 
reduces the chances of wrongdoing on the part of the management team. 
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[Please insert Table 5.3 about here] 
 
5.4.2 The Impact of State Ownership 
Moreover, I further split the research sample into SOEs and non-SOEs to see whether 
such an effect is dependent on ownership type. As Allen et al. (2005) show, state-
owned firms differ significantly from privately owned companies. Despite the impact 
of ownership type on firm performance seems inclusive (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Kole and 
Mulherin, 1997), due to the operating system, the governance quality of SOEs is 
always less efficient than that of non-SOEs (Cornett et al., 2010). Since I am focusing 
on the influence of directors taking a dual role on the boards of shareholder companies, 
the ownership type differences become even more crucial.  
 To conduct such analysis, I ran the regression from Table 5.3 again using the split 
sample. The results are shown in Table 5.4. The results for Ind ROA are shown in the 
first two columns. The chi2 value of the difference-in-means test on the coefficients of 
SIDR is 7.10, which is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the relationship 
between SIDR and Ind ROA is stronger in SOE firms. This implies that shareholder 
interlocked directors in SOEs could better help these firms to increase their 
performance. A possible explanation for this result could stem from the unique features 
of the SOE executives. As Jiang and Kim (2015) show, unlike those in non-SOEs, 
many executives in SOEs hold entitled political positions, and directors of the 
shareholder companies commonly have much higher political ranks than those of the 
subsidiary companies. Political position is very important for communication, and 
without such interlocking directorships, communication may rely solely on formal 
report relationships which are less efficient. It will be very hard in such cases to 
communicate directly with top-tier management in the shareholder companies on an 
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equal footing to ask for resources and support. Another possible explanation aligns 
with Megginson and Netter (2001) in that the state could use SOEs to pursue non-
profit goals that may not always maximize the interests of minority shareholders. This 
will create pressure on the company’s board when making decisions. Therefore, when 
the number of shareholder interlocked directors sitting on the board increases, the 
director who sits on the boards of SOE shareholder companies will be more careful 
when dealing with those non-profit goals in order to balance the interest of other 
shareholders. 
 The results from the probit regression on fraud and lawsuits are shown in columns 
3 and 4 of Table 5.4. The chi2 value of the difference-in-means test on the coefficient 
of SIDR is 4.03 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that shareholder interlocked 
directors perform better in their disciplining role in the non-SOEs. Directors with 
interlocked directorships in privately owned shareholder companies will be better 
connected to the shareholders’ interests, and will have a greater incentive as well as 
capabilities to monitor the management team in the subsidiary listed firm. For the 
SOEs, as the monitoring function puts the interlocked directors and the management 
team on opposite sides, the self-interest aspect of the directors mean that they may not 
willing to offend the management team and other colleagues since their political career 
depends more on colleague evaluation than on their monitoring reward.  
[Please insert Table 5.4 about here] 
5.5 Further Tests 
5.5.1 IV Test and PSM Analysis 
Although the SIDR is largely dependent on the nomination and election process of the 
board, which is less likely to produce an endogeneity problem with the dependent 
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variables, the fear of reputational harm for individual directors, or the idea of 
performance and governance outcomes being measures of directors’ capabilities, could 
affect the shareholder company’s decision to appoint a director of the shareholder 
company to the listed firm’s board. Even if the director of the listed firm perform well, 
they may be appointed as the directors of the shareholder firm for wider career reasons 
or as a political promotion in an SOE. Based on these concerns, to add further 
robustness to the main results, I ran both IV analysis and PSM analysis.  
 
5.5.1.1 IV Analysis 
IV analysis is widely used in research to control potential endogeneity problems 
(Weber and Willenborg, 2003). To apply the IV analysis, I employ two variables as the 
instruments, which are correlated with the independent variable SIDR, but not with the 
dependent variables. The first is the one-year-lagged averaged value of SIDR for 
different industries and years, and the calculation of this value does not include the 
observation itself. This method is consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Laeven 
and Levine, 2007; Leary and Roberts, 2014; Xia, 2014), in terms of appropriately 
reflecting the industry-specific level of shareholder interlocked director status. The 
second variable is the change in the number of shares outstanding of the firm. Since 
ownership and control are designed to be separated, the change on number of shares 
outstanding may have little effect on the dependent variables in this chapter. However, 
according to the Chinese Company Law, directors are elected by the shareholder 
meeting, and the company article always defines a certain portion of shares will 
provide rights to the shareholder to nominate a director. Therefore, when more shares 
are issued by the company, the nomination rights among shareholders will change 
accordingly, which would affect the composition of board, and therefore affect the 
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level of SIDR. By applying these two instrument variables, The results of the IV 
analysis are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.5. They show that, after controlling 
for the IVs, the relationship between SIDR and the dependent variables remains 
significant, which supports the main results. 
 
5.5.1.2 PSM Analysis 
In addition to the IV analysis, existing literature demonstrates that the PSM approach 
can provide more efficient statistical results through accurate matching (Conniffe et 
al., 2000; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). I conduct 1-on-1 matching with no 
replacement for all the dependent variables in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. I use all the 
independent variables apart from SIDR as the matching criteria.29 After this process, 
I have 6,324 and 12,468 observations as two separate subsamples. Then, I run the 
regressions from Tables 5.3 and 5.4 again. The results are shown in Table 5.5 and are 
consistent. 
[Please insert Table 5.5 about here] 
 
5.5.2 Alternative Measures 
5.5.2.1 Breaking Down the Overall Governance Outcome into Fraud and Lawsuits 
Respectively 
In the main test presented in Table 5.4, I follow Persons (2006), and use a combined 
variable for fraud and lawsuit events. To add further robustness to the main results, I 
break the variable down to test the impact of SIDR on fraud and lawsuits separately. 
The probit regression results are shown in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5.6. It can be seen 
                                                             
29 Since Industry adjusted ROA is a continuous variable, to ensure the matching process is valid, I take 
the value at top 20% of the sample as the host sample, and use the rest sample as the matching sample 
to conduct the 1-1 match. 
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that, after the separation, the results remain the same, which further supports the idea 
that a higher SIDR could reduce the probability of a firm facing these distress situations.  
[Please insert Table 5.6 about here] 
 
5.5.2.2 Alternative Measure for SIDR 
As a further robustness test, in addition to the original SIDR variable, I take the actual 
number of directors with interlocking directorships on shareholder companies’ boards 
as an alternative measure, and use it in the regression analyses for the two hypotheses. 
The results are shown in Table 5.7. Consistent with the results in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, 
the amount of director interlock with shareholder boards has a positive relationship 
with industry-adjusted ROA and a negative relationship with fraud and lawsuits, 
respectively. This result further confirms the benefits of directors’ interlocked 
relationships with shareholders. 
[Please insert Table 5.7 about here] 
 
5.5.3 The SIDR and Tunneling Behaviors 
Apart from the traditional financial and market-based measures, another potential issue 
that may be linked to the SIDR is the risk of tunneling. The literature shows that, in 
countries with weak legal protection for investors, controlling shareholders may tunnel 
wealth from listed firms, harming the interests of minority shareholders (Johnson et 
al., 2000). Gao and Kling (2008) show that outside directors and a dispersed ownership 
structure could reduce the chances of tunneling, while large firms and less leveraged 
firms also face a lower probability of tunneling behaviors. Wang and Xiao (2011) show 
that tunneling behavior reduces executive pay-performance sensitivity, and that 
controlling shareholders with the incentive to tunnel will have less of an incentive to 
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increase such sensitivity. To perform the analysis on the relationship between the SIDR 
and tunneling, the following panel OLS model with fixed effect is employed: 
𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑘+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘                  (5.3) 
where 𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑘+1 on the left-hand side of the equation is a continuous 
variable capturing the tunneling behavior in firm j at year k+1. Moreover, in order to 
capture the tunneling effect, following Jian and Wong (2010) and Ying and Wang 
(2013), I use the abnormal related party transaction which generate income to the 
shareholder as the measure.30 To construct the variable, I first regress the level of 
related party transactions between the listed firm and the shareholder firm against the 
listed firm’s Size, Leverage, and Tobin’s Q. Following Jian and Wong (2010), the 
related party transactions is include by the purchase of goods and assets, guarantees, 
mortgages and other forms of cooperation. Moreover, following Ying and Wang (2013), 
I include an industry dummy within the regression to control the industry effects. After 
running the regression, I take the residual as the abnormal part of the related party 
transactions, and use it as a proxy for the tunneling effect. Where the larger number of 
the residual implies higher level of potential tunneling behaviors. In addition, I lead 
the dependent variable by one year to address the potential endogeneity problem. 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 and the other control variables are defined the same as those in equation 5.2. 
Table 5.8 reports the regression results for the relationship between SIDR and the 
probability of shareholder tunneling. In column 1, the coefficient of SIDR is -0.016, 
which is significantly negative at the 5% level. In column 2, the coefficient of SIDR 
remains significant at the same level after controlling for the various fundamental and 
governance factors. A possible explanation for this result could stem from both the 
                                                             
30 This thesis use the same method and control variables hired by Ying and Wang (2013) to calculate 
the degree of shareholder’s tunneling behaviors. 
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capability and willingness of shareholders to tunnel from the listed firm. Regarding 
capabilities, I believe that, when the SIDR increases, the monitoring function of 
directors is enhanced. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that concentrated ownership 
will enhance monitoring quality and better align the interests of majority and minority 
shareholders. Since a higher SIDR implies more concentrated ownership 31 , these 
shareholder-representing directors will tend to provide a better monitoring function. 
Moreover, as Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Gao and Kling (2008) show, an increased 
number of directors could strengthen the effectiveness of their monitoring of each other, 
which would better coordinate and balance the interests of different parties and reduce 
the incidence of tunneling. In line with this notion but from the point of view of 
accountability rather than the number of directors, I believe that interlock makes 
directors’ interests better aligned with the represented shareholders. Interlocked 
directors are more empowered by the shareholders to execute their monitoring function, 
which reduces the probability of tunneling. In addition, director interlock could be seen 
as an indicator that the listed firm is strategically important to the shareholders. 
According to the company law, the number of directors that can be nominated by the 
shareholders is pre-agreed by company articles. Therefore, if they choose to appoint a 
director to an interlocked position in a listed firm, it indicates that the listed firm is 
more likely to be used for business extension or company brand creation, rather than 
as a drilling machine which tunnels the money from listed firm and to harm the 
minority shareholders’ interests. Otherwise, the director of a shareholder company 
does not need to take an interlocked position in a listed firm in-person to be exposed 
to the minority shareholders, potential public scrutiny and outrage. A scapegoat as 
                                                             
31 Shareholders need enough shares to nominate its own board member to be seated at the board of the 
listed firm, therefore, a higher SIDR implies higher ownership concentration  
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proxy to seat in listed firm’s board could satisfy these needs.  
[Please insert Table 5.8 about here] 
 
5.5.4 The SIDR and Shareholder Voting Engagement 
To further explore whether shareholder interlocked directors enhance firm governance 
quality, I also examine the relationship between the SIDR and shareholder voting 
engagement behaviors. Voting rights are valuable to shareholders; research such as 
Kalay et al. (2014) uses the contingent claims approach to simulate synthetic stock by 
bond and option, and finds that voting rights do have a premium value. Therefore, 
failing to execute such rights could be seen as abandoning part of the stock value. 
Moreover, it is argued that shareholders could use voting as a channel for 
communicating with the directors (Yermack, 2010)32, enhancing firm transparency and 
increasing the efficiency of communication. Therefore, if shareholder voting 
engagement increased, both shareholder wealth and governance quality should be 
enhanced. Since shareholder interlocked directors provide a good bridge between the 
shareholder firm and the listed firm, the chances of shareholders participating in voting 
should be higher. To empirically examine this hypothetical argument, the following 
panel OLS model with fixed effect is employed: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝐶𝑇 𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘                  (5.4) 
where Shareholder Vote PCT is the percentage of shareholders who attended the 
shareholder meeting and voted, for a given firm and year. Other variables are defined 
as in Table 5.3. The results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.8. As I can see, 
the SIDR enhances the percentage of shareholders attending the meeting and voting, 
                                                             
32  As Yermack (2010) shows, the votes in shareholder’s meeting provide opportunities for 
communications between shareholders, directors, as well as the management team. 
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suggesting that a higher SIDR could enhance shareholder voting engagement. This in 
turn could help shareholders understand company operations, it could enhance the 
efficiency of the communication channel between the director and shareholders, and it 
could reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders, which would enhance 
the shareholders’ wealth (Yermack, 2010). 
 
5.5.5 The SIDR and Outside Directors’ Meeting Absence 
In addition, I believe shareholder interlocked directors may not only directly help 
promote governance quality, but also indirectly enhance board efficiency by increasing 
outside director effectiveness. Information is the most significant disadvantage of 
outside directors. As discussed above, shareholder interlocked directors have better 
knowledge and access to information from shareholder companies and they perform a 
very useful boundary-spanning function for the outside directors through 
communications during the board meeting. With more information, outside directors 
could become more effectively involved in the governance process and make higher-
quality decisions. Moreover, not offending the management team is a self-interested 
motivation of outside directors with less monitoring power. Since shareholder 
interlocked directors could enhance the board’s bargaining power, the probability of 
the management team making risky proposals should be reduced, and even when they 
do make such proposals, boards with higher bargaining power should be able to reject 
them and not leave outside directors with opposing opinions standing alone. To 
conduct the analysis on how shareholder interlocked directors affect outside director 
effectiveness, I use outside director attendance as a proxy for their effectiveness 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Lin et al., 2014) and propose the following probit model: 
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𝑂𝐷 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑗,𝑘+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑗,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘                  (5.5) 
where OD Absence is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one outside 
director absence during a financial year, and otherwise equals 0. Other variables are 
defined as in Table 5.3. The results are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.8. As I 
can see, the SIDR reduces the probability of outside director absence, with or without 
control variables, at the 1% level, suggesting that a higher SIDR could enhance outside 
directors’ active engagement in their job. This result again confirms the notion that an 
increase in the SIDR could enhance the information environment and communication 
channels, thereby improving governance by outside directors.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This paper has empirically tested the impact of shareholder interlocked directors on 
firm performance and governance quality. The results show that, the higher is the 
percentage of shareholder interlocked directors on the board, the greater is the ROA, 
and the lower is the probability of fraud and lawsuits. The results suggest that 
shareholder interlocked directors could bring extra resources to the firm, help 
corporate boards make more effective decisions, better regulate the behavior of the 
management team, and reduce the probability of majority shareholders harming the 
interests of minority shareholders. The impact of shareholder interlocked directors 
varies according to the ownership type. The results are robust after controlling for 
potential endogeneity problems using IV and PSM approaches. This chapter also 
shows higher SIDR will enhance shareholder voting engagement, lower outside 
director absence as well as decrease the incidence of shareholder tunneling, which 
further support the main findings. 
161 
 
This chapter makes the following contributions to the literature and regulators. 
First, in line with the notion in Zona et al. (2018), this chapter, by extending the study 
on director interlock and focusing on one specific group of firms with unique 
characteristics, finds significant influence on firm performance and governance quality 
when firms’ directors take interlock directorship in their shareholder’s board. Second, 
empirical results of this chapter point to an new  factor that could affect firms’ 
governance and performance. Third, this chapter provides new evidence on the 
governance and performance differences between SOEs and non-SOEs. Fourth, the 
results urge the regulators and market practitioners to take into account the SIDR as a 
positive indicator for board effectiveness. 
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Tables for Chapter 5 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for the Chinese A-share listed firms used in this 
chapter, from 2004 to 2015. We report the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, median, and 
first and third quartile values of all the main variables used in this chapter. Detailed definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Appendix A1. 
 Variable N Mean Standard Dev. P25 Median P75 
(1) SIDR 16431 0.1590 0.1659 0.0000 0.1111 0.2500 
(2) Tunneling 16431 -0.0001 0.0782 -0.0295 -0.0206 -0.0088 
(3) Lawsuit 16431 0.4117 0.4922 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
(4) OD Absence 16431 0.1310 0.3374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(5) Fraud 16431 0.1233 0.3288 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(6) Ind ROA 16431 -0.8802 10.0165 -0.0242 0.0044 0.0404 
(7) Independence Ratio 16431 0.3677 0.0526 0.3333 0.3333 0.4000 
(8) Board Meeting Freq. 16431 9.4105 3.6736 7.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
(9) Board Size 16431 9.1003 1.9648 8.0000 9.0000 9.0000 
(10) CEO Duality 16431 1.7871 0.4094 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 
(11) BTMV 16431 1.0017 1.0612 0.3777 0.6534 1.1991 
(12) Ln(MV) 16431 15.5017 1.0796 14.7423 15.3781 16.0995 
(13) Top 10 Hold 16431 58.8672 15.6179 47.8900 59.8900 70.8300 
(14) Sales Growth 16431 0.4292 1.4565 -0.0472 0.1109 0.3841 
(15) Shareholder Vote PCT 16407 52.7826 16.4419 40.5967 53.3948 65.3245 
(16) Leverage 16431 0.4561 0.2193 0.2869 0.4575 0.6197 
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Table 5.2 Pairwise correlation matrix 
This table reports the pairwise correlation matrix for the main variables from 2004 to 2015. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A1. * indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[1]SIDR 1.00                
[2]Tunneling 0.00 1.00               
[3]Lawsuit -0.06* -0.08* 1.00              
[4]OD Absence -0.06* -0.03* 0.13* 1.00             
[5]Fraud -0.02* 0.00 0.06* 0.00 1.00            
[6]Ind ROA 0.02 -0.01 0.07* 0.00 0.02 1.00           
[7]Independence Ratio -0.06* -0.06* 0.09* 0.02* 0.00 0.02 1.00          
[8]Board Meeting Freq. 0.00 -0.08* 0.06* 0.04* 0.04* -0.02 0.06* 1.00         
[9]Board Size 0.05* 0.06* -0.18* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.35* -0.02* 1.00        
[10]CEO Duality 0.06* 0.07* -0.17* -0.07* -0.03* -0.02* -0.10* 0.00 0.18* 1.00       
[11]BTMV 0.06* -0.01 -0.14* -0.05* -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10* 0.29* 0.15* 1.00      
[12]Ln(MV) 0.05* 0.01 0.10* -0.06* -0.04* 0.05* 0.07* 0.18* 0.25* 0.08* 0.12* 1.00     
[13]Top 10 Hold 0.07* 0.01 0.09* 0.05* -0.04* -0.01 0.04* -0.01 0.03* -0.04* -0.01 0.23* 1.00    
[14]Sales Growth -0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.10* -0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00   
[15]Leverage 0.08* 0.02* -0.23* -0.10* 0.03* 0.02 -0.02* 0.18* 0.23* 0.18* 0.57* 0.16* -0.12* 0.07* 1.00  
[16]Shareholder Vote PCT  0.07* 0.02 0.05* 0.05* -0.04* 0.00 0.00 -0.08* 0.07* -0.03* -0.01 0.15* 0.86* -0.04* -0.15* 1.00 
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Table 5.3 Effect of shareholder interlocked director ratio on return on assets and fraud and 
lawsuits 
This table reports the panel OLS/probit regression results for the effect of the shareholder interlocked director 
ratio (SIDR) on the industry-adjusted return on assets (Ind ROA) for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 
to 2015. Models 1 and 2 report panel OLS results for the SIDR as the key independent variable for the full 
sample, without and with control variables respectively, regressed on Ind ROA and clustered at firm and year 
level. Models 3 and 4 report the corresponding results for the SIDR regressed on the fraud and lawsuits variable, 
clustered at industry and year level. Adjusted R2/pseudo R2 and F-value/chi2-value are reported for all the 
regression models. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered 
at the firm level. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A1. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ind ROA Ind ROA Fraud and Lawsuits Fraud and Lawsuits 
SIDR 2.439*** 2.500*** -0.426*** -0.263*** 
 (2.89) (2.94) (-4.16) (-2.60) 
Independence Ratio  1.601  0.259 
  (0.57)  (0.77) 
Board Meeting Freq.  -0.008  0.015*** 
  (-0.21)  (2.71) 
Board Size  0.208**  -0.006 
  (2.22)  (-0.53) 
CEO Duality  -0.143  -0.088*** 
  (-0.56)  (-3.05) 
BTMV  0.371**  -0.233*** 
  (2.36)  (-7.92) 
Ln(MV)  0.204  0.002 
  (0.81)  (1.11) 
Ind ROA    -0.288*** 
    (-6.95) 
Top 10 Hold  -0.004  0.008*** 
  (-0.30)  (5.32) 
Sales Growth  -0.007  -0.001 
  (-0.11)  (-0.14) 
Leverage  -0.749  -0.393*** 
  (-0.88)  (-3.70) 
Constant 1.352*** -5.582 2.280*** 6.244*** 
 (7.84) (-1.24) (21.02) (14.65) 
No. of Observations 16431 16431 16431 16431 
R2 0.1307 0.1313 0.4075 0.4384 
F-Value/Chi2 81.984*** 45.256*** 3596.20*** 3378.33*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5.4 Effect of shareholder interlocked director ratio on return on assets and fraud and 
lawsuits by ownership type 
This table reports the panel OLS/probit regression results for the effect of the shareholder interlocked director 
ratio (SIDR) on the industry-adjusted return on assets (Ind ROA) for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 
to 2015. Models 1 and 2 report results for the SIDR as the key independent variable regressed on Ind ROA and 
clustered at firm and year level, for the SOE and non-SOE samples respectively. Models 3 and 4 report the 
corresponding results for the regression on the fraud and lawsuits variable, clustered at industry and year level. 
Adjusted R2/pseudo R2 and F-value/chi2-value are reported for all the regression models. Values in parenthesis 
below each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm level. The t-values of the 
differences in the SIDR coefficients between the SOEs and non-SOEs for columns 1/2 and 3/4 are presented 
separately. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A1. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ind ROA 
(SOE=0) 
Ind ROA 
(SOE=1) 
Fraud and Lawsuits 
(SOE=0) 
Fraud and Lawsuits 
(SOE=1) 
SIDR 1.124 3.954*** -0.467*** -0.154 
 (1.12) (2.98) (-3.56) (-0.98) 
Independence Ratio 3.116 -0.474 0.640 -0.182 
 (1.15) (-0.10) (1.38) (-0.37) 
Board Meeting Freq. 0.004 -0.031 0.011* 0.009 
 (0.13) (-0.46) (1.66) (1.17) 
Board Size 0.158 0.191 0.009 0.015 
 (1.26) (1.46) (0.51) (1.04) 
CEO Duality -0.341 0.000 -0.176*** -0.162** 
 (-1.16) (0.00) (-3.47) (-2.02) 
BTMV 0.817*** 0.121 -0.117* -0.043 
 (2.86) (0.64) (-1.95) (-1.44) 
Ln(MV) 1.046*** -0.504 -0.240*** -0.137*** 
 (3.80) (-1.27) (-7.06) (-3.16) 
Ind ROA   0.002 0.002 
   (0.89) (0.83) 
Top 10 Hold -0.019 -0.015 0.013*** 0.000 
 (-1.36) (-0.68) (7.88) (0.06) 
Sales Growth -0.068 0.052 -0.014 0.008 
 (-1.49) (0.40) (-1.11) (0.53) 
Leverage -0.622 -1.255 -0.099 -0.152 
 (-0.69) (-0.80) (-0.67) (-0.94) 
Constant -16.257*** 6.716 5.694*** 4.673*** 
 (-4.02) (1.06) (9.76) (7.40) 
Difference in 
coefficient on SIDR 
Chi2= 7.10 
Prob > chi2 =0.0077*** 
Chi2= 4.03 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0448*** 
No. of Observations 8457 7974 8457 7974 
R2 0.098 0.151 0.4205 0.416 
F-Value/Chi2 11.946*** 29.786*** 1849.70*** 1655.87*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5.5 Effect of shareholder interlocked director ratio on return on assets and fraud and 
lawsuits with propensity score matching and instrumental variables 
This table reports the propensity score matching (PSM) 1-on-1 matching subsample regression results and 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis for the effect of the shareholder interlocked director ratio (SIDR) on the 
industry-adjusted return on assets (Ind ROA), and fraud and lawsuits, for Chinese A-share listed firms from 
2004 to 2015. Model 1 and 3 is clustered at firm and year level, and Model 2 and 4 clustered at industry and 
year level. Adjusted R2 and F-values/chi2 are reported for all the regression models. Values in parenthesis below 
each coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm level. The t-value of the differences 
in the SIDR coefficients between SOEs and non-SOEs are presented separately. Detailed definitions of all 
variables are reported in Appendix A1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ind ROA 
Fraud and 
Lawsuit 
Ind ROA Fraud and Lawsuit 
 IV PSM 
SIDR 106.917*** -34.646*** 3.317* -0.304*** 
 (2.86) (-3.80) (1.74) (-2.96) 
Independence Ratio 20.547** -6.262*** 5.729 0.189 
 (2.36) (-3.20) (0.81) (0.55) 
Board Meeting Freq. 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.018*** 
 (0.30) (1.00) (0.09) (3.32) 
Board Size 0.214 -0.079** 0.052 -0.008 
 (1.06) (-2.36) (0.25) (-0.67) 
BTMV -0.531 0.074 1.223** -0.119*** 
 (-1.30) (0.94) (2.04) (-3.79) 
Ln(MV) -0.970* 0.067 0.158 -0.206*** 
 (-1.96) (0.66) (0.30) (-6.57) 
Ind ROA  0.015**  -0.005 
  (2.43)  (-1.10) 
CEO Duality -2.129** 0.394* -0.122 -0.199*** 
 (-2.17) (1.90) (-0.21) (-5.09) 
Top 10 Hold -0.084** 0.033*** 0.005 0.007*** 
 (-2.46) (4.36) (0.18) (4.94) 
Sales Growth 0.388** -0.108** -0.081 -0.003 
 (2.18) (-2.47) (-0.59) (-0.27) 
Leverage -6.176** 1.575*** -1.200 -0.314*** 
 (-2.43) (2.79) (-0.68) (-2.92) 
Constant 2.703 4.762*** -5.685 4.453*** 
 (0.44) (5.15) (-0.69) (9.80) 
 SIDR33  
SIDR_Ind_Avg_Lag1 -.0002   
 (-1.83)*   
No. of Shares Outstanding -.0133   
 (-3.32)***   
No. of Observations 16332 16332 6324 12468 
R2 NA NA 0.139 0.231 
F-Value/Chi2 8.429*** 565.70*** 10.250*** 2264.74*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
                                                             
33 To ensure there is significant correlation between the SIDR and the IVs, the results of a simple OLS between 
the SIDR and the IVs have been presented here. 
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Table 5.6 Effect of shareholder interlocked director ratio on fraud and lawsuits separately 
This table reports the probit regression results for the effect of the shareholder interlocked director ratio (SIDR) 
on regulatory enforcement against fraud and involvement in lawsuits, separately, for Chinese A-share listed 
firms from 2004 to 2015. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled across all the regression models. Pseudo 
R2 and chi2 values are reported for all regression models. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient are their 
respective robust t-statistics. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A1. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fraud Fraud Lawsuit Lawsuit 
SIDR -0.225** -0.186** -0.427*** -0.212* 
 (-2.40) (-1.97) (-3.54) (-1.77) 
Independence Ratio  -0.093  -0.010 
  (-0.31)  (-0.03) 
Board Meeting Freq.  0.018***  0.011* 
  (4.67)  (1.65) 
Board Size  0.014  -0.022 
  (1.42)  (-1.61) 
BTMV  -0.104***  -0.016 
  (-5.05)  (-0.44) 
Ln(MV)  -0.146***  -0.193*** 
  (-7.57)  (-4.83) 
Ind ROA  0.000  0.004 
  (0.30)  (0.96) 
CEO Duality  -0.055  -0.328*** 
  (-1.58)  (-6.50) 
Top 10 Hold  -0.001  0.011*** 
  (-1.15)  (5.26) 
Sales Growth  0.001  0.001 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Leverage  0.671***  -1.174*** 
  (7.63)  (-8.84) 
Constant -1.175*** 0.779** 1.990*** 5.885*** 
 (-15.67) (2.51) (17.91) (10.66) 
No. of Observations 16431 16431 16431 16431 
R2 0.032 0.049 0.502 0.544 
Chi2 278.84*** 455.34*** 2817.48*** 2632.20*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5.7 Effect of number of shareholder interlocked directors on performance and 
governance quality 
This table reports the panel OLS/probit regression results for the effect of the number of shareholder interlocked 
directors on the board, on the industry-adjusted ROA (Ind ROA) and on the fraud and lawsuits variable, for 
Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2015. Models 1 and 2 report the regression results for Ind ROA and 
clustered at firm and year level for the full sample, without and with control variables respectively. Models 3 
and 4 show the regression results for fraud and lawsuits and clustered at industry and year level. Pseudo 
R2/adjusted R2 and F-values/chi2 are reported for all regression models. Values in parenthesis below each 
coefficient are their respective robust t-statistics. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 
A1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ind ROA Ind ROA Fraud and Lawsuit Fraud and Lawsuit 
SID Total 0.304*** 0.284*** -0.053*** -0.023** 
 (3.31) (3.02) (-4.70) (-2.05) 
Independence Ratio  1.588  0.269 
  (0.57)  (0.80) 
Board Meeting Freq.  -0.008  0.015*** 
  (-0.21)  (2.70) 
Board Size  0.167*  -0.002 
  (1.76)  (-0.21) 
CEO Duality  -0.141  -0.289*** 
  (-0.55)  (-6.97) 
BTMV  0.371**  -0.088*** 
  (2.36)  (-3.05) 
Ln(MV)  0.200  -0.234*** 
  (0.79)  (-7.94) 
Top 10 Hold  -0.004  0.008*** 
  (-0.30)  (5.28) 
Sales Growth  -0.007  -0.001 
  (-0.11)  (-0.12) 
Leverage  -0.745  -0.396*** 
  (-0.88)  (-3.73) 
Ind ROA    0.002 
    (1.10) 
Constant 1.287*** -5.156 2.284*** 6.214*** 
 (7.43) (-1.15) (21.07) (14.57) 
No. of Observations 16431 16431 8457 7974 
R2 0.130 0.130 0.408 0.438 
F-Value/Chi2 81.710*** 45.277*** 3589.64*** 3375.50*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5.8 Effect of shareholder interlocked director ratio on tunneling, shareholder voting as 
well as outside director meeting attendance 
This table reports the panel OLS/probit regression results for the effect of the shareholder interlocked director 
ratio (SIDR) on tunneling, shareholder engagement in the shareholders’ meeting (measured by voting 
percentage), and outside directors’ board meeting absence, for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2015. 
Models 1 and 2 report results for the tunneling behavior as the dependent variable, without and with control 
variables respectively. Models 3 and 4 report OLS results for shareholder engagement as the dependent variable, 
without and with control variables respectively. Models 5 and 6 report probit results for outside directors’ board 
meeting absence as the dependent variable, without and with control variables respectively. Adjusted R2/pseudo 
R2 and F-values/chi2 values are reported for all regression models. Values in parenthesis below each coefficient 
are their respective robust t-statistics. Model 1 to 4 are clustered at firm and year level, Model 5 and 6 are 
clustered at industry and year level. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A1. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tunneling Tunneling Shareholder 
Vote PCT 
Shareholder 
Vote PCT 
OD 
Absence 
OD 
Absence 
SIDR -0.016** -0.016** 7.807*** 2.714*** -0.534*** -0.425*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.51) (6.33) (3.74) (-4.63) (-3.73) 
Independence Ratio  -0.061***  -3.309*  0.938*** 
  (-2.88)  (-1.77)  (2.68) 
Board Meeting Freq.  -0.001**  -0.066***  0.034*** 
  (-2.24)  (-2.69)  (7.64) 
Board Size  -0.000  0.324***  0.045*** 
  (-0.29)  (4.18)  (3.96) 
CEO Duality  0.002  0.063  -0.032 
  (0.88)  (0.23)  (-1.41) 
BTMV  -0.003**  0.316**  -0.163*** 
  (-2.15)  (2.22)  (-7.49) 
Ln(MV)  -0.004*  -1.042***  0.001 
  (-1.93)  (-5.03)  (0.59) 
Top 10 Hold  0.000  0.735***  -0.148*** 
  (0.09)  (61.17)  (-3.60) 
Sales Growth  0.000  -0.418***  0.006*** 
  (0.73)  (-5.35)  (4.92) 
Ind ROA  -0.000*  0.005  -0.002 
  (-1.72)  (1.05)  (-0.15) 
Leverage  -0.009  -2.798***  -0.600*** 
  (-0.97)  (-3.54)  (-5.29) 
Constant 0.005 0.103*** 62.337*** 22.618*** -1.567*** 0.225 
 (1.58) (2.62) (142.50) (6.25) (-17.49) (0.63) 
No. of Observations 16431 16431 16407 16407 16431 16431 
R2 0.001 0.005 0.239 0.558 0.072 0.098 
F-Value/Chi2 1.648*** 2.252*** 140.060*** 406.027*** 676.36*** 732.03*** 
Control Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 5.A1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
SIDR 
A ratio calculated by the number of directors also taking a dual role on the board of a 
shareholder company, divided by the original listed firm’s board size. 
Board Meeting Freq.  Number of times corporate board meetings took place in the financial year. 
Fraud_Lawsuit 
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm received at least one enforcement against 
fraud by the regulator or was involved in a lawsuit during the financial year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Fraud  
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm received at least one enforcement against 
fraud by the regulator during the financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
Lawsuit  
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm was involved in at least one lawsuit during 
the financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
OD Absence 
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if an outside director was absent from a board 
meeting during the financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
Independence Ratio Number of outside directors divided by the board size.  
CEO Duality 
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 
otherwise. 
Board Size Number of directors on the firm’s board at the end of the financial year. 
Top 10 Hold The percentage of the total shares outstanding that are held by the top 10 shareholders. 
BTMV  Book value divided by the market value of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Ln(MV)  Natural logarithm of the total market value of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the financial year.  
Sales Growth Growth in sales during the financial year compared to the previous year. 
Ind ROA 
Industry-adjusted return on assets, i.e. net income divided by the total assets of the 
current year minus the annual industry mean value. 
Tunneling A continuous variable equal to the residual of a regression measuring the level of 
tunneling from the listed firm  
 
Shareholder Vote PCT 
The annual average percentage of shareholders participating in the voting during a 
financial year. 
SOE  
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the government is the controlling shareholder in 
the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the impacts on corporate governance quality of in-meeting 
dissension by outside directors, the tenure of the corporate secretary, and director 
interlock with shareholder company boards. Chapter 3 discusses the whistleblower 
role of outside directors, in that their in-meeting activism can predict the incidence of 
regulatory enforcement for fraud, as captured by financial intermediations. Financial 
analysts lower the ratings of these companies in their reports, and mutual funds reduce 
their holdings in these companies. The results are robust using PSM to control potential 
self-selection bias and an instrumental variable approach. This chapter also shows the 
impacts of state ownership, outside director activism on CEO turnover, and financial 
analyst coverage. These findings provide evidence that, despite outside directors’ 
apparent inability to discipline the management team, their whistleblowing function 
could lead to the dissemination of negative information to markets and regulators, 
which effectively places executives under scrutiny. 
Chapter 4 discusses how the corporate secretary’s tenure is negatively associated 
with board meeting frequency, in-meeting dissension by outside directors, and the 
propensity for fraud and lawsuits. These results support the theoretical foundation 
established by McNulty and Stewart (2015), who show that the corporate secretary can 
have a significant influence on a company’s internal governance quality. The main 
findings are robust to potential endogeneity issues. Also tested were the impacts of 
tenure on the absence of outside directors from board meetings, on analyst coverage, 
and on the number of mutual funds, as well as on an array of different internal quality 
control measures. All results are consistent with the main findings. The results support 
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the importance of the corporate secretary and reinforce the need for academics, 
regulators, media, policy-makers, and practitioners to take corporate secretaries into 
account when evaluating corporate governance structure and effectiveness. 
Chapter 5 examines the impacts of the shareholder interlocked director ratio 
(SIDR) on company performance and governance quality. The results show that the 
SIDR has a positive relationship with industry-adjusted ROA and a negative 
relationship with fraud and lawsuits. These results are influenced by ownership type 
and are steadfast under several robustness checks such as the instrumental variable and 
propensity score matching approaches. These results suggest that an increase of 
shareholder interlocked directors could enhance company performance and help 
boards discipline management teams. Moreover, additional tests on tunneling 
behaviors, meeting attendance by outside directors, and shareholder meeting 
attendance further support this finding. These results open up a new subdimension for 
the study of director interlock with specific companies and urge regulators and market 
practitioners to use the SIDR as a positive indicator for board effectiveness. 
 Several implications can be obtained from the empirical results of the thesis. The 
results presented in Chapter 3 urge regulators and policy-makers to endow outside 
directors with more power, which can help turn outside directors from whistleblowers 
into real monitors. Moreover, more limits on absences and resignations by outside 
directors may also be helpful for outside directors to proactively address problematic 
proposals. The results presented in Chapter 4 advocates for companies and market 
participants to recognize the importance of the corporate secretary, to separate the 
assessment of corporate secretaries from CEOs, and to require companies to institute 
practical policies that enable corporate secretaries to better fulfill their duties. The 
results presented in Chapter 5 reveal the importance of shareholder interlocked 
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directors, and urge the market to recognize its impact on governance quality, as well 
as the importance of links between shareholders and boards. 
 This thesis has revealed several areas for further research. First, future research 
could take more steps towards examining the motivations for and consequences of 
whistleblowing by outside directors, especially regarding other characteristics that 
could affect the incidence of whistleblowing. Second, future research could use other 
characteristics of corporate secretaries to further explore their impact on governance 
quality and effectiveness. Lastly, scholars could further examine the impacts of having 
multiple directorships in other certain types of companies to see whether such 
interlocking could affect shareholder value. 
 
